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Cognitive behavioural models propose the way in which people with chronic fatigue 
syndrome (CFS) perceive and respond to symptoms and other illness-related information, 
contributes to the maintenance of fatigue and disability. Self-report studies exploring a 
number of these factors have proved fruitful. However, data regarding cognitions and 
behaviours that may occur at earlier, more implicit levels of processing is lacking. This 
thesis presents a series of experimental studies to investigate the manner in which people 
with CFS process information. The main work in this thesis is based on a large cross 
sectional cohort of people with CFS, compared to healthy controls; followed by a nested 
longitudinal study of the patients who underwent cognitive behavioural treatments for 
CFS, namely cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT) and graded exercise therapy (GET).  
 
Study 1: A systematic review of attention and interpretation biases found mixed evidence 
for information processing biases in CFS and highlights methodological issues in 
experimental design.  
 
Study 2: A published article addresses one of the key methodical issues highlighted in the 
review, the lack of illness-specific materials, by detailing a step-by-step process of 
comprehensive/robust stimuli development for experimental research. 
 
Study 3: A published quasi-experimental study indicates that, when using illness-specific 
materials, people with CFS (n=52) demonstrate attention and interpretation biases, 
compared to healthy individuals (n=51); which are associated with unhelpful responses 
to symptoms, but independent of comorbid mood disorder and attentional control deficits.  
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Study 4: A replication study with a Dutch cohort of CFS participants (n=38) indicates 
that cognitive biases are a robust finding across cultures and CFS populations, and 
confirms that these biases are independent of attentional control.  
 
Study 5: A nested longitudinal study (n=26) found that, pre-existing attentional biases, as 
well as a high capacity to develop an attentional bias (i.e. attention malleability), predicts 
better functioning, but not fatigue post treatment for CFS. Pre-treatment interpretation 
biases do not appear to predict treatment outcomes in CFS. 
 
Study 6: A small follow-up up study (n=20) found that attentional control capacity 
significantly improves following treatment for CFS. Whilst attention and interpretation 
biases did not significantly change across this treated sample, the degree to which they 
changed was associated with more helpful cognitions and behaviours.  
 
By exploring the more implicit factors within the cognitive behavioural model of CFS, 
this body of experimental work has added another dimension to the CFS literature and 
contributes to a more comprehensive and nuanced understanding of information 
processing in CFS.   
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Chapter 1 Introduction  
1.1 Chapter over-view 
This chapter introduces the key features of CFS, including a brief history of CFS, its 
various case definitions of CFS, prevalence, clinical presentation and aetiology. The 
controversy surrounding the definition and study of CFS is briefly summarised. This 
chapter then reviews empirical literature on the pathophysiology and treatment of CFS. 
Literature regarding the contribution of cognitive and behavioural factors in maintaining 
fatigue and disability in CFS are summarised.  
 
1.2 Introduction to Chronic Fatigue Syndrome  
Fatigue is the experience of extreme tiredness usually resulting from mental or physical 
exertion or illness. Fatigue is a common symptom; approximately 20% of patients in 
primary care present with  fatigue (Bates, et al., 1993; Buchwald, et al., 1995; Fuhrer, 
1994; Kroenke, Wood, Mangelsdorff, Meier, & Powell, 1988; Pawlikowska, et al., 1994) 
and approximately 13.6% of patients in this setting consider chronic fatigue their primary 
or secondary complaint (Cathébras, Robbins, Kirmayer, & Hayton, 1992). Most of these 
occurrences can be accounted for by medical or psychiatric diagnoses (Wessely, Chalder, 
Hirsch, Wallace, & Wright, 1997). However, there are a proportion of cases who continue 
to experience debilitating ongoing fatigue that cannot be otherwise medically explained. 
These cases account for between approximately  0.2% and 0.26% of the population 
(Johnston, Brenu, Staines, & Marshall-Gradisnik, 2013; Prins, van der Meer, & 
Bleijenberg, 2006). 
 
Of these cases of persistent fatigue, some may receive a diagnosis of chronic fatigue 
syndrome (CFS) (Fukuda, et al., 1994), or myalgic encephalomyelitis (ME), as it is often 
referred to in the UK (Steincamp, 1989). CFS is characterised by severe, debilitating and 
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enduring, mental and physical exhaustion (Fukuda, et al., 1994). This fatigue lasts for at 
least 6 months, is not alleviated by rest and is often accompanied by a range of other 
somatic and neuropsychiatric symptoms, such as muscle pain, sleep disturbance, memory 
and concentration problems (Fukuda, et al., 1994; Jason, et al., 1999; Sharpe, et al., 1991; 
Wearden & Appleby, 1997). CFS cannot be explained by any single diagnosis (Fukuda, 
et al., 1994; Sharpe, et al., 1991). The condition has been likened to an extreme and 
persistent flu whereby the individual cannot engage in daily activities and struggles to 
recover their energy levels after a period of activity, in some cases leaving patients bed-
bound. People with CFS report substantially higher levels of anxiety and depression than 
patients with other medical conditions (Cella, Sharpe, & Chalder, 2011b; Cella, White, 
Sharpe, & Chalder, 2013; Henningsen, Zimmermann, & Sattel, 2003; Skapinakis, Lewis, 
& Mavreas, 2003). Those with more symptoms report increased anxiety and depression 
(Skapinakis, et al., 2003).  
 
1.2.1 History of Chronic Fatigue Syndrome  
The concept of an illness primarily characterised by fatigue in not new. In fact the cluster 
of symptoms that describe CFS, as it’s known today, have existed for centuries under an 
array of illness labels and operational definitions (Shorter, 1993; Straus, 1991). Most 
memorably, George Beard (Beard, 1869) coined the termed ‘neurasthenia’; a condition 
of nervous exhaustion, characterised by mental and physical fatigue experienced on the 
slightest exertion; with headaches, gastrointestinal disturbances and various subjective 
sensations forming the primary somatic symptoms (Abbey & Garfinkel, 1991; Wessely, 
1991). Neurasthenia acquired credibility as a neurological condition and was a popular 
diagnosis for about 20 years, not only in the US but as far afield as Europe and East Asia 
(Ware & Kleinman, 1992). More recently, the complex cluster of symptoms implicated 
in these conditions have been referred to as myalgic encephalomyelitis (ME), chronic 
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mononucleosis syndrome, postviral fatigue syndrome, or chronic Ebstein-Barr Virus 
infection (Abbey & Garfinkel, 1991). These all form precursors of the condition now 
known as Chronic Fatigue Syndrome (CFS).  
 
1.2.2 Diagnostic criteria  
In 1987 the Centre for Disease Control (CDC) in the USA introduced the label of Chronic 
Fatigue Syndrome (CFS), in combination with a case definition, based on consensus 
opinion of leading researchers and clinicians. It was unanimously agreed that the term 
CFS was appropriate as it describes the central symptoms of the disorder while avoiding 
assumptions about aetiology (Demitrack & Abbey, 1996). This was in contrast with 
previous descriptors such as myalgic encephalomyelitis (ME) (Steincamp, 1989) which 
implies an organic origin and brain pathology, for instance (Sharpe, et al., 1991).  
 
The associated criteria was put forward to create a more homogenous group of patients 
for research purposes (Klonoff, 1992). The criteria were based on a distinct symptom 
profile and the careful exclusion of known medical and psychiatric entities, which have 
very similar symptom profiles to CFS. Thus, CFS as defined by Holmes, et al., (1988) 
was characterised by a new onset of fatigue lasting at least 6 months and causing 
reductions in activity levels by at least 50% compared to premorbid standards. In addition, 
8 of 11 minor symptoms, such as sore throat, muscle pain or neuropsychological 
complaints needed to be present for a diagnosis of CFS to be warranted. At the time this 
definition was proposed, it was theorized that viral illness was the primary aetiology of 
CFS; therefore, the criteria focused on physical symptoms.  
 
However, this new case definition was found to be too restrictive for clinical use (Klonoff, 
1992). For instance, the requirement of a 50% reduction of activity levels was not only 
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difficult to assess objectively, but, in turn, excluded patients with less severe presentations 
of symptoms; thereby failing to acknowledge the patients' illness experiences and not 
providing a label or diagnosis for presentations which were less severe or less typical 
(Straus, 1991). Furthermore, the exclusion of psychiatric disorders was problematic, as 
the presence of psychiatric disorders such as depression or anxiety may well be a result 
of the disabling illness (Skapinakis, Lewis, & Meltzer, 2000). 
 
In 1994 the CDC put forward a revised set of case criteria for CFS (Fukuda, et al., 1994). 
The new criteria maintained the main requirement of persistent or relapsing fatigue of 
more than six months’ duration. However, in addition, it specified a requirement for a 
smaller number of minor symptoms compared to the original CDC-1988 criteria, 
reducing the prerequisite number to 4 of 8. It was envisaged that this reduction in 
symptom criteria would avoid selecting patients with psychiatric disorders, which were 
considered to be associated with a higher incidence of physical complaints (Hyams, 
1998). Additionally, some previously specified minor symptoms were eliminated; such 
as low grade fever, generalised weakness and the requirement for acute onset of 
symptoms over a short period of time (Komaroff, et al., 1996b). The criteria provided a 
comprehensive list of potential comorbidities and specific exclusion of criteria (the full 
criteria is provided in Appendix A). The latter CDC-1994 case definition has proven 
influential and remains one of the most frequently used to date, in research, and clinical 
practice.  
 
Other groups of researchers such as Lloyd, Wakefield, Boughton, and Dwyer (1988) and 
Sharpe et al. (1991) put forward separate case definitions, termed the Australian and 
Oxford criteria, respectively. In terms of symptom requirements, the Oxford criteria are 
broader than either set of the CDC-1994 criteria. The Oxford criteria state that fatigue 
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should be severe, disabling and affect both mental and physical functioning, be present 
for at least 6 months’ duration, and more than 50% of the time. There is no requirement 
for additional minor symptoms, although the potential presence of symptoms such as 
myalgia, or mood and sleep disturbances is acknowledged (Sharpe, et al., 1991). 
Similarly, the required symptoms in the Australian definition are post-exertional malaise, 
substantial functional impairment and cognitive symptoms. No other additional 
symptoms are required. The Australian and Oxford criteria differ in that the Oxford 
requires a new onset of fatigue (i.e. not life-long) whereas the Australian definition does 
not.  
 
More recently, Carruthers, et al. (2003) put forward a Canadian clinical working case 
definition (or Canadian Consensus Criteria, CCC-2011) of CFS/ME. A revised version 
was presented as the International Consensus Criteria (ICC-2003) for ME (Carruthers, et 
al., 2011). The CCC-2003 and ICC-2011 claim to be more selective case definitions for 
the identification of patients with neuroimmune exhaustion. The main symptom is "post-
exertional neuroimmune exhaustion" (PENE) i.e. low stamina, rapid fatigability, 
symptom exacerbation, and variable onset with prolonged recovery. For a diagnosis of 
ME, PENE must also be accompanied by symptoms from neurological, immune/gastro-
intestinal/genitourinary, and energy metabolism/transport impairment categories, 
combined with at least a 50% reduction in activity, which is described as "mild". An 
important revision of the Canadian 2003 criteria was that the ICC-2011 dropped the 
required six-month waiting period before diagnosis.  
 
Most recently, the Institute of Medicine (IOM) proposed a new name and diagnostic 
criteria for CFS (Clayton, 2015). A new name was called for as many patient groups felt 
the term CFS did not accurately represent the severity of the condition and trivialised 
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their experience of the illness (Jason, Holbert, Torres-Harding, & Taylor, 2004; Sen, 
Sahoo, Aggarwal, & Singh, 2016; Twisk, 2016). The institute panel recommended that 
the illness be renamed “systemic exertion intolerance disease” (SEID). The term was 
developed in an attempt to reflect what patients, clinicians and researchers agree is a core 
symptom: a sustained depletion of energy following minimal activity, i.e. post-exertional 
malaise. The diagnostic criteria focus on the central symptoms of ME/CFS in order to 
make it easier for clinicians to recognize and accurately diagnose these patients in a 
timelier manner. The committee weighed several factors in reaching consensus on the 
diagnostic criteria: (1) the frequency and severity with which these symptoms were 
experienced by patients, (2) the strength of the scientific literature, and (3) the availability 
of objective measures supporting the association of particular symptoms with the 
diagnosis. The resulting core criteria were impaired function, post-exertional malaise and 
unrefreshing sleep; plus, either cognitive impairment and orthostatic intolerance (i.e. 
symptoms, such as light-headedness, that occur when upright, but are alleviated when 
reclining). Symptoms should be present for a minimum of 6 months, with moderate or 
greater frequency and severity, in order to make a diagnosis. 
 
Table 1 outlines the diagnostic criteria to date. A more detailed table comparing the 
diagnostic criteria is in Appendix A. Broadly, the existing diagnostic criteria focus on 
similar sets of symptoms, but they differ markedly in the number of symptoms required 
and how those symptoms are defined. For example, for a diagnosis of ME the CCC-2003 
(Carruthers, et al., 2003), and revised ICC-2011 (Carruthers, et al., 2011) criteria require 
post-exertional neuroimmune exhaustion (PENE); “a pathological inability to produce 
sufficient energy on demand with prominent symptoms primarily in the neuroimmune 
regions” (Carruthers, et al., 2003; page 329). This is similar to, but distinct from post-
exertional malaise; “worsening of a patient’s symptoms and function after exposure to 
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physical or cognitive stressors” (Committee on the Diagnostic Criteria for Myalgic 
Encephalomyelitis/Chronic Fatigue, Board on the Health of Select, & Institute of, 2015; 
page 78); which is a requirement for IOM criteria (Clayton, 2015) but only one of the 
minor, non-compulsory symptoms in the revised CDC-1994 definition (Fukuda, et al., 
1994).  
 
Despite the array of diagnostic criteria for CFS, the definition used extensively to define 
research populations remains the CDC-1994 (Fukuda, et al., 1994), perhaps because it is 
the most straightforward to use; requiring 4 of 8 listed symptoms alongside the core 
symptoms of mental and physical fatigue which are defined in their severity and 
frequency. It also provides a clear list of exclusionary criteria and potential comorbidities. 
The CDC-1994 (Fukuda et al., 1994) is also commonly used in clinical practice, alongside 
the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) guidelines (Baker & Shaw, 
2007; NICE, 2007). The NICE (2007) guidelines generally follow the CDC-1994 criteria, 
with the exception of duration of symptoms. NICE (2007) advises clinicians to diagnose 
patients with CFS after four months of persisting symptoms, rather than six, in order to 
reduce the delay in access to services and support. Though concerns have been raised as 
to whether the label of ‘chronic’ at an early stage of an illness is helpful (Chew-Graham, 
Dowrick, Wearden, Richardson, & Peters, 2010; Huibers & Wessely, 2006), qualitative 
interviews with people with CFS have found patients want a positive, early diagnosis and 
information on how to manage their symptoms (Bayliss, et al., 2014). The ICC 
(Carruthers, et al., 2011) is the only criteria not to define a minimum duration of 
symptoms before making a diagnosis, despite evidence that many other causes of similar 
fatigue are likely to become clear within this time frame (Jason, Sunnquist, Brown, Evans, 
Vernon, Frust & Simonis, 2014; Nisenbaum, Reyes, Mawle, & Reeves, 1998). Thus, the 
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lack of specify in a timeframe over which to rate the symptoms may inadvertently bring 
individuals without ME or CFS into patient samples.  
 
Some studies have empirically compared case definitions to assess whether they are 
defining the same or different groups of patients (Brurberg, Fønhus, Larun, Flottorp, & 
Malterud, 2014; Haney, et al., 2015; Jason, McManimen, Sunnquist, Brown, & Newton, 
2015; Jason, et al., 2016; Meeus, et al., 2016). A core argument of the newer case 
definitions (CCC-2003 and ICC-2011, IOM-2015) is that they capture a more specific set 
of patients, with a neuroimmunological condition. These patients are assumed to be  more 
fatigued and impaired than those identified by earlier case definitions such as the revised 
CDC (Fukuda, et al., 1994). However, there are mixed reports as to whether this is the 
case or not. A systematic review of case comparison studies found no empirical evidence 
to support this hypothesis for the Canadian definitions (CCC-2003 or ICC-2011) 
(Brurberg, et al., 2014); whereas, a subsequent review (Haney, et al., 2015) found 
application of the newer criteria (CCC-2003, ICC-2011 and IOM-2015) produces a more 
functionally impaired group than the CDC-1994 criteria. However, validation studies are 
generally methodologically weak and heterogeneous; some basing diagnoses on 
questionnaire responses only, others following detailed clinical interviews and laboratory 
testing (Brurberg, et al., 2014). The most cited case definition-the revised 1994 CDC 
criteria- is also the most extensively validated one. Whereas validation studies are few 
(CCC-2003; ICC-2011; IOM-2015) or missing (NICE, 2007) for recently presented case 




Table 1 Case definitions for CFS/ ME 
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* Postexertional immune disorder (PENE) as defined by Carruthers, et al., (2011) is a pathological inability to produce sufficient energy on demand with prominent 
symptoms primarily in the neuroimmune regions. Characteristics are as follows: 
 1. Marked, rapid physical and/or cognitive fatigability in response to exertion, which may be minimal such as activities of daily living or simple mental tasks, can be 
debilitating and cause a relapse. 
 2. Post-exertional symptom exacerbation: e.g. Acute flu-like symptoms, pain and worsening of other symptoms. 
 3. Post-exertional exhaustion may occur immediately after activity or be delayed by hours or days. 
 4. Recovery period is prolonged, usually taking 24 h or longer. A relapse can last days, weeks or longer. 
 5. Low threshold of physical and mental fatigability (lack of stamina) results in a substantial reduction in pre-illness activity level. 
Note: For a more detailed table of diagnostic criteria see Appendix A 
Table 1 (Continued) 





1.2.3.1 Prevalence  
The prevalence rate of CFS varies according to the diagnostic criteria used, the method 
of assessment and the population studied (Brurberg, et al., 2014; Johnston, et al., 2013). 
The 1994 CDC case definition remains the standard definition for CFS and appears to be 
the most reliable clinical assessment tool available (Brurberg, et al., 2014; Johnston, et 
al., 2013). Using the 1994 CDC Fukuda definition of CFS, the commonly assumed 
population prevalence rate is 0.2% to 0.26% of the population (Baker & Shaw, 2007). 
Few studies have assessed prevalence rates using the most recent and debated criteria 
(CCC-2003; ICC-2011; IOM-2015). A recent study compared a range of diagnostic 
criteria within a relatively small international sample (n=895), that was pre-selected for 
self-identifying as having CFS, ME/CFS or ME (Jason, et al., 2015). They found, of this 
pre-selected sample, 92% met the 1994 CDC criteria (Fukuda, et al., 1994), 88% met the 
IOM criteria for SEID (Clayton, 2015) and 60% met the ICC-2011 (Carruthers, et al., 
2011). However, this study provided no information on those who screened negative in 
the first place. We do not know whether some of those might have had a positive 
diagnosis if screened with one of the other case definitions.  
 
Whilst community settings find prevalence rates around 0.2% in the UK  (Nacul, et al., 
2011) and 0.24% in the US (Reyes, et al., 2003), prevalence rates in primary care settings 
are higher. Using the 1994 CDC criteria, a UK study conducted in primary care found 
prevalence of CFS of 2.6% or 0.5% when psychological morbidity was excluded 
(Wessely, et al., 1997). Similarly, high prevalence has been found in primary care across 
countries; the Netherlands (1%) (van’t Leven, Zielhuis, van der Meer, Verbeek, & 
Bleijenberg, 2010), US (0.3%) (Bates, et al., 1993), Brazil (1.6%) (Cho, Menezes, 
Hotopf, Bhugra, & Wessely, 2009), Japan (1.5%) (Kawakami, Iwata, Fujihara, & 




Kitamura, 1998), Korea (0.6%) (Kim, Shin, & Won, 2005) and  Iceland (1.4%) (Líndal, 
Stefánsson, & Bergmann, 2002).  It may be that those attending primary care clinics are 
a higher risk group than those in the general community. This is in contrast to the lower 
prevalence rates of CFS obtained from case reports, (Bazelmans, et al., 1997; Gunn, 
Connell, & Randall, 1993; Haines, Saidi, & Cooke, 2005; Versluis, de Waal, Opmeer, 
Petri, & Springer, 1997) suggesting that CFS may be subject to considerable 
underreporting.  
 
However, given the variation in sample strategies, response rate, strategies for non-
response adjustment, as well as the methods and rigor of assessment, prevalence studies 
cannot be directly compared. Even when using the same case definition and the same 
study sample, methods of applying the case definition can impact CFS classification 
(Unger, et al., 2016). For example, a meta-analysis of prevalence studies found that 
studies which employed self-report assessments yielded higher and more variable 
prevalence rates of CFS than clinical assessments (Johnston, et al., 2013).  
 
1.2.3.2 Demographic Characteristics  
Early studies suggested that individuals with CFS were more likely to be women, white 
and of higher socioeconomic status (Afari & Buchwald, 2003). However, more recent 
research suggests that CFS is much higher in Black and minority ethnic (BME) groups 
and those with lower socioeconomic status than previously thought (Dinos, et al., 2009; 
Hickie, et al., 2009). The finding of a higher prevalence of CFS in women than in men 
has been a consistent; with the ratio about 2:1 (Bakken, et al., 2014; Buchwald, Pearlman, 
Kith, & Schmaling, 1994; Cho, et al., 2009; Nacul, et al., 2011; Prins, et al., 2006; 
Skapinakis, et al., 2003). It has been suggested that this gender difference is an artefact 
of recruiting samples from specialist centres and reflects differences in illness behaviour 




and referral patterns (Richman & Jason, 2001). However, many community-based studies 
confirm this finding (Cella & Chalder, 2010; Jason, et al., 1999; Pawlikowska, et al., 
1994), which suggests that there may be a true gender difference. This difference does 
not seem to be explained by differences in psychological comorbidity (Pawlikowska, et 
al., 1994; Skapinakis, et al., 2000; Wessely, et al., 1997). Various predisposing 
vulnerabilities have been proposed to explain this finding; such as, endocrine and stress-
related factors. However, to date no singular factor has been identified (Buchwald, et al., 
1994).  
 
For adults the most common age of onset for CFS reported in the UK is between early 
20s to mid-40s (Jason, et al., 1999; Steele, et al., 1998). Similarly, a population based 
study in Norway identified the incidence of CFS onset in adults peaked between 30-39 
years (Bakken, et al., 2014). In sum, it seems CFS has a similar presentation across 
cultures, classes and ethnic groups. More women are diagnosed with CFS, however it is 




A high proportion of people with CFS also have comorbid diagnoses of anxiety, 
depression or both (Cella, et al., 2013; Henningsen, et al., 2003; Janssens, Zijlema, 
Joustra, & Rosmalen, 2015). About 25% of people with CFS have a current diagnosis of 
depression and 50%–75% of people with CFS have lifetime history of major depression 
(Afari & Buchwald, 2003). Levels of anxiety and depression in CFS are substantially 
higher than that found in the general population, or other similar medical conditions 
(Cella, et al., 2011b; Cella, et al., 2013; Henningsen, et al., 2003; Skapinakis, et al., 2003). 
However, there may be an over-estimation of the prevalence of psychiatric disorders in 




CFS, as many studies use methodologies to assess psychopathology which confound 
fatigue and other symptoms with mood disorders. For example, the Diagnostic Interview 
Schedule (Robbins, Cottler, & Keating, 1989), is most commonly used to assess 
comorbidity in CFS. It is a highly structured interview administered by lay interviewers, 
which, rigidly attributes unexplained symptoms, such as fatigue, to psychiatric causes. 
Indeed, several studies that have used an alternative diagnostic interview- the Structured 
Clinical Interview for DSM-III-R (Spitzer & Williams, 1988)- have found lower rates of 
psychiatric disorders in CFS  (Hickie, Lloyd, Wakefield, & Parker, 1990; Lloyd, Hickie, 
Boughton, Spencer, & Wakefield, 1990; Taylor & Jason, 1998). This may be due to the 
fact that the latter diagnostic interview is administered by a trained clinician and is semi-
structured, thus allowing for more nuanced responses.  
 
The high prevalence and premorbid levels of psychopathology in CFS, combined with 
lack of a consistent physiological marker, has led some researchers to argue that CFS is 
a manifestation of a psychiatric condition (Greenberg, 1990; Manu, Lane, & Matthews, 
1993; Manu, et al., 1989; Stewart, 1990). However, subsequent research has identified 
that, whilst there is considerable overlap between some psychiatric disorders and CFS (in 
particular anxiety and depression) they are most likely distinct entities (Griffith & 
Zarrouf, 2008). The presentation of CFS differs from that of anxiety or depression; 
primary symptoms of CFS such as post exertional malaise and sore throat, are not typical 
of psychiatric disorders, and symptoms typical of psychiatric disorder are not always 
present in CFS (Griffith & Zarrouf, 2008). Furthermore, people with CFS and depression 
think about and respond to their symptoms differently (Moss-Morris & Petrie, 2001). 
People with depression tend to have low self-esteem, and generally negative cognitive 
styles; whereas, people with CFS are more specifically concerned with physical illness 
and tend to respond to symptoms by limiting stress and activity levels activities (Moss-




Morris & Petrie, 2001). Furthermore, antidepressant medications do not have an effect 
on CFS as they do with depression (Vercoulen, et al., 1996; Wearden, et al., 1998). 
Studies of phenomenology also discriminate between psychiatric conditions and CFS; 
indicating that discrete physiological abnormalities that can distinguish CFS from 
depression and anxiety (Cho, et al., 2006). It may be that psychiatric comorbidity occurs 
in response to CFS. Indeed, anxiety and depression are common emotional responses to 
medical illness generally (Vercoulen, et al., 1996). The particularly high rates of anxiety 
and depression in CFS compared to other chronic conditions (Cella et al., 2013; 
Skapinakis, et al., 2003) may be reflective of the lack of illness legitimization experienced 
by many patients (Lehman, Lehman, Hemphill, Mandel, & Cooper, 2002). Thus, whilst 
anxiety and depression are risk factors for developing CFS, and have some overlap with 
the condition, they are likely to be distinct entities.  
 
There is also considerable overlap between CFS and other medically unexplained 
conditions such as, fibromyalgia, chronic pain, multiple chemical sensitivities and 
irritable bowel syndrome (Aaron & Buchwald, 2001; Geisser, et al., 2008; Skapinakis, et 
al., 2000; Whitehead, Palsson, & Jones, 2002). These conditions and other chronic multi-
symptom illnesses frequently co-occur and share common associated factors, such as 
pain, fatigue, sleep disturbance, and memory problems (Aaron & Buchwald, 2001; 
Geisser, et al., 2008). It has been argued that in many cases these disorders are 
indistinguishable and debate has centred on whether these disorders should be defined as 
separate entities or whether in fact there should be an overarching definition which 
incorporates all of the syndromes (Fink & Schröder, 2010; Moss-Morris & Spence, 2006; 
Nimnuan, Rabe-Hesketh, Wessely, & Hotopf, 2001; Wessely, Nimnuan, & Sharpe, 1999; 
Wessely & White, 2004). Similarly to the comorbidity with depression; although 
similarities between conditions have been documented, there is also evidence that they 




differ; specifically in their onset and symptom profile (White, 2010). For example, several 
prospective studies have identified that CFS and IBS are triggered by different factors; 
CFS by viral infection and IBS by a gastroenteritis (Hamilton, Gallagher, Thomas, & 
White, 2009; Moss-Morris & Spence, 2006). Furthermore, CFS is predominantly 
characterised by post-exertional malaise, which may or may not be accompanied by 
abdominal discomfort (Maes, Leunis, Geffard, & Berk, 2014; Whitehead, et al., 2002).  
 
Several researchers propose that those with CFS and other comorbid somatic conditions, 
such as IBS and fibromyalgia, represent a subgroup of CFS patients (Hadzi-Pavlovic, et 
al., 2000; Williams, Chalder, Sharpe, & White, 2017), who also show increased symptom 
severity, disability (Creed, et al., 2013; Williams, et al., 2017), anxiety and depression 
(Janssens, et al., 2015). Indeed, CFS has been described as a heterogeneous condition and 
researchers have defined subgroups by a diverse range of characteristics; including 
specific symptoms (Hickie, et al., 1995; Wilson, et al., 2001), biological variables (e.g. 
body mass index and sleep disturbance (Aslakson, Vollmer-Conna, Reeves, & White, 
2009; Aslakson, Vollmer-Conna, & White, 2006; Vollmer-Conna, Aslakson, & White, 
2006), mood (Harvey, Wessely, Kuh, & Hotopf, 2009; Hirsch & Wallace, 1996; 
Williams, et al., 2017) self-efficacy and behavioural patterns (Williams, et al., 2017). This 
demonstrates the heterogeneity in the presentation of CFS. There is also heterogeneity in 
the aetiology of CFS.  
 
1.2.5 Aetiology  
Self-report studies have found that people with CFS identify a variety of factors as 
triggers for the initial symptoms; such as episodes of infection (57.9%, of which 74% 
were reported as viral infections), psychological stress (24.8%), trauma or surgery 




(11.3%), and other factors (6.0%) (Nacul, et al., 2011). These and other factors have been 
explored by empirical research, attempting to identify the aetiology of CFS.  
 
1.2.5.1 Genetic studies 
Twin studies have found some evidence for a familial predisposition for chronic fatigue 
(Buchwald, et al., 2001; Claypoole, et al., 2007; Schur, Afari, Goldberg, Buchwald, & 
Sullivan, 2007; Sullivan, Pedersen, Jacks, & Evengard, 2005). A study with female twins 
pairs, found the concordance of twins meeting the 1994 CDC criteria for CFS (Fukuda, 
et al., 1994) was higher in monozygotic than dizygotic twins (38% versus 11%) 
(Buchwald, et al., 2001). The discordance was accounted for by additive genetic factors 
as well as common environmental effects (they each explain around 40% of the 
discordance). A later study by  Schur, et al. (2007), included both male and female twins 
and found intriguing differences in the patterns of genetic influences for women and men. 
In women, correlations for prolonged (self-reported fatigue present for ≥1 month) and 
chronic fatigue (self-reported fatigue present for ≥6 months) were quite similar for 
monozygotic and dizygotic pairs; suggesting predominantly environmental influences in 
chronic fatigue in women. This finding was in contrast to the much higher correlations in 
male monozygotic pairs than in male dizygotic pairs; suggesting a predominantly genetic 
influence in chronic fatigue in men. However, the findings from this study are 
inconsistent with other twin studies in Sweden (Sullivan, et al., 2005) and the US 
(Furberg, et al., 2005). The discrepancy may be due to methodological issues; for example 
Schur, et al. ’s (2007) sample was predominantly female and smaller than either Sullivan, 
et al. (2005) or Furberg, et al. (2007). Further studies are needed to establish whether 
there are gender differences in genetic and environmental contributors for fatigue.  
 




These studies provide some evidence for a partly genetic component of CFS. However, 
whether this represents a true genetic origin of CFS is unclear. It may be that these studies 
are detecting a genetic predisposition to distress, which in turn increases the risk of CFS. 
Indeed, a another much larger twin cohort study by Kato, Sullivan, Evengård, and 
Pedersen (2006) identified personality traits of emotional instability and distress were 
also linked to a genetic predisposition to CFS. Whilst there is some basis for a genetic 
link to CFS, a review by Cho, Skowera, Cleare, and Wessely (2006) argues that 
environmental effects are still predominant. At this stage the identification of specific 
genes is still a long way off (Kerr, et al., 2008). In order to reliably detect any genotypic 
risks, genetic studies need to recruit much larger clinical and control samples and state 
priori hypothesis, rather than gene scanning.  
 
1.2.5.2 Neuroendocrine studies 
Some of the most robust findings concerning the pathophysiology of CFS have been 
related to the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal (HPA) axis. The HPA axis is under 
homeostatic control and regulates many of the body’s systems, including the 
cardiovascular, immune and central nervous systems (Tsigos & Chrousos, 2002). One of 
the hormones synthesised and secreted as a consequence of HPA axis function is cortisol, 
a glucocorticoid released in response to stress. A number of studies have shown that, 
compared to healthy individuals, people with CFS demonstrate a down-regulation of the 
HPA axis, evidenced by reduced cortisol in response to waking and a blunted HPA 
response to challenge (Cleare, 2004; Papadopoulos & Cleare, 2012; Powell, Liossi, 
Moss-Morris, & Schlotz, 2013; Roberts, Wessely, Chalder, Papadopoulos, & Cleare, 
2004; Tak, et al., 2011; Tomas, Newton, & Watson, 2013). About one third of patients 
with CFS exhibit hypocortisolism (i.e. low cortisol levels) (Nater, et al., 2008a; Nater, et 
al., 2008b; Parker, Wessely, & Cleare, 2001) and treating people with CFS with cortisol 




replacement seems to temporarily lessen fatigue (Cleare, et al., 2001). These findings 
strengthen support for an association between HPA axis dysregulation and CFS.  
 
However, results are not always consistent (Cleare, 2004; Gaab, et al., 2004; Gaab, et al., 
2005) and not everyone with CFS shows HPA dysfunction (Parker, et al., 2001). 
Furthermore, the direction of this relationship is unclear (Tomas, et al., 2013). It may be 
that for some people neurobiological changes are triggered by a prolonged or early stress 
response and then in-turn contribute to symptomology. Indeed, studies show a reduced 
cortisol response in people with CFS who had a history of childhood trauma or early life 
stress (Heim, et al., 2009; Van Den Eede, Moorkens, Van Houdenhove, Cosyns, & Claes, 
2007); and prospective studies have identified that abuse in childhood and major life 
events are significant risk factors in developing CFS (Fries, Hesse, Hellhammer, & 
Hellhammer, 2005; Nater, et al., 2008a; Taylor & Jason, 2001).  
 
Conversely, it may be that for some people with CFS neurobiological changes occur in 
at later stages of the illness, in response to certain symptoms or behavioural changes, i.e. 
sleep disturbance, physical inactivity, deconditioning (Cleare, 2004). Indeed, studies have 
found hypocortisolism is more prominent in patients with a longer duration of illness 
(Cleare, 2004; Gaab, et al., 2004). Furthermore, behavioural treatments seem to increase 
cortisol levels. Roberts, Papadopoulos, Wessely, Chalder, and Cleare (2009) showed that 
patients who clinically improved followed CBT, showed a significant rise in cortisol 
levels post-treatment. Similarly, Hall, et al. (2014) found a stress management program 
for people with CFS, resulted in reduced post-exertional malaise which was mediated by 
greater cortisol awakening response. Thus, HPA dysregulation does appear to be 
implicated in CFS but it may not necessarily have a causal effect.  
 




1.2.5.3 Immune system abnormalities 
Despite many studies of the immune system in CFS, few consistent results have emerged 
(Lyall, Peakman, & Wessely, 2003). The most frequently studied immune changes in 
CFS are in relation to enhanced inflammatory cytokines and T-cells, and deficient natural 
killer cell count and function (e.g. Caligiuri, et al., 1987; Kishimoto, Akira, Narazaki, & 
Taga, 1995; MacDonald, et al., 1996; Tirelli, Marotta, Improta, & Pinto, 1994; Tomoda, 
et al., 2005). The results of these studies suggest that people with CFS may have chronic 
low-level immune system activation. Given that the HPA axis is involved in regulating 
the immune system (amongst others), researchers have investigated immune responses 
during and after stress. Findings indicate that people with CFS have different immune 
responses following stress than healthy controls (Gaab, et al., 2004; Gaab, et al., 2005; 
Wood, Bentall, Gopfert, Dewey, & Edwards, 1994). Although, to what extent these 
abnormalities relate to symptoms remains unclear. Furthermore, a comprehensive review 
of immunological studies in CFS indicated that no clear pattern emerges when data are 
viewed collectively and some findings may be erroneous (Lyall, et al., 2003). While CFS 
may be related to some immunological dysfunction (in particular changes in T cell 
number, function and activation), there are a number of inconsistencies in the literature 
that should be interpreted with caution.  
 
1.2.5.4 Infectious agents 
Many patients predate the onset of CFS to an acute infective episode (Nacul, et al., 2011). 
This led to a number of early studies attempting to pin down the assumed viral pathogen 
of CFS. Of particular interest was Epstein-Barr virus (EBV), a latent and largely 
ubiquitous tumourogenic herpes virus that has been implicated in a wide range of 
illnesses, such as Hodgkin’s disease and B lymphoproliferative disease. It most 
commonly causes infectious mononucleosis (IM), which is often referred to as glandular 




fever (Macsween and Crawford, 2003). Early, retrospective, case control studies 
implicated increased EBV titres (indicative of a possible EBV infection), as a causal 
factor in CFS (Hellinger, et al., 1988; Holmes, et al., 1987; Straus, et al., 1985). However, 
results were inconsistent and subsequent well-designed prospective studies have found 
little evidence of a relationship between CFS and EBV titres (Buchwald & Komaroff, 
1991; Matthews, Lane, & Manu, 1991).  
 
Whilst studies have found little evidence that EBV titres play a role in CFS it seems the 
clinical manifestation of EBV, i.e. glandular fever, does. Glandular fever is an acute 
illness characterised by fatigue, sore throat, tender lymph nodes and fever. It usually 
resolves within two to four weeks (Rea, Russo, Katon, Ashley, & Buchwald, 2001). 
Prospective studies show that around 12 % of adults and adolescents who experience 
glandular fever, do not fully recover and subsequently develop CFS (Hickie, et al., 2006; 
Katz, Shiraishi, Mears, Binns, & Taylor, 2009; Petersen, Thomas, Hamilton, & White, 
2006; White, et al., 2001). A handful of studies have also reported CFS after cases of 
other severe infections such as Q fever, parvovirus and Lyme disease (Cleare, et al., 1995; 
Demitrack, 1997; Hickie, et al., 2006; Torpy, et al., 2001; Wildman, et al., 2002). 
However, cases do not seem to occur after common infective episodes (e.g. influenza) 
(Wessely, et al., 1995).  
 
Thus, it seems that not one but several, viral as well as bacterial infections, predict the 
onset of CFS. Antiviral medications, successful in treating these infections, do not seem 
to be effective at treating the associated CFS (Bou-Holaigah, Rowe, Kan, & Calkins, 
1995; Chambers, Bagnall, Hempel, & Forbes, 2006; Freeman & Komaroff, 1997; Rowe, 
Bou-Holaigah, Kan, & Calkins, 1995), indicating that though the virus may trigger CFS, 
it is not necessarily maintaining it. Furthermore, in a study by Cameron, et al. (2006) 




people with glandular fever who developed post infective CFS did not differ from those 
who didn’t when analysing viral load and antiviral immune response. Thus, whilst some 
immunological factors may trigger the initial fatigue for some individuals (Moss-Morris 
& Spence, 2006; White, et al., 2001), and some neurobiological differences associated 
with the syndrome exist (Cleare, 2004; Roberts, et al., 2004), to date no single 
immunological marker for CFS has been identified. These findings suggest that, whilst 
the experience of an acute infection may be an important factor in the onset of CFS, other 
risk factors may interact with the virus to trigger and maintain symptoms.  
 
1.2.5.5 Psychosocial predictors of post infectious fatigue  
Patients who experience an acute episode of acute infection, such as glandular fever, 
provide an ideal group with which to prospectively examine other risk factors in the onset 
of CFS. Prospective studies have identified that how an individual responds to symptoms 
and conceptualises the virus at the time of infection, is important for predicting 
subsequent onset of CFS. For example, spending more days in bed (Jason, Katz, Shiraishi, 
Mears, Im & Taylor, 2014) and engaging in oscillating all-or-nothing patterns of activity 
during an infection (Moss-Morris, Spence, & Hou, 2011), increase the risk of post 
infectious fatigue. Furthermore, expecting that the virus will take a long time to recover 
from and anticipating that it will have serious consequences, also increases the likelihood 
of developing CFS (Candy, et al., 2003; Moss-Morris, et al., 2011).  
 
The advantage of exploring these cognitive and behavioural responses to symptoms is 
that they are amenable to change, and could therefore be useful to target. A study by 
Candy, Chalder, Cleare, Wessely, and Hotopf (2004) tested this hypothesis. They 
provided a brief, nurse administered, psychoeducational package to patients shortly after 
onset of glandular fever. The package provided information about the condition and 




advice about management. The findings were promising; the psychoeducational package 
significantly reduced the number of people who went on to develop CFS six months later, 
when compared to the treatment as usual control group (Candy, et al., 2004). This study 
illustrates the potential for cognitive and behavioural factors to play a key role in the onset 
of chronic fatigue. Research, such as this, exploring amenable factors involved in the 
development and perpetuation of symptoms, has been the corner stone for the 
development of effective, evidence based, cognitive and behavioural treatments for CFS 
(discussed in section 1.5). 
 
1.2.5.1 Predisposing factors  
Evidence suggests that people with a history of psychopathology or elevated premorbid 
distress are predisposed or more at risk for illnesses such as CFS. Two prospective studies 
of British birth cohorts (1946 and 1958), found that people who had a prior experience of 
a psychiatric disorder in adulthood, particularly anxiety or depression, had a two-fold 
increase in the risk of developing CFS (Clark, Goodwin, Stansfeld, Hotopf, & White, 
2011; Harvey, Wadsworth, Wessely, & Hotopf, 2008). Furthermore, prospective studies 
of individuals who had a viral infection indicate that those most likely to go on to develop 
CFS had higher premorbid levels of distress, depression and anxiety; and these factors 
were more predictive of CFS onset than the virus itself (Moss-Morris & Spence, 2006; 
Wessely, et al., 1995; White, et al., 2001). These findings have been linked to a genetic 
predisposition to distress  (as discussed in 1.2.5.1).  
 
Another key predictor of CFS onset is premorbid activity levels. A large UK birth cohort 
study of data collected in 1970, found childhood experiences of a limiting illness and 
sedentary lifestyles were predictors of fatigue later in life (Viner & Hotopf, 2004); 
suggesting that learnt experiences at an early age shape how a person copes with illness 




in adulthood. However, conversely data from the British birth cohort studies in 1946 and 
1958, found that those who were more physically active in childhood and adulthood and 
continued to be active after the initial onset of fatigue, were more likely to develop CFS 
(Clark, et al., 2011; Harvey, et al., 2008). The latter finding coincides with patients 
accounts of themselves pre-CFS as being highly active and very driven, and having an 
‘over-active’ lifestyle compared to controls (Van Houdenhove, Neerinckx, Onghena, 
Lysens, & Vertommen, 2001). Some studies have indicated a link between these high 
levels of activity and the personality characteristic of perfectionism (Van Houdenhove, 
et al., 2001). Findings from cross-sectional and post-infectious prospective studies 
suggest that those with negative perfectionism (characterised by particularly high 
standards and expectations of themselves) are more likely to develop CFS (Deary & 
Chalder, 2010; Luyten, Van Houdenhove, Cosyns, & Van den Broeck, 2006; Moss-
Morris, et al., 2011; White & Schweitzer, 2000). 
 
Other studies of personality in CFS, have indicated people with CFS score highly on 
neuroticism (Blakely, et al., 1991; Buckley, et al., 1999; Fiedler, et al., 2000; Johnson, 
DeLuca, & Natelson, 1996; Masuda, Munemoto, Yamanaka, Takei, & Tei, 2002; 
Taillefer, Kirmayer, Robbins, & Lasry, 2003); however, it is difficult to draw general 
conclusions from this data as study methods, patient populations, control groups and CFS 
case definitions vary. A review of the personality studies in CFS suggests that, whilst 
personality is an important factor to investigate in CFS, studies should move away from 
a narrow focus on trait personality factors or disorders, and begin to consider how 
personality may evolve and change in response an individual’s environment (van Geelen, 
Sinnema, Hermans, & Kuis, 2007). Indeed multiple studies have now provided evidence 
that personality traits change across the life-span (Helson, Jones, & Kwan, 2002; Roberts, 
Walton, & Viechtbauer, 2006) and a recent systematic review has indicated that 




psychological treatments can change personality traits, in particular emotional stability 
and extraversion were identified as most amenable to change (Roberts, et al., 2017). 
Research still needs to establish whether these multidimensional aspects of personality 
play a role in CFS and explore whether there are critical phases, when changing 
personality structures may interact with or precipitate the onset of CFS. For instance, 
during an acute illness whereby a person’s sense of identity may be challenged. 
 
These studies indicate that a diverse range of physiological and psychological factors may 
predispose or precipitate CFS. It is likely that many of these factors interact; for example 
predisposing genetics, personality factors, infection and distress may all, to varying 
degrees, affect neurobiological mechanisms. The relative weight of each of these 
components in predicting CFS onset may vary according to individual and environmental 
factors. In sum, it seems unlikely that CFS is caused by a single agent.  
 
1.2.6  Controversy 
The exploration of psychological factors in CFS has sparked fierce debate about the 
aetiology of CFS, namely whether it is physical or psychological in its nature. This is 
reflected in the contention about the case definitions and terminology of CFS (as 
discussed under ‘diagnostic criteria’ section 1.2.2). For example, the Oxford-1991 
(Sharpe, et al., 1991), CDC-1994 (Fukuda, et al., 1994) and NICE-2007 have been 
criticised, especially by patient organisations, for undue overlap with psychopathology. 
Proponents of the recent Canadian case definitions, (CCC-2003; Carruthers, et al., 2003 
and ICC-2011; Carruthers, et al., 2011), claim to achieve a narrow selection of patients 
with ME conforming to a hypothesised specific pathophysiology. However, Brurberg, et 
al. (2014) demonstrated that these case definitions do not necessarily exclude patients 
with psychopathology. As outlined earlier in this chapter (section 1.2.2). 





The proposed terminology of CFS is also hotly debated. The newest label- systematic 
exertion intolerance disorder (SEID)-proposed by the IOM (Clayton, 2015), was an 
attempt to appease patient groups who championed a more ‘biological’ term, whilst 
refraining from making unfounded assumptions about the aetiology of the condition. 
However, the proposed new terminology is still not acceptable to many of those 
diagnosed with this syndrome or advocates of a purely biological aetiology (Sen, Sahoo, 
Aggarwal, & Singh, 2016; Twisk, 2016a, 2016b). Many patient groups still prefer the 
term myalgic encephalomyelitis (ME), a term which eludes to inflammation of the central 
nervous system (myelitis) (Evengård, Schacterle, & Komaroff, 1999; Ramsay, 1988).  
 
If current definitions are referring to a similar group of patients with the same core 
symptoms does it matter which terminology of ME/ CFS/ SEID is used? A study 
comparing the prognosis of different diagnostic labels of fatigue found that patients with 
ME had the worst prognosis while patients with ‘postviral fatigue syndrome’ had the best 
(Hamilton, et al., 2009). This could mean that the patients destined to the worst prognosis 
were labelled with the ME diagnosis, or it might be explained as an adverse effect of 
being labelled with ME. Research points to the latter conclusion. Studies show that those 
who attribute the cause of symptoms fixedly to an exclusive organic origin or label 
themselves as having ‘ME’, engage in reduced physical activity and report worse fatigue 
than those who attribute symptoms to other factors (Vercoulen et al., 1998; Wilson et al., 
1994; Chalder, Power, & Wessely, 1996). Thus, it seems that the terminology of 
CFS/ME/SEID does matter; as terminology is inextricably linked with how an individual 
conceptualises their illness and responds to symptoms (i.e. monitoring symptoms and 
avoiding activity), which in turn influences the experience of fatigue and disability.  
 




It is important to bear in mind that these illness attributions are formed in the context of 
the high profile controversy around the aetiology of CFS. A UK survey published in 2013 
identified that 89% of patient organisations thought the illness is physical, compared with 
58% of newspaper articles and 24% of medical authorities (Hossenbaccus & White, 
2013). Patients may form illness attributions based on these sources of information, 
perhaps in the absence of, or indeed in spite of the medical profession. Numerous authors 
have highlighted how a poor or absent relationship with a general practitioner can 
reinforce unhelpful illness behaviour and symptom interpretations (Dowrick, Ring, 
Humphris, & Salmon, 2004; Nimnuan, Hotopf, & Wessely, 2000; Salmon, Dowrick, 
Ring, & Humphris, 2004; Simon, VonKorff, Piccinelli, Fullerton, & Ormel, 1999). Many 
patients with CFS report dissatisfaction with their care (Deale & Wessely, 2001) and GPs 
report feeling ill equipped to make a diagnosis of CFS/ME (Chew-Graham, Dowrick, 
Wearden, Richardson, & Peters, 2010). These factors are likely to cause delays in 
treatment and reinforce the patient’s belief that there is single, toxic, organic and 
undiscovered cause for their symptoms.  
 
 
Clearly trying to categorize illnesses into either biological or psychological models has 
created division among healthcare professionals and patients. This illustrates the 
importance of the biopsychosocial model, first expressed by George Engel (Engel, 1980). 
The advantage of this model is that it moves away from the traditional biomedical models 
of illness, which focus on discovering the pathology. Rather it focuses on understanding 
the illness and emphasises that disease is only one factor contributing to illness and illness 
behaviour. Indeed, most medical disorders have a complex aetiology, and, as with most 
illnesses, psychological and social factors can be important in understanding illness and 
helping patients recover.  





1.3 Cognitive behavioural model of CFS  
The biopsychosocial model of CFS proposes that CFS is caused by a complex interaction 
between biological, affective, behavioural and cognitive factors (Vercoulen, et al., 1998). 
The bio-psychosocial framework has been elaborated in Cognitive Behavioural (CB) 
models, which suggest that certain individuals are predisposed to CFS by a range of 
factors, such as genetic vulnerabilities, premorbid psychopathology and some immune 
abnormalities (discussed in section 1.2.5). For these predisposed individuals fatigue may 
be triggered by an organic insult (such as a virus), stress or social factors, and is 
subsequently maintained by a cycle of cognitive, behavioural and emotional responses. 
This formulation was later expanded into predisposing, precipitating and perpetuating 
factors (Surawy, Hackmann, Hawton, & Sharpe, 1995).  
 
1.3.1 Predisposing factors 
According to the CB model of CFS, the aetiological factors identified by genetic, 
immunological and prospective studies (outlined in section 1.2.5) may make an 
individual more vulnerable to developing CFS but are unlikely to be the main factors that 
drive or maintain the illness. These predisposing factors are thought to include; an 
experience of a severe illness (such as glandular fever) (Hickie, et al., 2006), a genetic 
predisposition to distress (Buchwald, et al., 2001), premorbid psychopathology (Clark, et 
al., 2011), high levels of  negative perfectionism (Deary & Chalder, 2010; White & 
Schweitzer, 2000), neuroticism and chronic stress (Kato, et al., 2006) as well as childhood 
experiences, such as abuse (Heim, et al., 2009) and having a limiting illness (Viner & 
Hotopf, 2004).  
 




1.3.2 Precipitating factors 
Precipitating factors are factors proposed to trigger the initial symptoms. Prospective 
studies (discussed earlier in this chapter, section 1.2.5.4), have identified that the 
experience of a serious infection can trigger CFS for some people. Numerous studies have 
also identified major life events, such as divorce, job loss, death of close relative or friend, 
as clear precipitating factors in CFS (Deary, Chalder, & Sharpe, 2007; Hatcher & House, 
2003). Chronic life difficulties, such as work problems and ill health in the immediate 
family, also increase the risk of CFS and be a trigger for some people (Hatcher & House, 
2003). The CB model proposes that a toxic combination of predisposing and precipitating 
factors leads to the development of the initial symptoms of extreme fatigue. For example, 
dealing with chronic stress combined with a lack of social support leaves someone 
vulnerable to developing CFS and may precipitate its onset. Indeed, a study of patients 
who consulted primary care for fatigue, found a fast recovery in male patients, who were 
not providing care to others (e.g. older people or primary carer of children) and reported 
better perceived health, and fewer (serious) prolonged difficulties (Nijrolder, van der 
Windt, & van der Horst, 2009). Conversely, a more chronic course of fatigue was 
predicted by baseline pain intensity and less social support (Nijrolder, et al., 2009). The 
CB model proposes that these diverse factors can predispose some people to developing 
CFS and may play a role in triggering the initial symptoms.  
 
1.3.3 Perpetuating factors 
According to the CB model, in most individuals, symptoms cease when the trigger (e.g. 
a virus or stressful event) disappears or lessens. However, in some cases, especially for 
those who are vulnerable to develop CFS, perpetuating factors can cause the persistence 
of symptoms long after the initial trigger has abated. Precipitating factors include an 
individual’s interpretation of symptoms as well as their cognitive, behavioural and 




emotional responses to symptoms (Deary, et al., 2007; Vercoulen, et al., 1998). For 
example, when faced with an acute infection or excessive stress, a predisposed individual 
may respond by continuing to press on in order to achieve their high standards (e.g. 
negative perfectionism). This behaviour may lead to on-going symptoms, which are more 
closely related to pushing too hard than to the initial insult or injury. The individual may 
interpret symptoms as a sign of ongoing physical illness and, concerned they have not 
recovered within the timeframe they would expect, begin to monitor their symptoms and 
engage in illness behaviours, resting for longer periods in an attempt to recover. However, 
reduced activity conflicts with individuals’ high standards and, in an attempt to meet 
expectations, they may engage in periodic bursts of activity, which ultimately exasperates 
symptoms and disability. In this way the CB model proposes that cognitive and 
behavioural factors play an important role in maintaining fatigue and disability in CFS 
(Figure 1).  
 




Figure 1 Boom and bust cycle of activity in CFS  
 
These cognitive and behavioural responses to symptoms can result in further fear and 
avoidance of activity (fear avoidance) and physical deconditioning (i.e. loss of muscle 
and fitness). The person may become sensitized to lower levels of external stress and and, 
attributing symptoms to an unknown but organic origin, become hypervigilant for signs 
of illness. When the individual attempts to resume activates they experience normal signs 
of increased physiological arousal (e.g. aching muscles and fatigue after exertion), 
however, having reduced their activity levels they may misinterpret these signals as 
further evidence of illness. Over-time CFS patients may perceive the condition in an 
increasingly negative way, attributing a wide range of symptoms to the illness and 




believing symptoms to be harmful, uncontrollable and incurable. Thus, begin the vicious 
cycle of chronic fatigue and disability (Figure 2).  
 
 




                   
 
 








1.4 Empirical support for the cognitive behavioural model of CFS 
1.4.1 Illness beliefs 
Several decades of research testing this model has proved fruitful. Studies have identified 
how people perceive and respond to symptoms play a key role in perpetuating fatigue and 
disability in CFS. Cross-sectional studies have identified that negative illness perceptions 
(i.e. believing symptoms to be harmful, uncontrollable and incurable) account for almost 
40% of the variance in self-reported disability and around 30% of the variance of 
psychological well-being (Edwards, Suresh, Lynch, Clarkson, & Stanley, 2001; 
Heijmans, 1998; Moss‐Morris, Petrie, & Weinman, 1996). It could be argued that these 
illness perceptions may simply develop in response to the chronicity of the condition. 
However, this is unlikely as prospective studies have identified illness perceptions are a 
risk factor in developing CFS (as discussed in section 1.2.5.5); furthermore, people with 
CFS attribute more symptoms to their condition and report more severe consequences 
when compared to patients with other chronic conditions (e.g. arthritis, diabetes and 
chronic back pain) (Dickson, Toft, & O'Carroll, 2009; Komaroff, et al., 1996a; Moss-
Morris & Chalder, 2003; Moss‐Morris, et al., 1996).  
 
The CB model suggests that these illness perceptions guide the way in which patients 
cope with their illness (Leventhal, Meyer, & Nerenz, 1980). Indeed, negative beliefs 
about the identity (i.e. how many symptoms are linked to the illness label), time-line (i.e. 
expected duration of illness) and consequences of their illness has been shown to correlate 
with unhelpful coping strategies such as fear of injury or further damage and subsequent 
disengagement or avoidance of activity (fear-avoidance); which in turn are associated 
with greater psychological distress, illness worry and illness-related disability (Edwards, 
et al., 2001; Heijmans, 1998; Moss-Morris, 2005; Moss-Morris & Chalder, 2003; Moss‐




Morris, et al., 1996; Petrie, Moss-Morris, & Weinman, 1995; Ray, Weir, Cullen, & 
Phillips, 1992).  
 
1.4.2 Behavioural responses to symptoms 
Research has identified two different types of coping responses; (i) avoidance and 
limiting behaviours; with associated beliefs that rest and reduced activity are helpful in 
controlling symptoms and (ii) all-or-nothing behaviours, whereby the individual pushes 
themselves to keep going until they ‘crash’ (Ray, Jefferies, & Weir, 1995; Skerrett & 
Moss-Morris, 2006; van der Werf, Prins, Vercoulen, van der Meer, & Bleijenberg, 2000). 
Research has identified that all-or-nothing behaviours during an acute infection is 
associated with the onset of CFS, whereas limiting behaviours are not (Spence, Moss-
Morris, & Chalder, 2005). It is likely that coping and behavioural responses to symptoms 
change over the course of the illness. Once an individual has CFS, limiting behaviours 
are associated with increased disability, whereas all-or-nothing behaviours are more 
strongly associated with fatigue (Skerrett & Moss-Morris, 2006). Changing these 
cognitive and behavioural responses to illness have been identified as key mechanisms of 
efficacious treatments for CFS, thus demonstrating the importance of these factors in CFS 
(e.g. Nijs, et al., 2013; Wiborg, Knoop, Prins, & Bleijenberg, 2011) 
 
1.4.3 Symptom focusing  
The belief that symptoms are indicative of a long-term, harmful and biological condition 
would plausibly lead the individual with CFS to focus on and closely monitor symptoms. 
We know that within healthy individuals focusing attention on the body increases 
symptom reporting (Pennebaker, 2000). Therefore, it is unsurprising that a reportedly 
heightened focus on symptoms in CFS is associated with increased levels of fatigue and 
illness-related impairment (Knoop, Prins, Moss-Morris, & Bleijenberg, 2010; Moss-




Morris, 2005; Ray, et al., 1995; Ray, Jefferies, & Weir, 1997; Vercoulen, et al., 1998). 
Furthermore, reducing attention to symptoms has been shown to be partly responsible for 
reducing fatigue and disability within treatment for CFS (Heins, Knoop, Burk, & 
Bleijenberg, 2013; Moss-Morris, Sharon, Tobin, & Baldi, 2005b; Wiborg, et al., 2011). 
 
1.4.4 Psychosocial influences  
These cognitive and behavioural responses to symptoms are shaped by a range of factors, 
including social and cultural experiences. For example, how other people in the patient’s 
life, such as family and partners, understand and respond to the illness can be influential. 
A solicitous spouse or family member may limit the opportunity for the person with CFS 
to engage in activity and reinforce unhelpful illness beliefs and behaviours, thus further 
exasperating fatigue and disability (Band, Wearden, & Barrowclough, 2015). Conversely, 
discord between patients and significant others about the cause and validity of the patients 
symptoms is associated with increased patient distress, depression and poorer relationship 
quality (Band, et al., 2015). The response of significant others is particularly important in 
CFS given the high levels of stigma (Looper & Kirmayer, 2004) and social isolation 
(Assefi, Coy, Uslan, Smith, & Buchwald, 2003) associated with the condition.  
 
In sum, the CB model proposes that symptoms in CFS are generated and/or maintained, 
not by one specific disease process, but by the interaction of multiple factors in distinct 
domains. Deary, et al. (2007) described this as ‘autopoietic cycle’; referring to a system 
consisting of several interacting processes which reproduce and maintain one another. 
The model is supported by the current data and the efficacy of treatments based on a CB 
model formulation.  
 




1.5 Treatments  
Current recommended treatments for CFS are cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT) and 
graded exercise therapy (GET) (NICE, 2007). Both are based on the CB model of CFS 
and tend to focus initially on perpetuating factors in an attempt to break the vicious cycle 
of symptom maintenance and dismantle the self-maintaining interlock of cognitive, 
behavioural and physiological responses, hypothesised to perpetuate CFS. 
 
1.5.1 Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT) 
CBT for CFS aims to help the participant to change how they interpret symptoms and 
reduce the associated fear, symptom focusing and avoidance, which are assumed to be 
partially responsible for perpetuating the participant’s symptoms and disability (White, 
Sharpe, Chalder, DeCesare, & Walwyn, 2007). Participants are encouraged to see 
symptoms as temporary and reversible and not as signs of harm or evidence of fixed 
disease pathology. As the predisposing, precipitating and perpetuating factors are multi-
faceted and specific to the individual, CBT relies on the CB model to formulate a 
coherent, individualised case conceptualisation that forms the rational for treatment 
(Deary & Chalder, 2010). This model also acknowledges that the participant’s beliefs and 
behaviours are influenced by contextual factors, such as available information, attitudes 
of families and friends, and that these may also need to be addressed.  
 
CBT treatment for CFS is usually structured as course of 10-14, one to one sessions 
between the person with CFS and a trained health professional (NICE, 2007). CBT 
treatments involve the following components: initial stabilisation of activity and rest, 
establishing a regular sleep pattern and then graded increases or changes in activity to 
work towards planned goals. CBT also actively addresses the participant’s understanding 
of their illness which may involve challenging unhelpful beliefs, e.g., about symptoms or 




activity that may be preventing recovery (White, Sharpe, Chalder, DeCesare, & Walwyn, 
2007). Techniques such as ‘thought records or diaries’ are used to encourage the patient 
to recognise unhelpful thought processes and generate alternative, more balanced 
appraisals.   
 
1.5.2 Graded Exercise Therapy (GET) 
GET for CFS aims to reverse the physical inactivity (deconditioning) that is thought to 
play a role in maintaing CFS; and to re-engage the participant in aerobic exercise (e.g. 
brisk walking) and physical activity (e.g. housework) (Edmonds, McGuire, & Price, 
2004). Participants are encouraged to see symptoms as temporary and reversible, as a 
result of their current physical weakness, and not as signs of progressive pathology 
(White, et al., 2007). The rational is that reversing deconditioning and improving fitness 
and physical functioning will alter the persons perception of effort and enable the body 
to gain fitness and strength; leading to a reduction in symptoms and an increase in activity 
capacity (Fulcher & White, 1997).  
 
GET is delivered on a one to one basis by a trained exercise therapist, usually a 
physiotherapist (NICE, 2007). The number of sessions vary according to the treatment 
protocols used. The most widely used GET protocol within specialist CFS clinics 
provides a course of 10-14 sessions (White, et al., 2007). GET involves establishing an 
agreed baseline of physical activity, at a manageable and low level of intensity. The 
duration and intensity of the physical exercise is then increased slowly and carefully, at 
the right time for each participant. GET focuses on avoiding overexertion by advising 
participants not to exceed the agreed levels of physical exercise/ activity but at the same 
time maintaining, rather than stopping, physical exercise/ activity in the presence of 
symptoms. Recent approaches to GET advocate flexibility in the graded exercise 




programs according to the individuals tolerance level (Nijs, Paul, & Wallman, 2008; 
Wallman, Morton, Goodman, Grove, & Guilfoyle, 2004). Thus, the level of activity is 
mutually reviewed on a regular basis and plans adjusted depending on the participant’s 
current health and symptoms. Techniques include heart rate monitoring and a keeping a 
record of daily activity. 
 
1.5.3 Pragmatic Rehabilitation  
Pragmatic rehabilitation is another treatment for CFS which follows the CB model. 
Pragmatic rehabilitation has elements in common with both CBT and GET but differs in 
that it starts with the explicit delivery of an explanatory model for patients’ symptoms 
(Powell, Bentall, Nye, & Edwards, 2004; Wearden, et al., 2006). The explanatory model 
focuses on factors that may be maintaining fatigue and activity limitations, including 
cardiovascular and muscular deconditioning, disturbed sleep–wake cycles, and the 
somatic manifestations of arousal. The patient and therapist then collaborate to design a 
rehabilitation programme based on addressing these factors. Recent trials have also 
assessed a multidisciplinary treatment approach which combines GET, CBT and some 
pharmacological treatment for specific complaints, such as sleep disorders (Houlton, 
Christie, Smith, & Gardiner, 2015; Vos-Vromans, et al., 2016). The results of these trials 
will be discussed in section 1.5.5. 
 
1.5.4 Other treatments 
Other treatments which do not follow the CB model of CFS include adaptive pacing 
therapy (APT), the Phil Parker Lightning Process® (LP) and pharmacological treatments. 
APT is espoused by patient support groups. It regards CFS as an organic disease process 
that is not reversible by changes in behaviour and which results in a reduced and finite 
amount (envelope) of available energy (Jason, 2008; Jason, et al., 2013). The aim of APT 




is to achieve optimum adaptation to the illness, by helping the participant to plan and pace 
activity in order to reduce or avoid fatigue and achieve prioritised activities (Jason, et al., 
2013). Therapeutic strategies consist of identifying links between activity and fatigue by 
use of a daily diary. Patients are encouraged to plan activity to avoid exacerbations, i.e. 
limiting stress, planning regular rest and avoiding activities that exceed 70% of their 
perceived energy envelopes. APT encourages vigilance for early warnings of 
exacerbation and when such signs are observed patients are advised to stop the activity 
in order not to exceed the finite envelope of energy. Increased activities are encouraged, 
if the participant feels able, and as long as they do not exacerbate symptoms.  
 
The Phil Parker Lightning Process® (LP) is a trademarked intervention that claims to 
train individuals to recognize when they are stimulating or triggering unhelpful 
physiological responses (i.e. the stress response); and to help participants develop more 
appropriate responses to situations. Little is known about the theoretical underpinning or 
therapeutic techniques involved in the LP and no study to date has assessed the efficacy 
of the LP for CFS. A trial in the UK (the SMILE trial) is currently underway to compare 
specialist medical care with specialist medical care plus the LP for CFS (Crawley, Mills, 
Hollingworth, Deans, Sterne, Donovan, Beasant & Montgomery 2013). If LP is a viable 
treatment for CFS it shall be theoretically and therapeutically valuable to establish the 
specific components of the treatment which are beneficial.  
 
1.5.5 Treatment efficacy 
In support of the CB model for CFS, studies have found that treatments based on a CB 
formulation are the most effective treatments for CFS (Castell, Kazantzis, & Moss‐
Morris, 2011; Malouff, Thorsteinsson, Rooke, Bhullar, & Schutte, 2008; Marques, De 
Gucht, Gouveia, Leal, & Maes, 2015; Wearden, et al., 2010; White, Goldsmith, Johnson, 




Chalder, & Sharpe, 2013). Whereas, little evidence has emerged for the efficacy of any 
pharmacological treatments, complimentary therapies or APT (Chambers, et al., 2006; 
NICE, 2007). Three Cochran reviews  (Edmonds, et al., 2004; Larun, Brurberg, Odgaard-
Jensen, & Price, 2016; Price, Mitchell, Tidy, & Hunot, 2008), three systematic reviews 
(Chambers, et al., 2006; Raine, et al., 2002; Whiting, et al., 2001) one non-systematic 
review (Clark & White, 2005) (Clarke & White, 2005), and three meta-analyses (Castell, 
et al., 2011; Malouff, et al., 2008; Marques, et al., 2015) have demonstrated CBT and 
GET have positive effects on fatigue and functioning in patients with CFS.  
 
A meta-analysis by Castell, et al. (2011) compared the effects of CBT (n=16) and GET 
(n=5) trials and found both types of intervention presented similar overall post-treatment 
effects (g=0.33 and g=0.28 respectively) for CFS patients. These findings are further 
supported by recent randomized control trials (Burgess, Andiappan, & Chalder, 2012; 
Núñez, et al., 2011; Van Damme, Bulcke, Durnez, & Crombez, 2016; Vos-Vromans, et 
al., 2016; White, et al., 2011b; Wiborg, van Bussel, van Dijk, Bleijenberg, & Knoop, 
2015), the most high profile and largest of these  being the PACE trial (White et al., 2011). 
The PACE trial (n= 641) demonstrated superiority of CBT and GET in reducing fatigue 
and improving functioning over that of APT or specialised medical care alone (involving 
an explanation of CFS and generic advice, such as to avoid extremes of activity and rest). 
There was no clear superiority of either CBT or GET in their treatment effects; both 
equally improved outcomes of fatigue, functional impairment, anxiety, and depression 
(White, et al., 2011b). Similarly, positive but smaller effects have been found following 
CBT and GET delivered in routine clinical practice (Crawley, Collin, White, Rimes, 
Sterne & May, 2013; Fernie, Murphy, Wells, Nikčević, & Spada, 2016; Quarmby, Rimes, 
Deale, Wessely, & Chalder, 2007). These differences may be due to differences in the 
delivery or content of treatments given in routine clinical practice. For example, many 




patients in NHS services appear to be offered five or six sessions whereas PACE trial 
participants attended 12–14 sessions (Crawley, Collin, White, Rimes, Sterne & May, 
2013). 
 
Fewer trials have assessed the efficacy of other CB based treatments. Two randomized 
controlled trails show positive effects of pragmatic rehabilitation (Taylor, 2004; 
Wearden, et al., 2010); one being a nurse lead home based treatment (Wearden, et al., 
2010) and the other a patient led illness management group, plus one to one peer support 
(Taylor, 2004). These findings are collaborated by non-randomized, observational studies 
(Masuda, Nakayama, Yamanaka, Koga, & Tei, 2002; Schreurs, Veehof, Passade, & 
Vollenbroek-Hutten, 2011; Thomas, Sadlier, & Smith, 2008; Torenbeek, et al., 2006). 
However, reported treatment effects are smaller than that following CBT or GET, and the 
effects do not appear to be maintained at one year follow up (Wearden, et al., 2010). 
Similarly, trials of multidisciplinary treatment approach have shown only short-term 
improvements (Cox, 1999; Houlton, et al., 2015; Thomas, et al., 2008; Vos-Vromans, et 
al., 2016). These findings may reflect that fact that most CBT/GET trials have been 
delivered within secondary care and specialist treatment centres; which are associated 
with better treatment outcomes than primary care (Castell, et al., 2011; Marques, et al., 
2015). Other accounts for these differences in treatment outcomes may be related to the 
level of training and experience of the providers, as well as the therapeutic alliance 
(Castell, et al., 2011; Huibers & Wessely, 2006; Wearden, et al., 2010). A meta-analysis 
of behavioural interventions for CFS found interventions delivered by psychologists or 
psychotherapists were more effective in reducing fatigue severity (Marques, et al., 2015).  
 




1.5.6 Long term treatment efficacy 
A systematic review of longitudinal studies, found that the benefits of CB treatments for 
CFS, including CBT, GET and pragmatic rehabilitation, were maintained at follow-up in 
about 40% cases (Cairns & Hotopf, 2005). Several subsequent longitudinal studies 
support the finding of maintained treatment effects of CBT and GET for CFS (Knoop, 
Stulemeijer, de Jong, Fiselier, & Bleijenberg, 2008; Nijhof, Bleijenberg, Uiterwaal, 
Kimpen, & van de Putte, 2012; Núñez, et al., 2011). Most recently a follow-up of the 
PACE trial found CBT and GET treatment effects were maintained after a median of 2.5 
years after randomization, with no evidence of deterioration in overall health from end of 
treatment to follow-up (Sharpe, et al., 2015). However, maintained improvements in 
fatigue and functioning do not necessarily equate to recovery.  
 
Recovery can be measured in a number of ways. The most meaningful depiction of 
recovery may be the individuals’ perception of improvement; both in terms reduced 
symptoms and the associated impact of symptoms everyday life. Several non-randomized 
studies (Flo & Chalder, 2014; Quarmby, et al., 2007) have found that 6 months after 
receiving CBT in routine clinical practice, over half of patients report feeling “better” or 
“much better” (57% to 60.8% respectively). Similar subjective improvements have been 
reported in randomized control trials of CB treatments for CFS, ranging from 70% (Deale, 
Husain, Chalder, & Wessely, 2001) to 40%  (White, et al., 2013) reporting feeling 
“better” or “much better”. 
 
Recovery can also reflect a return to premorbid levels of health and wellbeing. Some 
researchers have defined this as 1-2 standard deviations (SD) from the population mean 
of fatigue and functioning. The SD allows for fluctuation around baseline levels of fatigue 
and functioning (Deale, et al., 2001; Knoop, Bleijenberg, Gielissen, van der Meer, & 




White, 2007; White, et al., 2013). Using this definition of recovery, a meta-analysis of 
RCT’s of CBT for CFS, reported that 50% of the patients improved to the point of no 
longer being clinically fatigued (Malouff, et al., 2008). The most recent and largest RCT 
to assess CFS recovery rates- the PACE trial- found that, 40% of patients were within 
1SD of the normal range of fatigue following CBT and 33% following GET, one year 
after starting treatment. In terms of physical functioning, 52% of participants who 
received CBT were within 1 SD of the population mean and 53% of those who received 
GET (White, et al., 2013). Similar proportions of patients meet this definition of recovery 
in routine clinical practice. Knoop, et al., (2008) found 48% of patients were within 2 SD 
of the population mean of fatigue immediately after treatment; whereas, Flo and Chalder 
(2014) found 49% of their sample were within 1SD of normal level 6 months after 
receiving CBT in clinical practice.  
 
The most objective measure of recovery entails no longer meeting the diagnostic criteria 
for CFS (Oxford and CDC criteria). Employing this criteria, early RCTs indicate that 
23%-24% of patients fully recover following CBT (Deale, et al., 2001; Knoop, et al., 
2008) and between 0% and 31% of the CFS patients show full recovery in routine clinical 
practice (Cairns & Hotopf, 2005). This large variability is likely to be due, at least in part, 
to the range of treatment protocols and delivery methods. Since then treatments have 
become more standardized. The recent PACE trial being the largest RCT to date in this 
area, provided treatment protocols for each of the arms of the multi-centred trail (CBT; 
GET; APT) (White, et al., 2013). They employed a stricter criterion for recovery; defined 
as no longer meeting the Oxford criteria for CFS (Sharpe, et al., 1991), combined with a 
self-rated improvement in overall health as ‘much better’ or ‘very much better’. Using 
these criteria they found that 22% of patients recovered after CBT, 22% after GET, 8% 
after APT and 7% after specialist medical care  (White, et al., 2013). The odds for 




recovery after CBT or GET were 3.36 and 3.38 respectively when compared to APT. 
Similar proportions recovered when the additional condition of not meeting the CDC-
1994 criteria for CFS (Fukuda et, al., 1994) was applied. These findings confirm that 
recovery from CFS is possible and cognitive behavioural treatments currently offer the 
mostly likely route to achieving this.  
 
However, whilst it seems CB treatments for CFS provide some lasting benefits, some 
people with CFS have difficulty making further improvements and maintaining changes 
in the long term. In their 5-year longitudinal study, Deale, et al. (2001) reported 63% of 
patients were within 1 SD of the normal population mean of fatigue, 6 months post CBT 
for CFS, however this dropped to 28% when assessed 5 years post treatment. Similarly, 
though 63% were within normal range of functioning 6 months’ post CBT, this dropped 
to 48% over 5 years (Deale et, al., 2001). This attenuation of treatment effect may be 
because patients fall into old habits of thinking or responding to symptoms. However, it 
is important to bear in mind that there was a high attrition rate in this study (at 5 years 
n=25), thus these results should be interpreted with caution.  
 
The prognosis for people with CFS who do not receive treatment is poor. Naturalistic 
follow-up studies have found that, if untreated, full recovery rates are 5% and the median 
proportion of patients who improve over-time, without intervention is less than 40% 
(Cairns & Hotopf, 2005). In light of this, the evidence for the effectiveness of CBT and 
GET is surely auspicious. However, despite favourable outcomes for some patients with 
CFS, CB treatments for CFS have been met with extreme cynicism from those espousing 
a purely biological aetiology of the condition (Twisk & Maes, 2008). Despite evidence 
to the contrary, patient groups resolutely espouse unwavering support for APT as an 
efficacious treatment for CFS (Kindlon, 2011). Advice dispensed by some CFS groups 




may have a negative effect on recovery, for example by advocating the avoidance of 
activity (Surawy, et al., 1995). Indeed, one study found that being a member of a support 
group predicted less favourable response to CB based treatments (Bentall, Powell, Nye, 
& Edwards, 2002). Some patient organisations and researchers have claimed that 
behavioural and psychological treatments for CFS pose harm to patients and do not tally 
with results from patient surveys (Twisk & Maes, 2008). This has been accompanied by 
calls for NICE to revoke their recommendation that all patients with CFS should be 
offered CBT or GET (Coyne & Laws, 2016; Shepherd, 2013, 2016; Wilshire, Kindlon, 
Matthees, & McGrath, 2016).  
 
However, the claim that behavioural treatments cause harm is empirically unfounded; 
analysis of adverse events after the PACE trial found no difference in the number or 
severity of adverse events reported in GET or CBT compared to APT or standard medical 
care (Dougall, et al., 2014). Indeed, deterioration in physical function was more likely 
after APT (Dougall, et al., 2014). The safety of cognitive behavioural treatments for CFS 
has been further supported by a number of RCTs conducted by a variety of research 
groups (Heins, et al., 2010; Price, et al., 2008).  
  
Thus, to date CBT and GET offer the most effective and safe treatments to improve levels 
of fatigue and functioning in CFS. Nevertheless, it is clear that for some people with CFS, 
CB treatments do not result in clinically significant improvements. Even with effective 
treatment, a relatively small proportion of patients fully recover (Knoop, et al., 2007; 
White, et al., 2013) and even for those that do recover, the risk of relapse increases over 
time (Deale, et al., 2001). Work is needed to optimise treatment efficacy for CFS and 
bolster long-term treatment effects. One way of doing this could be to add more treatment 
sessions. A meta-analysis found higher number of treatment sessions improved efficacy 




(Castell, et al., 2011). Increasing the number of sessions or offering alternative, more 
flexible methods of treatment delivery (e.g. over the internet, Nijhof, et al., 2012; or 
telephone, Burgess, Andiappan, & Chalder, 2012) may prove therapeutically beneficial. 
Another avenue to optimize treatment effects would be to explore factors that predict and 
mediate treatment outcomes. By identifying factors that predict treatment response, we 
can establish who will benefit most from certain treatments and tailor service/ treatment 
delivery and allocation accordingly. By identifying factors that mediate the effect of 
existing treatments, we can capitalize on effective treatment components and further 
strengthen our theoretical understanding of CFS.  
 
1.5.7 Predictors of treatment outcome 
Despite claims that some diagnostic classifications identify patients characterised by a 
more severe neuroimmune disorder (e.g. CCC and ICC), it seems CB treatments are 
equally effective across diagnostic classifications (Brurberg, et al., 2014). Patient 
characteristics which do predict how an individual will respond to CB treatments include, 
older age, increased disability, weight fluctuation and pain (Cairns & Hotopf, 2005; Cella, 
Chalder, & White, 2011a; Chalder, Godfrey, Ridsdale, King, & Wessely, 2003; Crawley, 
Collin, White, Rimes, Sterne & May, 2013; Flo & Chalder, 2014; Quarmby, et al., 2007). 
Some studies suggest the severity of fatigue pre-treatment is also predictive of worse 
treatment outcomes (Heins, et al., 2010; Kempke, et al., 2010); however, others find do 
not find this effect (Bentall, et al., 2002; Chalder, et al., 2003; Flo & Chalder, 2014; 
Kempke, et al., 2010). This discrepancy may be due to the different treatment protocols. 
For example, Kempke, et al. (2010) found that the initial level of fatigue predicted 
response to a multi-component treatment for CFS, which varied in content, duration and 
intensity for each patient (i.e. some received additional psychoeducational content; some 
attended group sessions weekly, others monthly). This type of flexible, group based 




treatment for CFS may be most effective for those with less fatigue pre-treatment; 
whereas, other treatments such as individual face-to-face CBT may be equally effective 
for those mildly to more severely fatigued (e.g., Flo & Chalder, 2014). Similarly, the 
duration of illness seems to predict response to some treatments for CFS but not others. 
The duration of illness does not appear to predict how people will respond to CBT and 
GET for CFS (Bentall, et al., 2002; Chalder, et al., 2003; Kempke, et al., 2010), 
suggesting that these treatments for CFS can be effective at any stage of the illness 
trajectory. However, Wearden, Dunn, Dowrick, and Morriss (2012) found longer illness 
durations predicted poorer treatment outcomes for nurse lead, home based pragmatic 
rehabilitation and treatment as usual (combined treatment arms), at 70 weeks follow-up. 
It might be that for those with longer illness durations more intensive, specialist delivered 
treatments are required. 
 
Certain beliefs about the illness and coping in general, are also associated with treatment 
response. For example, believing that expression of emotions is unacceptable is related 
to worse outcomes for CFS (Flo & Chalder, 2014) and a poorer prognosis  (Cairns & 
Hotopf, 2005; Sharpe, Hawton, Seagroatt, & Pasvol, 1992); whereas, conversely, 
processing, expressing and accepting distressing emotions has been found to predict more 
favourable responses to CB treatments for CFS (Godfrey, Chalder, Ridsdale, Seed, & 
Ogden, 2007). Illness attributions pre-treatment also influence treatment outcome. 
Patients with CFS who believe that their illness is primarily physical are more likely to 
respond poorly to CBT (Butler, Chalder, & Wessely, 2001) and experience symptom 
deterioration, either with or without treatment (Heins, et al., 2010). This may be related 
to associated unhelpful responses to symptoms. For example, attributing symptoms to a 
physical cause predicts less activity (Chalder, Power, & Wessely, 1996) which in turn 
may result in deconditioning and further exasperation of symptoms (Marques, De Gucht, 




Gouveia, Leal, & Maes, 2015). Other specific cognitive and behavioural responses to 
symptoms have also been identified as predicting treatment outcomes in CFS. Symptom 
focusing, catastrophic beliefs about the consequences of engaging in activity, and a 
passive activity pattern have been found to predict less improvement following CB 
treatments for CFS (Cella, et al., 2011a; Flo & Chalder, 2014; Prins, et al., 2001). These 
relationships further support the CB model of CFS and highlights the need for patients to 
receive a coherent bi-psychosocial explanation of the condition, highlighting the multiple 
contributory factors of CFS. 
 
One of the most important factors in predicting how an individual will respond to CFS 
treatments is psychiatric comorbidities. In particular, having co-morbid depression has 
been consistently found to predict poorer response to CBT for CFS (Bentall, et al., 2002; 
Bonner, Ron, Chalder, Butler, & Wessely, 1994; Cairns & Hotopf, 2005; Flo & Chalder, 
2014; Kempke, et al., 2010; Prins, Bleijenberg, & Rouweler, 2005; Sharpe, et al., 1992). 
A latent class analysis found that those with CFS who responded poorly to CBT had 
higher levels of anxiety pre-treatment than those who responded well (Cella, et al., 
2011a). Similarly, Wearden, et al. (2012) found depressive symptoms at baseline 
significantly moderated the effect of pragmatic rehabilitation on fatigue at 1-year follow-
up. It may be that those with more severe mood disorders are more resistant to treatment 
and may benefit from additional treatment sessions (Wearden, et al., 2012) or increased 
number of treatment hours (Malouff, et al., 2008). These findings are of particular 
pertinence given depression and anxiety represent the most common co-morbid disorders 
among CFS patients (Cella, et al., 2013).  
 
These studies highlight the range of different factors that predict how an individual may 
respond to CB treatments for CFS. Auspiciously many of these factors are amendable. 




However, whether changes in these predictive factors equate to improved treatment 
outcomes is a separate question. In order to assess the mechanisms of change underlying 
the efficacy of CB treatments for CFS, mediation analyses are needed.  
 
1.5.8 Mediators of treatment outcome 
Pre-post treatment designs have assessed factors that mediate improvements in fatigue 
and functioning over the course of treatment for CFS. These studies have found that key 
mediators of CB treatments for CFS (CBT, GET and pragmatic rehabilitation) are 
changes in cognitive and behavioural factors such as, fear and avoidance of activity, 
symptom focusing and self-efficacy (Chalder, Goldsmith, White, Sharpe, & Pickles, 
2015; Moss-Morris, Sharon, Tobin, & Baldi, 2005a; Stahl, Rimes, & Chalder, 2014b; 
Wearden & Emsley, 2013; Wiborg, et al., 2011). These findings correspond with 
longitudinal mediation studies (Chalder, et al., 2015; Stahl, Rimes, & Chalder, 2014a; 
Wearden & Emsley, 2013). The FINE trial of a nurse delivered pragmatic rehabilitation 
programme for CFS found changes in catastrophizing and activity limitation were 
associated with a reduction in fatigue following treatment (Wearden & Emsley, 2013). 
Similarly, a mediation analysis of the PACE trial found that changes in avoidance 
behaviours and increased walking distance, alongside changes in fear avoidance beliefs 
and self-efficacy were associated with better fatigue and functioning outcomes post CBT 
and GET (Chalder, et al., 2015). 
 
Interestingly, an increased fitness capacity and physical activity do not appear to mediate 
treatment effects. One study objectively measured levels of physical activity via a motion 
sensor watch, worn for 12 days before and after treatment (Wiborg, Knoop, Stulemeijer, 
Prins, & Bleijenberg, 2010). They found that, although CBT effectively reduced fatigue 
and improved functioning, it did not change levels of physical activity. Furthermore, 




changes in physical activity were not related to changes in fatigue. Similarly, though some 
improvements in objectively measured fitness (e.g. step test) have been reported, changes 
in fitness have not been shown to mediate the effects of treatments (Chalder, et al., 2015; 
Marques, et al., 2015; Moss-Morris, et al., 2005a; Wearden & Emsley, 2013). It may be 
that these studies have not adequately assessed what constitutes a meaningful increase in 
activity levels for the patient. For example the motion sensor used by Wiborg, et al. (2010) 
measures movement but not necessarily physical activity per se. Perhaps alternative 
objective measures are needed to assess physical activity more accurately. Alternatively, 
these findings may suggest that increases in physical fitness and activity do not 
necessarily lead to improved fatigue or functioning. It seems that treatment effects may 
arise primarily from changes in cognitive and behavioural responses to symptoms rather 
than necessarily getting fitter.  
 
Though broadly consistent, mediation studies highlight different cognitive and 
behavioural mechanisms of treatment. In particular, there are inconsistent findings 
regarding the role of symptom focusing. Some studies have found reducing symptom 
focusing is a key mechanism of CBT for CFS (Moss-Morris, et al., 2005a; Wiborg, et al., 
2011) whereas others found a weak association in mediating CBT or GET (Chalder, et 
al., 2015) or not at all in the case of pragmatic rehabilitation within the FINE trial 
(Wearden & Emsley, 2013). Methodological differences may account for this variability; 
for example Wiborg, et al. (2011) adapted a version of the Pain Coping Inventory, 
including 8 items to assess symptom focusing (Jensen, Turner, Romano, & Strom, 1995), 
and Moss-Morris, et al., (2005a) used the 9 item ‘focusing on symptoms’ subscale of the 
Illness Management Questionnaire (Ray, Weir, Stewart, Miller, & Hyde, 1993). Whereas 
both PACE (Chalder, et al., 2015) and FINE trials (Wearden & Emsley, 2013) used the 6 
item symptom focusing subscale on the Cognitive Behavioural Response to Symptoms 




Questionnaire (CBSQ; Skerrett & Moss-Morris, 2006). Perhaps the CBRQ is less 
sensitive at detecting change in symptom focusing than the others. Another explanation 
for this disparity may be the large heterogeneity within CFS; a mechanism of change for 
one individual may be vastly different to that of another. It may also reflect heterogeneity 
in treatment content and delivery. Even when the same process changes it may be 
achieved through different means; for example, reducing symptom focusing and fear-
avoidance of activity may be a mechanism of both CBT and GET but achieved through 
different techniques.  
 
1.6 Gap in the literature 
Mediation studies of CBT and GET have provided good support for the CB model of 
CFS. Findings suggest that targeting specific cognitive and behavioural factors could 
enhance treatment effects. However, the specific cognitions and behaviours measured in 
these studies explain only a relatively small amount of variance in treatment effect 
(Deary, et al., 2007; Knoop, et al., 2010). Thus, other processes of change may be 
occurring during treatment that, as yet, have eluded investigation; either through 
measurement error or omission. Two themes in particular have been espoused for further 
investigation; symptom appraisal (Petrie & Weinman, 2003) and attention (Deary, et al., 
2007). Though self-report measures have gone some way in assessing the explicit facets 
of these concepts, such as self-reports of symptom focusing and catastrophic 
interpretation of symptoms, few studies have experimentally assessed how people with 
CFS appraise and attend to illness-related information at more implicit, habitual levels of 
information processing. A hypervigilance for somatic cues, and/or bias to interpret benign 
information as health threatening may reinforce unhelpful cognitive and behavioural 
responses to symptoms and thus perpetuate chronic fatigue and disability. Experimental 
methods can help us explore some of these more habitual cognitive processes in CFS. 




This will be the focus of the work presented in this thesis. The next chapter will introduce 








Chapter 2 Information processing  
2.1 Chapter overview 
The previous chapter outlined a number of cognitive and behavioural factors, amongst 
others, which are important in maintaining fatigue and disability in CFS. Self-report 
studies exploring a number of these factors have proved fruitful. However, data regarding 
cognitions and behaviours that may occur at earlier, more implicit levels of processing is 
lacking. The next chapter will introduce the concept of cognitive processing biases and 
explain how they may play a role in CFS.  
 
The chapter begins by introducing the concept of information processing and describing 
how, theoretically, information processing can become biased to detect and preferentially 
process illness-specific information. Two key biases in information processing are 
defined, attentional bias and interpretation bias, followed by contextual information about 
how these biases are measured. The chapter draws on the plethora of experimental work 
within anxiety and depression, to demonstrate the methodological and conceptual 
underpinning of cognitive bias research; and highlights experimental work in the pain 
literature, drawing parallels between chronic pain and CFS. This chapter also outlines the 
hypothesised mechanisms underpinning these cognitive biases, namely attentional 
control and attentional malleability.  
 
2.2 What is information processing? 
At the heart of cognitive psychology is the idea of information processing. A common 
analogy of information processing is to consider how a computer processes information; 
the computer takes in information, codes (i.e. changes) information, stores 
information in a limited capacity central processor, uses information, and produces an 
output (retrieves info). Similarly, humans process information in the environment 




through a number of processing systems (e.g. attention, perception, and short-term 
memory); these processing systems transform or alter the information in systematic ways, 
which results in behavioural responses.  
 
However, human information processing is clearly more complex than this computer 
analogy suggests. How humans process incoming information is influenced by a number 
of conflicting emotional and motivational factors and unlike computers, people have the 
capacity for extensive parallel processing (i.e. a number of complex processing tasks 
occur at the same time). In order to appropriately respond to information and avoid over-
loading our limited working-memory capacity (Miyake & Shah, 1999), humans need to 
select the most important information for further processing (Broadbent, 2013). This 
process is known as ‘selective attention’.  
 
Treisman (1969) proposed that information is selected based on a recognition threshold, 
i.e. people have lower thresholds for certain information, the lower the threshold, the 
more easily and likely an input is to be perceived. Recognition thresholds are lowered by 
several factors including: (i) context and expectation- certain information that is context 
relevant or expected, can become momentarily more pertinent and accessible; and (ii) 
subjective importance- words that possess subjective importance, such as ‘help’ or ‘fire’, 
or information with salient personal meaning, will have a lower threshold and will be able 
to come into awareness more easily. This filtering system of incoming information is built 
for maximum economy: while facilitating the potential for important, unexpected, or 
relevant stimuli to be perceived, it ensures that those messages sufficiently attenuated do 
not get through much more than the earliest stages of analysis, preventing an overburden 
on sensory processing capacity (Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977).  
 




The processes described thus far all assume that the environmental stimuli are driving 
how information is processed. These processes are referred to as ‘bottom-up’, ‘stimulus 
driven’ or ‘automatic’ and are thought to occur very quickly, outside of our control and 
awareness (Isen & Diamond, 1989; Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977; Shiffrin & Schneider, 
1977). However, although it is agreed that stimulus driven information in cognition is 
important, an individual’s expectations and past experiences are also important in 
determining how information is processed. These influences are known as 'top-down', 
‘goal-directed’ or ‘strategic’ and refer to more controllable, intentional and conscious 
processes (Isen & Diamond, 1989; Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977; Shiffrin & Schneider, 
1977). 
 
These ‘top-down’ processes are thought to occur at later stages of the information 
processing system, after the stimuli has been selected; and serve to assimilate and 
organize the selected information (Buschman & Miller, 2007). For example, pain is 
known to capture ‘bottom up’ attention when it is new or novel, intense, or is threatening 
(Legrain, et al., 2009). This means that vague and commonplace pains like epigastric 
pain, can often be ignored. However, ‘top down’ attention can also direct attention 
towards painful events – for example, if an individual is expecting pain or they are 
particularly fearful and catastrophic about the experience of pain (Keogh, Ellery, Hunt, 
& Hannent, 2001; Keogh, Thompson, & Hannent, 2003).  
 
However, the dichotomy of these ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ processes has been subject 
to debate (Awh, Belopolsky, & Theeuwes, 2012; Moors & De Houwer, 2007). It is 
thought that ‘bottom up’ attention, while unintentional, is influenced by ‘top-down’ 
processes; and vice versa. For example, ‘bottom-up’ attentional capture of novel, pain 
related information can act as a distraction from ‘top-down’ task-relevant goals; 




conversely, a ‘top-down’ strategy to monitor or expect pain can sensitize the ‘bottom-up’ 
recognition and attentional selection of pain related information.  
 
2.3 Biases in information processing  
Cognitive models propose that how information is processed can become biased for 
certain types of information. For example, Beck’s Schema Theory of Emotion and 
Cognition (Beck & Clark, 1988) proposes that cognitive schema (i.e. core knowledge and 
related beliefs about people, situations, and events) guide the encoding, comprehension, 
and retrieval of new information (i.e. information processing) (Beck & Clark, 1988). 
Beck and Clark (1988) propose that people with mood disorders have maladaptive 
schemata; i.e. predominantly negative (depression) or fearful (anxiety) ways of viewing 
the world, which bias the processing of incoming information for schema congruence. 
Depressed individuals will selectively process negative information related to loss and 
failure, whereas anxious individuals will selectively process information related to danger 
and threat (Beck & Perkins, 2001). Cognitive models proposed more recently maintain 
that some groups of people (e.g. anxious and depressed) preferentially process certain 
types of information e.g. negative and threatening information in anxiety and depression. 
However, rather than a ‘schema’ driving these processes these models refer to distorted 
cognitive processes, that may be determined by a genetic vulnerability or poor attentional 
control (De Raedt & Koster, 2010; Derakshan & Eysenck, 2009; Disner, Beevers, Haigh, 
& Beck, 2011; Eysenck & Derakshan, 2011; Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos, & Calvo, 2007; 
Hertel & Mathews, 2011; Joormann & D'Avanzato, 2010). These issues are discussed 
further in section 2.5. 
 
Two biases in information processing have dominated the research in this area; attentional 
bias and interpretation bias. Attentional bias refers to the preferential allocation of 




attention towards certain types of information. Interpretation bias refers to the tendency 
or habit to interpret ambiguous information in particularly negative, threatening or 
schema-congruent ways. The next section will briefly describe the types of experimental 
paradigms used to assess these processing biases, followed by an over-view of some of 
the key research findings using these experimental methods.  
 
2.3.1 Experimental research into cognitive biases  
Experimental paradigms have been developed that tap into these cognitive biases at both 
early, automatic or ‘bottom-up’ stages of processing as well as biases at later more 
elaborative, ‘top-down’ stages of processing. Tasks attempting to tap into ‘automatic’ 
cognitive biases measure how an individual responds to stimuli (usually measured by 
reaction times) presented very briefly and subliminally (i.e. below the threshold of 
conscious awareness). Tasks measuring cognitive biases at later stages of ‘top-down’ 
processing, measure responses to stimuli after the person has had time to recognize the 
stimuli and reflect upon it.  
 
For instance, a commonly used measure of attentional bias is the visual probe task (VPT; 
MacLeod, Mathews, & Tata, 1986). In this task, participants are presented with two 
stimuli, which have contrasting valence, i.e., a threatening versus a neutral word or image 
(an illustration of a trial in the VPT is presented in Appendix C, Figure 5). According to 
the principles of information processing, these two stimuli will be competing for 
attentional selection and processing within our limited working-memory capacity 
(Miyake & Shah, 1999; Treisman, 1969). The person will direct their attention to the 
stimuli that is of most personal and contextual salience. In this task, the direction or 
allocation of their attention is measured by reaction times to probes that replace the 
stimuli. Faster reaction times to probes replacing the threatening stimuli, indicates an 




attentional bias to this type of information. In order to tap into different stages of 
processing (i.e. automatic versus strategic), the conditions under which stimuli are 
presented is adapted. To assess ‘bottom-up’ or automatic attentional capture, stimuli are 
presented very briefly (under 500ms) and under masked conditions (i.e. a string of letters 
appears immediately before and after the stimuli). To assess ‘top-down’ ‘strategic’ 
attentional processes, stimuli are presented for longer durations (over 500ms), which 
allows time for the individual to exert effortful attentional control to direct their attention 
to task-relevant or goal-driven information (Bradley, Mogg, Falla, & Hamilton, 1998).  
 
Similarly, tasks that measure interpretation biases have been adapted to tap into different 
stages of processing. Rapid, ‘automatic’ or spontaneous interpretations of stimuli are 
assessed by reaction times indicating the immediate interpretation of ambiguous 
information (on-line tasks). Tasks that assess interpretation biases that occur at later 
stages of processing (off-line tasks), allow participants time to reflect on the ambiguous 
materials without being forced to report the first inference that comes to mind; for 
example, writing five words that come to mind after hearing homophones (e.g. ‘pain’ 
pane’). More detail on these and other measures of attention and interpretation bias is 
provided later in the thesis (Chapter 2, section 2.5) 
 
Using these and other, similar, experimental paradigms studies have identified that 
healthy people tend to show positive biases in processing information (Pool, Brosch, 
Delplanque, & Sander, 2016); preferentially attending to positive over neutral stimuli and 
interpreting ambiguous information in a particularly positive way. Conversely, clinical 
populations, for example people with anxiety and depression disorders, have a distinct 
lack of positive biases and show attention and interpretation biases for negative, disorder-
congruent information. For example, in generalized anxiety disorder (GAD) attention  is 




‘captured’ by salient, threatening information in the environment (Bar-Haim, Lamy, 
Pergamin, Bakermans-Kranenburg, & Van Ijzendoorn, 2007),  and people with GAD tend 
to interpret ambiguous information as less benign and more threatening in general, 
compared to healthy people (Anderson, et al., 2012; Eysenck, Mogg, May, Richards, & 
Mathews, 1991; Mathews, Richards, & Eysenck, 1989; Mogg, Baldwin, Brodrick, & 
Bradley, 2004). However, a consistent limitation of the interpretation bias studies in GAD 
is that they are unable to distinguish whether the bias occurs when ambiguity is first 
encountered (on-line), or only later on reflection (off-line). Studies in social anxiety 
disorder (SAD) have used both on-line and off-line interpretation paradigms and have 
identified that, compared with non-anxious controls, people with SAD interpret 
ambiguous material more negatively and less positively, both when reflecting on 
situations (i.e. offline) and in the moment (i.e. online) (Amir, Beard, & Bower, 2005; 
Amir, Prouvost, & Kuckertz, 2012; Hirsch, Clark, & Mathews, 2006; Hirsch & Mathews, 
2000; Voncken, Bögels, & Peeters, 2007; Voncken, Bögels, & de Vries, 2003).  
 
Experimental research in depression has identified similar cognitive processing biases, 
but occurring at different stages of information processing and for content specific to 
depression (Mogg & Bradley, 2005; Mogg, Bradley, & Williams, 1995). For example, 
people with clinical depression show attentional biases for stimuli relating to themes of 
loss and sadness, but only when presented for longer, not shorter durations (Peckham, 
McHugh, & Otto, 2010). This indicates that while attention may not be ‘captured’ by 
depression relevant information, attention may be held longer by this type of information. 
Recently, studies have also shown that, not only do people with depression preferentially 
attend to negative information, but that they also avoid positive information (Winer & 
Salem, 2016).  
 




In terms of interpretations, similar patterns of processing biases have been identified. A 
meta-analysis of interpretation biases, showed that people with clinical depression 
interpreted information in a more negative and less positive way than healthy participants 
when interpretation biases were measured using ‘off-line’ tasks (i.e. tapping into later 
elaborative or ‘top down’ interpretations); but not ‘on-line’ tasks (i.e. tapping into 
spontaneous interpretation when material is first encountered). These findings for biases 
occurring at later more elaborate stages of processing may relate to the ruminative nature 
of depression (Donaldson, Lam, & Mathews, 2007; Koster, De Lissnyder, Derakshan, & 
De Raedt, 2011).  
 
2.3.2 Do cognitive biases matter? 
It seems that cognitive biases in anxiety and depression are hallmarks of these conditions; 
but do these cognitive biases matter? To what extend are these biases a bi-product of the 
condition; and to what extent do they have an active role in maintaining symptoms?  
 
Consider the computer processing analogy referred to at the start of this chapter. If the 
inputted information is consistently negative, and ambiguous information is encoded as 
negative, the resulting output is likely to reflect the negative information that has been 
processed. Similarly, an individual who constantly attends to threatening information in 
their environment (attentional bias) and tends to interpret ambiguity in a particularly 
threatening way (interpretation bias) is likely to have a heightened sense of threat. 
Cognitive models propose that these mechanisms reinforce already salient concerns (e.g. 
schemas) and play a key role in maintaining symptoms of anxiety, depression and 
distress.  
 




Cross-sectional and longitudinal studies have gone some way supporting this hypothesis. 
Studies have demonstrated that not only do people with anxiety and depression have 
cognitive biases for condition-congruent information but also, importantly, these biases 
can be associated with increased symptom reporting and other clinically relevant 
outcomes (Bar-Haim, et al., 2007; Dickson, 2015; Hirsch, Meeten, Krahé, & Reeder, 
2016b). It is still unclear, however, whether this is indicative of a causal role of cognitive 
biases on symptoms (i.e. biases result in symptoms), or indeed vice-versa (i.e. symptoms 
result in biases) (Van Bockstaele, et al., 2014).  
 
In support of the causal hypothesis of cognitive biases, several prospective studies have 
shown that an increased attentional bias is predictive of later stress vulnerability (Pérez-
Edgar, et al., 2010) and increased fear responses; including biological markers of distress, 
such as elevated cortisol levels and cardiovascular activity (Egloff, Wilhelm, Neubauer, 
Mauss, & Gross, 2002; Fox, Cahill, & Zougkou, 2010). For instance, Fox, Cahill, and 
Zougkou, (2010) found that in a sample of healthy university students, an attentional bias 
towards threat at baseline, predicted their cortisol response to a real-life stressor (i.e. an 
exam period) 8 months later. This suggests that attentional biases are a precursor of 
increased anxiety in response to stess. However, the absence of large-scale longitudinal, 
predictive studies constitutes a major gap in the literature. Furthermore, some studies 
have found evidence for the inverse relationship, i.e. symptoms precede the onset of an 
attentional bias (Koster, Crombez, Van Damme, Verschuere, & De Houwer, 2004; Van 
Damme, Crombez, Hermans, Koster, & Eccleston, 2006). A review of the relationship 
between attentional biases and anxiety suggests that current evidence points to 
bidirectional, maintaining, or mutually reinforcing relation; rather than a strictly causal 
one (Van Bockstaele, et al., 2014).  
 




2.3.3 Cognitive bias modification studies (CMB) 
Another line of research to test the causal/ maintaining role of cognitive biases, has been 
the development of cognitive bias modification techniques (CBM). CBM aims to modify 
the attention or interpretation bias, by repeatedly training attention towards more positive 
or benign information, or reinforcing positive or benign resolutions of ambiguity 
(respectively). CBM can test the causal relationship between cognitive biases and 
symptoms by experimentally manipulating the bias and measuring any associated change 
in symptoms. CBM is discussed in more detail in subsequent chapters (Chapter 8 and 
Chapter 9 in particular). The following paragraphs, highlight some key findings from 
CBM studies in the anxiety and depression literature, where most of this research has 
been conducted, which illustrate the potentially maintaining role of cognitive biases in 
these conditions.  
 
2.3.3.1 CBM in Anxiety  
A recent meta-analysis pooled data from children and adults with anxiety, who had 
received CBM for attentional biases (Price, et al., 2016b). The study found that, when 
CBM was effective at shifting the attentional bias, there were associated reductions in 
symptoms. Furthermore, the degree of change on attentional bias mediated improvements 
in levels of anxiety. This provides support for the hypothesis that attentional biases 
maintain some core aspects of anxiety. However, it should be noted that across the 
heterogeneous sample, (including GAD, SAD and other anxiety disorders), levels of 
anxiety did not differ between those who had completed CBM or the placebo training; 
and reduced attentional bias only mediated the treatment effects in younger groups and 
those who completed the CBM training in the lab. This suggests that, CBM thus far is 
only effective at modifying attentional biases in some groups and under certain 
conditions. These findings correspond with other meta-analyses of attentional bias CBM 




in anxiety disorders (Hallion & Ruscio, 2011; Mogg & Bradley, 2016; Pergamin-Hight, 
Naim, Bakermans-Kranenburg, van IJzendoorn, & Bar-Haim, 2015).  
 
There have been a number of meta-analyses of CBM studies which have aimed to modify 
interpretation biases in anxiety disorders. A recent meta-analysis by Menne-Lothmann, 
et al., (2014) found that CBM can be effective at facilitating more benign interpretations 
of ambiguity, and importantly the attenuation in interpretation biases is associated with a 
range of clinically important outcomes, such as reduced anxiety, worry, rumination and 
intrusive memories. These findings are supportive of the causal role of interpretation 
biases in the maintenance of anxiety disorders. However, similarly to the attentional bias 
CBM research, findings are not always consistent. Modifying IB in sub-clinical 
populations who have high anxiety sensitivity (i.e. fear of bodily sensations related to 
anxiety, such as dizziness or a racing heart), do not result in changes in fear/anxiety post 
CBM training (Clerkin, Beard, Fisher, & Schofield, 2015; MacDonald, Koerner, & 
Antony, 2013; Steinman & Teachman, 2010). Perhaps to assess and modify 
interpretations of bodily sensations, other sensory methods are required.  
 
2.3.3.2 CBM in Depression 
CBM studies in depression have similarly found mixed results. A meta-analysis of 
clinically depressed populations, found CBM had a medium effect on reducing both 
attention and interpretation biases when these studies were grouped together (Hallion & 
Ruscio, 2011). When CBM for attention and interpretation were analysed separately, the 
effect was stronger for interpretation than for attention biases (Hallion & Ruscio, 2011). 
However, neither CBM for attention or interpretation biases significantly modify levels 
of depression post intervention. The lack of change across the CBM studies is likely to 
be due, in part, to the different CBM protocols. Hallion and Ruscio (2011) included CBM 




that administered just one training session, which arguably is not sufficient for any 
meaningful change to occur. Studies which assess participants before and after 
completing multiple CBM training sessions have found more promising results. For 
instance, Williams, Blackwell, Mackenzie, Holmes, and Andrews (2013) found that 
interpretation bias training reduced depressive symptoms in a group of clinically 
depressed participants. Importantly, this change was at least partially mediated by the 
change in interpretation bias; thus supporting the hypothesis that interpretation biases are 
maintaining some core aspects of depression. In terms of attentional bias CBM, recent 
papers have provided some indications, that under certain conditions, training aimed at 
modifying attention biases can be effective in depression (Baert, Koster, & De Raedt, 
2011; Blackwell, et al., 2015; Wells & Beevers, 2010). However, whether changes in 
attentional bias lead to symptom reduction in depression is still unclear.  
 
It is fair to say that CBM research has provided mixed results. There is no single protocol 
for CBM and effect sizes for changing cognitive biases are modest at best (Mogoaşe, 
David, & Koster, 2014). Some studies fail to demonstrate a significant change in a bias, 
and  even when change in a bias is observed it is not always associated with changes in 
symptoms (Beard, 2011; Hakamata, et al., 2010; Hallion & Ruscio, 2011; Mogoaşe, et 
al., 2014). A particularly critical meta-analysis of CBM in anxiety and depression 
concluded that while ‘CBM may have small effects on mental health problems….it is 
also very well possible that there are no significant clinically relevant effects.’ (Cristea, 
Kok, & Cuijpers, 2015).  
 
However, crucially, this meta-analysis combined data from a range of disorders and did 
not differentiate among them in the analysis, nor did they assess whether the benefits of 
CBM are moderated by type of disorder. Furthermore, they pooled the results of CBM 




studies which were targeting different biases (attention and interpretation) and using a 
range of different techniques (CBM, concreteness training and avoidance training). This 
analytic strategy makes it difficult tease apart specific causal processes, and to assess the 
effectiveness of different techniques in modifying biases for different disorders. 
Importantly, Cristea, et al. (2015) determined the effects of CBM on symptoms without 
examining whether CBM had actually been effective at modifying the bias in the first 
place. If CBM does not change the bias (which is after all the treatment target and 
assumed mechanism of CBM), then associated changes in other clinical outcomes cannot 
be expected.  
 
Clearly, much more work is needed in CBM before any definitive conclusions can be 
drawn about the malleability of cognitive biases and the associated benefits of modifying 
cognitive biases. What experimental research has established, thus far, is that cognitive 
biases operate at various stages of information processing in both anxiety and depression. 
There is also growing evidence from CBM and longitudinal studies in anxiety and 
depression, that these biases are not merely mood-dependent correlates of the disorder, 
but rather may be key causal, maintaining factors.  
 
2.4 How might cognitive biases be relevant in CFS? 
Experimental research has established that cognitive biases occur in mood disorders and 
may have a role in maintaining these problems. As established in Chapter 1 there are high 
rates of comorbid mood disorders in CFS. Perhaps cognitive biases have a role to play in 
maintaining the comorbid depression or anxiety for some people with CFS. However, as 
was also established in Chapter 1, not everyone with CFS has psychiatric comorbidity. In 
fact, research has shown that CFS is distinct from psychiatric conditions in its 
presentation and cognitive characteristics (Moss-Morris & Petrie, 2001). Given that 




cognitive biases occur for condition specific information, it is unlikely that people with 
CFS will show biases for generally negative or threatening content, as in depression and 
anxiety. It may be that, in line with the content specificity hypothesis in Beck’s Schema 
theory (Beck & Clark, 1988), people with CFS have cognitive biases specific to their 
illness concerns, such as fear of activity which may exasperate symptoms and subsequent 
avoidance of activity (fear-avoidance).  
 
The hypothesis that cognitive biases may also occur in CFS is supported by CB models 
of CFS. For instance, Vercoulen, et al. (1998) proposes that a hypervigilance to symptoms 
and misinterpretating stimuli as signs of damage and disease, are central in driving 
disability and symptom severity in CFS. These processes could be conceptualised as 
cognitive biases. For example, experiencing ongoing, debilitating and unexplained 
fatigue would understandably create a high personal relevance of fatigue and illness-
related information; thus lowering the threshold at which such personally salient 
information is perceived. The increased perception of illness-related information may 
reinforce the individual’s concerns that they are suffering from a dangerous organic 
disease (core beliefs that are referred to by Beck and as an ‘illness schema’). The 
individual may become hypersensitive and vigilant to illness-related information in their 
environment (attentional bias); or interpret ambiguous information in a way that is 
consistent with their illness-schema (interpretation bias). These cognitive biases in turn 
may keep illness-related information salient, which further reinforces beliefs that 
symptoms are pervasive, uncontrollable and diverse. Prior research (detailed in Chapter 
1) has identified that these types of illness beliefs can perpetuate an unhelpful cycle of 
responses to symptoms, such as fear and avoidance of activity, catastrophic thinking 
styles and symptom monitoring (Knoop, et al., 2010; Moss-Morris, 2005; Nijs, et al., 




2013; Petrie, et al., 1995; Vercoulen, et al., 1998). In this way, cognitive biases may play 
a role in the cognitive behavioural model of CFS.  
 
Whilst cognitive biases in CFS are theoretically plausible, few studies have 
experimentally tested these hypotheses. The available experimental research in CFS is 
reviewed in Chapter 3. In order to provide some context as to how cognitive biases may 
operate in chronic, physical conditions, I will outline some of the experimental research 
conducted in the pain literature, with particular reference to chronic pain studies. Chronic 
pain can be thought of as closely related to CFS in that they both share some comorbidity 
with anxiety and depression (Scott, et al., 2007), they are both primarily characterised by 
a physical but difficult to define symptom (Clauw & Chrousos, 1998), and both are 
proposed to have key cognitive and behavioural components in maintaining some aspects 
of the conditions; specifically fear avoidance beliefs and catastrophizing (Nijs, Van de 
Putte, Louckx, Truijen, & De Meirleir, 2008).  
 
2.4.1 Experimental research in chronic pain  
As summarised above for CFS, the theoretical underpinning for cognitive biases in 
chronic pain is that people experiencing chronic pain, will have a heightened expectation 
and sensitivity for detecting pain relevant information, which is congruent with their 
current concerns or ‘schemas’. This may lead them to be hypervigilant for pain relevant 
information (attentional bias) and interpret otherwise ambiguous information as pain 
related (interpretation bias).  
 
A recent meta-analysis of attentional biases in pain, indicated that individuals who 
experience chronic pain display an attentional bias towards supraliminal (i.e. above the 
threshold of conscious awareness) presented, sensory pain-related information (Crombez, 




Van Ryckeghem, Eccleston, & Van Damme, 2013). This indicates that in chronic pain, 
attentional biases occur for information related to the experience of pain and, similar to 
depression, these biases occur at later stages of processing. The authors hypothesized that 
repetitive negative thinking about chronic pain and related problems (i.e., worrying) 
maintains attention on pain-related information. However, the effect sizes in these studies 
were generally small and although plausible, this view awaits empirical corroboration. A 
meta-analysis of interpretation bias studies, suggested individuals with chronic pain 
demonstrate biased interpretation of ambiguous information favouring pain-
related/illness-related interpretations (Schoth & Liossi, 2016). However, at this stage it is 
not possible to determine, from the paradigms that have been used, whether interpretation 
bias occurs at early or later stages of processing in chronic pain.  
 
An important limitation of this experimental work is that many studies fail to specify 
what it is about pain that the materials are trying to tap into; is it the physical threat of 
pain, or the sensory pain experience itself? For example, most of the studies assessing 
both attention and interpretation biases in chronic pain, have grouped together a range of 
different types of stimuli; those related to the experience of pain (e.g. sensory pain words 
such as ‘agonizing’) as well as affective-pain/ illness-related stimuli (e.g. words such as 
‘miserable’). This is important, as biases are hypothesised to occur for information 
specific to individuals concerns (Beck & Perkins, 2001; Pergamin-Hight, et al., 2015); a 
person who is concerned about their experience of pain may have an attentional bias for 
somatic information (e.g. ‘aches’) but not necessarily for generic illness-related 
information (e.g. ‘hospital’). For instance, a study with people with chronic headache 
found people showed an attentional bias for images pertaining to headache but not general 
pain-images, health-threatening images or general threat pictures (Schoth & Liossi, 




2013). Without this level of specificity in the materials developed and selected for 
experimental tasks, it is difficult to draw definitive conclusions from the data.  
 
Taken together, the evidence suggests that people with chronic pain demonstrate illness-
specific attention and interpretation biases, and these biases seem to occur at later stages 
of processing. Biases in chronic pain do not appear to be dependent on levels of anxiety 
and depression (Crombez, Viane, Eccleston, Devulder, & Goubert, 2013). Whether or not 
these biases are associated with clinically relevant outcomes is yet to be established. 
Theoretical models of pain (e.g. the fear-avoidance model of pain and threat-
interpretation model) propose a role for cognitive biases in maintaining key aspects of 
pain; specifically, fear avoidance beliefs and catastrophizing (Crombez, Eccleston, Van 
Damme, Vlaeyen, & Karoly, 2012; Leeuw, et al., 2007; Todd, et al., 2015). However, 
empirical evidence for this association is tentative. Several cross-sectional studies have 
found that those who catastrophize and who are highly fearful about pain also 
demonstrate increased attentional bias towards pain stimuli and an interpretation bias 
favouring more negative pain/ illness related resolutions of ambiguity (Asmundson, 
Kuperos, & Ron Norton, 1997; Heathcote & Jacobs, 2015; Heathcote, Jacobs, Eccleston, 
Fox, & Lau, 2017; Heathcote, et al., 2015; Keogh, et al., 2001; Keogh, et al., 2003; 
Vancleef, Hanssen, & Peters, 2015; Vancleef & Peters, 2006). Several CBM studies also 
suggest that training people with chronic pain to direct attention away from pain-related 
information (i.e. reducing an attentional bias) is associated with reduced anxiety 
sensitivity and pain related fear (Carleton, Richter, & Asmundson, 2011; Schoth, 
Georgallis, & Liossi, 2013; Sharpe, et al., 2012). However, CBM research in this area is 
just beginning, and, as yet, mediation has not been established in these studies.  
 




In sum, experimental research in chronic pain indicates that cognitive biases do indeed 
occur for chronic physical conditions, with some indications of relationships between 
these biases and maintaining factors. It is plausible that similar illness-specific biases may 
occur in CFS. 
 
2.5 Hypothesised mechanisms of cognitive biases 
The experimental literature has identified heterogeneity in the existence and expression 
of cognitive biases. Some groups and individuals show illness-specific biases at early, 
almost ‘automatic’ stages of processing; others demonstrate biases at later, more 
elaborative stages; and some indicate no biases at all. So why might some people have 
cognitive biases at some stages of processing, and others not? Research has explored 
several potential mechanisms that mediate the expression of cognitive biases. Below I 
will outline two of the prominent mechanistic candidates, attentional control and 
attentional malleability.   
 
2.5.1 General attentional control 
Attentional control is a plastic cognitive resource (Petersen & Posner, 2012; Posner & 
Petersen, 1990). Its function is to direct attention to task orientated information and inhibit 
attentional capture by irrelevant information. As such, attentional control is 
conceptualised as a ‘top-down’ regulatory ability (Posner & Rothbart, 2000); it inhibits 
the ‘bottom-up’ influence of irrelevant distracters (Eysenck et al., 2007). The degree of 
attentional control varies between people and is influenced by emotional states. For 
example, older people have poorer attentional control than younger people (Verhaeghen 
& Cerella, 2002) and attentional control is reduced when under increased mental load or 
worry (Stefanopoulou, Hirsch, Hayes, Adlam, & Coker, 2014).  
 




Attentional control theory (Eysenck, et al., 2007) suggest that cognitive biases are a result 
of poor attentional control capacity. It posits that difficulties in the regulation and 
allocation of attention (i.e. poor attentional control) result in salient, but task-irrelevant 
information ‘grabbing’ attention more readily and, once attention has been captured, 
makes it more difficult to disengage from this information. There is some empirical 
research to support this hypothesis. For instance, Taylor, Cross, and Amir (2016) found 
that people with high levels of social anxiety combined with poor attentional control 
(objectively measured), demonstrated an increased attentional bias to threatening stimuli 
compared to those with good attentional control. Attentional control has also been 
implicated in interpretation biases. Salemink and Wiers (2012) found that people with 
high levels of social anxiety combined with poor attentional control (objectively 
measured) had stronger threat-related interpretations of ambiguity than those with good 
attentional control; suggesting that, in line with attentional control theory, people with 
poor attentional control and who were anxious were more fixed on negative 
interpretations. 
 
Attentional control has also been proposed as a mechanism through which cognitive 
biases are modified. For instance, several studies have indicated the degree of attentional 
control influences the degree of attentional bias change following a CBM (Clarke, 
Browning, Hammond, Notebaert, & MacLeod, 2014). However, interestingly, 
researchers have also demonstrated the inverse relationship i.e. changing cognitive biases 
influences attentional control. Chen, Clarke, Watson, MacLeod, and Guastella (2015) 
observed that individuals who completed CBM to modify attentional biases, subsequently 
demonstrated increased attentional control. These findings indicate that there may be a 
reciprocal relationship between attentional control and change in attentional biases. It 




may be that there are processes within the CBM procedure that target both content-
specific cognitive biases, as well as generic attentional control abilities.  
 
Outside of the anxiety and depression literature, there has been little research testing 
attentional control theory. Though studies in chronic pain have identified deficits in 
information processing speed and attentional control (Oosterman, Derksen, van Wijck, 
Kessels, & Veldhuijzen, 2012), to my knowledge, no study has assessed whether these 
deficits help or hinder cognitive biases for pain. One study assessed self-reported 
attentional control and attentional bias to pain in healthy adolescents (Heathcote, et al., 
2015). The study found that participants who scored highly on pain catastrophizing and 
reported poor attentional control ability demonstrated an increased attentional bias 
towards pain-related information. Furthermore, when pain stimuli were presented for 
longer durations (1,250ms) poorer attention control was associated with increased 
attention bias to pain (regardless of pain catastrophizing level). These findings suggest 
that poor self-reported attentional control may be important for top-down processing of 
pain related information; i.e. when people reported having good attentional control they 
were more capable of exerting control over their ‘top-down’ goal-directed processing of 
pain related information. Whilst this study goes some way in supporting attentional 
control theory in attentional bias towards pain, we do not know how objectively measured 
attentional control affects pain-related processing. Furthermore, these findings cannot 
necessarily be extrapolated to chronic pain patients, who are likely to have more 
pervasive and salient pain schema and thus stronger attentional biases than healthy 
individuals. 
 




However, contrary to the attentional control hypotheses, poor attentional control is not 
always accompanied by cognitive biases, and vice versa (Berggren & Derakshan, 2013). 
The lack of consistency in the relationship between attentional control and cognitive 
biases may be explained by attentional control only acting upon cognitive biases that are 
occurring at later, accessible stages of ‘top-down’ processing. For example, if attentional 
biases are occurring quickly, almost automatically, without the individuals’ conscious 
awareness, the individual will not be able to deploy effortful attentional control to correct 
them. Relatedly, attentional control theory does not adequately take into account an 
individuals’ current goals; which drive ‘top-down’ processing (Van Damme, Legrain, 
Vogt, & Crombez, 2010; Verhoeven, et al., 2010). Rather, attentional control theory 
assumes that attention is being ‘grabbed’ by salient threatening information. It may be 
that cognitive biases reflect a strategic, goal-driven behaviour, a prioritization of certain 
information; for instance, a considered response that a person has engaged in to recognise 
and avoid further injury or relapse. Indeed, there is some evidence from the anxiety 
literature that conflicting attentional processes (attentional avoidance of threat and an 
attentional dwelling on threat) are driven by strategic ‘top-down’ processes. For example, 
an individual may engage in attentional avoidance of threat in an attempt to reduce 
subjective discomfort elicited by aversive stimuli (Cisler & Koster, 2010; Mogg & 
Bradley, 1998); whereas, another may engage in prolonged dwelling on negative stimuli 
in order to facilitate its more extensive elaborative processing (e.g. to assess ‘is this threat 
illness-related? Is it damaging?’ Is it controllable?’) (Armstrong & Olatunji, 2012; Fox, 
Russo, & Dutton, 2002).  
 
In sum, while attentional control seems important in relation to cognitive processing 
biases, it is still unclear as to what extent attentional control moderates cognitive biases. 
A primary feature of CFS is difficulty with attention and concentration (Fukuda, et al., 




1994; Sharpe, et al., 1991). Indeed, cognitive difficulty is a core feature across the 
diagnostic criteria for CFS (as discussed in Chapter 1, section 1.2.3). Neuropsychological 
testing has shown that people with CFS have generally slowed information processing 
speed (Cockshell & Mathias, 2010) and deficits in attentional control compared to healthy 
individuals (Togo, Lange, Natelson, & Quigley, 2015). However, the degree to which 
these neuropsychological deficits correlate with the subjective impairment reported by 
patients is unclear (Cockshell & Mathias, 2013, 2014; Moss-Morris, Petrie, Large, & 
Kydd, 1996; Schmaling & Betterton, 2016). Given the findings described above we might 
expect that poor attentional control in CFS would moderate cognitive biases.  
 
2.5.2 Attentional malleability 
Another potential mechanism underlying these cognitive biases is ‘attentional 
malleability’. Attentional malleability is an individual’s readiness to acquire an 
attentional bias. It is measured as the ability to adopt an attentional bias after a very brief 
training (i.e. on an adapted VPT, MacLeod, Rutherford, Campbell, Ebsworthy, & Holker, 
2002); whereby attention towards or away from threat is repeatedly reinforced (more 
detail on this task is provided in Chapter 7).  
 
Notably, people vary widely in the extent of their attentional malleability (Chen, et al., 
2015; Clarke, MacLeod, & Shirazee, 2008; Clarke, Chen, & Guastella, 2012; Taylor, 
Bomyea, & Amir, 2011). The degree of attentional malleability can be mapped on to a 
genetic marker or ‘plasticity gene’; alternate forms of the serotonin transporter gene (5-
HTTLPR) (Fox, Zougkou, Ridgewell, & Garner, 2011). Fox, et al. (2011) found those 
with a low-expression form of the gene (i.e. indicating high malleability) demonstrated 
greater change in attentional bias following CBM, relative to those with the high-
expression form of the gene. Furthermore, this effect was consistent regardless of whether 




attentional malleability was measured as the readiness to adopt an attentional bias towards 
threatening stimuli or away from threatening stimuli.  
 
Other studies of attentional malleability have explored this concept only in relation to 
developing an attentional bias towards threat. Clarke, et al. (2008) found those with an 
increased malleability towards threatening information, were more likely to 
naturalistically develop an attentional preference for threat when exposed to extended 
mild stress (i.e. the first semester at university), which in turn predicted an elevation of 
trait anxiety. Thus, increased attentional malleability was a risk factor in developing 
attentional biases and anxiety, in response to the environment. Conversely, Clarke, et al. 
(2012) found that the same attentional malleability was adaptive for people with SAD 
when undergoing treatment. This study found people who had increased attentional 
malleability had larger reductions in anxiety following a course of group CBT, than those 
who had low malleability (Clarke, et al., 2012). Thus, people with high attentional 
malleability may be more at risk of developing attentional biases and anxiety in response 
to stressful environments. However, these same people may also be more likely to benefit 
when exposed to environments (i.e. treatment) which promote the adoption of a reverse 
processing bias. While Clarke et al. (2008, 2012) only measured attentional malleability 
towards threatening information, they hypothesised these effects would remain constant 
regardless of whether attentional malleability was measured towards threatening or 
neutral information. They termed this the ‘bias plasticity’ account (Clarke, et al., 2008; 
Clarke, et al., 2012).  
 
The concept of attentional malleability is relatively new; however, initial results are 
promising. Attentional malleability may provide a cognitive/ genetic marker to predict 
how people respond to different environments and treatment. Further investigation is 




obviously required to determine whether such applications of this concept are useful.  It 
may be fruitful to investigate whether attentional malleability predicts response to 
treatment in CFS, similarly to findings in SAD. This information could help us understand 
the cognitive characteristics predicting those most likely to benefit from current treatment 
protocols for CFS. This is particularly pertinent given the heterogeneity in treatment 
response and recovery in CFS (e.g. White, et al., 2013) (discussed in Chapter 1, section 
1.5.7). 
 
2.6 Thesis rational and overview  
The experimental research outlined in this chapter has identified that certain groups of 
people (e.g. anxious, depression, in pain) demonstrate cognitive biases in how they 
process incoming information, in favour of information that is salient and congruent with 
their current concerns. There is some evidence that these distortions in how information 
is processed reinforces unhelpful schemas/ beliefs and may play a role in maintaining 
distress and other symptoms. Whilst CB models provide a theoretical rational for similar 
cognitive biases in CFS, there is little experimental research in this area to date. This 
thesis addresses this gap in the literature, employing experimental methods to explore 
information processing in CFS.  
 
The empirical studies contained in this thesis are conducted with a view to understanding 
the nature of cognitive biases in CFS; and elucidating relationships with self-reported 
symptoms, cognitions and behaviours. The key aims are to determine whether (1) people 
with CFS have cognitive biases and attentional control deficits compared to healthy 
individuals, (2) these factors predict how people will respond to behavioural treatments 
for CFS and (3) current evidenced-based behavioural treatments for CFS are associated 
with changes in these cognitive processes.  





Figure 3 outlines the recruitment flow for the empirical studies within thesis and the 
chapters where this data is reported. Table 2 outlines the research aims and objectives of 
each chapter presented in the thesis, alongside the design of the study, participant 
populations included and the measures that were administered at each stage.  
 
As can be seen in table 2, chapter 3 is a systematic review, which synthesises the evidence 
for attention an interpretation biases in CFS to date, and determines the nature of these 
biases (published article, British Journal of Health Psychology1). Chapter 4 aims to 
establish a robust and systematic method to developing illness-specific materials that tap 
into these cognitive biases (published article, British Journal of Health Psychology). 
Chapter 5 is a large cross-sectional, experimental study, which aims to assess whether 
people with CFS have illness-specific attention and interpretation biases and the role of 
attentional control (published article, Psychological Medicine). Chapter 6 is a replication 
study conducted with a Dutch cohort of CFS participants, which aims to establish whether 
these biases are replicable and cross-cultural (under review, International Journal of 
Behavioural Medicine). Chapter 7 is a longitudinal analysis of cognitive predictors of 
treatment outcomes in CFS, which aims to establish whether attentional bias, 
interpretation bias and attentional malleability are important for treatment outcomes in 
CFS (submitted, Behaviour Research and Therapy). Chapter 8, the final empirical 
chapter, is a longitudinal analysis assessing whether cognitive biases and attentional 
control change over the course of treatment for CFS; and secondly whether change in 
                                                 
1 All citations within published articles have been converted to APA 6th style and are included in the final 
reference section of the thesis.   
 




these experimentally measured variables is associated with changes in self-reported 
outcomes. Chapter 9 includes a discussion of findings and limitations across the studies 
included in the thesis, providing directions for future research. 
 





























Table 2 Summary of the aims and objectives, samples and measures for each chapter. 
Figure 3. Flow chart of participants included in the empirical studies within the thesis 
 



















5 and 6 Time 1:  
Pre-
treatment 
Recruited in the UK 
 
 CFS, n =52 
Healthy controls, n =51 
 
Pre-treatment questionnaires 
Pre-treatment experimental tasks  
Complete post treatment questionnaires (n =26) 
CBT (n =19) 
 GET (n =7) 
 
Received < 3 sessions (n =4) 
Still on waitlist (n =3)  
Lost to follow- up (n =7) 
- 4 unable to contact  
- 3 declined  
Complete post treatment experimental tasks (n =20) 
CBT (n =13) 
 GET (n =7) 
 
Attending non-site treatment clinics (n =7) 
Did not receive funding for treatment (n =5) 
Participants assigned treatment (n=40) 
CBT (n =27) 
 GET (n =13) 
 
Time 2:  
Post-
treatment 
Recruited in the Netherlands 
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 Cognitions and 
behaviours 
 
Time 1 and Time 2 
experimental data:  
 Attentional bias  
 Interpretation bias 
 Attentional control  
                                                 
2 Cognitions and behaviours were not analysed in this study as it was not within the scope 
of the submitted article.  
3 Attentional malleability was measured at Time 1 (pre-treatment); it was analysed in 
Chapter 7 as a predictor of treatment outcome in line with previous studies of malleability 
(Clarke et al. 2008; Clarke et al. 2014).  




Chapter 3 A systematic review of attention and interpretation biases in 
CFS 
3.1 Chapter overview 
 
This chapter is published in the following article:  
 
Hughes, A.M., Hirsch, C., Chalder, T. and Moss-Morris, R. (2016), Attentional and 
interpretive bias towards illness-related information in chronic fatigue syndrome: A 





















3.2 Published article 
 
Title: Attentional and interpretive bias towards illness‐related information in chronic 
fatigue syndrome: A systematic review 
 
Authors Miss Alicia M Hughes MSc  
Professor Trudie Chalder PhD  
Dr Colette R Hirsch PhD  
Professor Rona Moss-Morris PhD  
 
Health Psychology Section, Institute of Psychiatry,  
5th Floor Bermondsey Wing, Guy’s Campus,  
King’s College London, UK  
 
Corresponding author: Professor Rona Moss-Morris  
Tel.: +442071880165 Fax: +442071880184  
Email address: Rona.moss-morris@kcl.ac.uk; Alicia.hughes@kcl.ac.uk; 
Colette.hirsch@kcl.ac.uk; Trudie.chalder@kcl.ac.uk. 
 
Conflict of Interest Statement: TC receives royalties for self-help books on chronic 
fatigue. 
 
Key words: attentional bias; chronic fatigue syndrome; cognitive behavioural model; 
illness representations; information processing; interpretive bias; symptom interpretation 
 





Purpose: Chronic fatigue syndrome (CFS) is characterised by severe and debilitating 
fatigue. Studies based on self-report measures suggest negative illness representations, 
related symptom interpretations and heightened symptom focusing are maintaining 
factors of fatigue. This paper reviews studies which have investigated these cognitive 
biases using experimental methods, in order to (a) to review the evidence for information 
processing biases in CFS, (b) determine the nature of these biases; i.e. the stages cognitive 
biases occurs and for what type of stimuli (c) provide directions for future methodologies 
in this area.  
Methods: Studies were included that measured attention and interpretation bias towards 
negative and illness related information in people with CFS and in a comparison group 
of healthy controls. PubMed, Ovid, Cinhal, PsychInfo, Web of Science and EThoS were 
searched to December 2014.  
Results: The evidence for cognitive biases was dependent on the methodology employed 
as well as the type and duration of the stimuli presented. Modified Stroop studies found 
weak evidence of an attentional bias in CFS populations, whereas Visual Probe studies 
consistently found an attentional bias in CFS groups for health threatening information 
presented for 500ms or longer. Interpretative bias studies which required elaborative 
processing, as opposed to a spontaneous response, found an illness related interpretive 
bias in the CFS group compared to controls.  
Conclusions:  Some people with CFS have biases in the way they attend to and interpret 
somatic information. Such cognitive processing biases may maintain illness beliefs and 
symptoms in people with CFS. This review highlights methodological issues in 
experimental design and makes recommendations to aid future research to forge a 
consistent approach in cognitive processing research. 
  





Chronic fatigue syndrome (CFS) is characterised by disabling mental and physical 
fatigue, which lasts at least six months and cannot be attributed to any other medical 
condition (Fukuda, et al., 1994; Sharpe et al., 1991). As well as fatigue, people may 
experience muscle pain, malaise, sleep disturbance (Fukuda, et al., 1994; Sharpe, et al., 
1991) and concentration and memory problems (Jason, et al., 1999; Wearden & Appleby, 
1997). People with CFS report increased rates of anxiety or depression compared to 
healthy people and other illness groups (Cella, White, Sharpe & Chalder, 2013) and poor 
quality of life (Johnson, DeLuca, & Natelson, 1996).  
 
The aetiology of CFS has been hotly debated. However, the findings to date suggest a 
biopsychosocial model best explains the condition in terms of a complex interaction 
between biological, affective, behavioural and cognitive factors (Moss-Morris, Deary, & 
Castell, 2013). The biopsychosocial framework has been elaborated in Cognitive 
Behavioural (CB) models which suggest that people can be predisposed to developing 
CFS by factors such as genetics, distress and/ or personality traits. For predisposed 
individuals, stressful life events and/or an acute infection can trigger the initial symptoms. 
These symptoms and associated disability are in part perpetuated by cognitive and 
behavioural factors such as negative illness representations, symptom focusing and all-
or-nothing behaviour (Deary, Chalder, & Sharpe, 2007; Knoop, Prins, Moss-Morris, & 
Bleijenberg, 2010).  
 
Illness representations are patients’ common-sense beliefs about their illness (Beck & 
Clark, 1988), which give personal meaning to the existing symptoms and influence the 
development of coping strategies and their appraisal (Leventhal, et al., 1997). Most 
patients with CFS attribute their illness to physical factors (e.g. immune system 




dysfunction) and/or stress, and believe associated symptoms to be serious, damaging, 
uncontrollable and incurable (Moss-Morris & Petrie, 2003). These negative illness beliefs 
are associated with the onset of CFS post glandular fever, as well increased severity of 
symptoms and disability in those who already have the illness (Moss-Morris, Spence, & 
Hou, 2011). Self-reported symptom focusing also appears to play an important role. Two 
randomised controlled trials (RCTs) of behavioural treatments for CFS found reduced 
symptom focusing mediated reductions in fatigue (Moss-Morris, Sharon, Tobin, & Baldi, 
2005; Wiborg, Knoop, Prins, & Bleijenberg, 2011). Thus, how people interpret and attend 
to somatic information appears to be important in the development and perpetuation of 
CFS.  
 
To date research has largely used self-report methods to tap into these illness 
representations and related constructs, such as, negative interpretation of symptoms and 
symptom focusing. Self-reports tap into peoples’ explicit and conscious beliefs and are 
open to response bias. People may also hold less conscious beliefs which may drive 
behaviour. Experimental methods can help tap into more implicit beliefs.    
 
Experimental methods can also help us understand how explicit illness beliefs may 
influence the way in which people process information. Leventhal’s Common Sense 
Model of Illness (Leventhal, et al., 1997) suggests that illness representations or schema 
drive coping strategies. Appraisals of the success of these strategies serve to maintain or 
change illness representations. We know from the literature on anxiety and depression, 
that dominant schemas also influence the way in which information is processed which 
in turn helps to maintain these schemas (Beck & Clark, 1988). In the case of CFS, a 
negative illness representation (schema) may lead to heightened attention to somatic 
information and a corresponding tendency to interpret symptoms in an overly negative 




fashion. These information processing biases may in turn help to maintain the original 
beliefs.  
 
Research into these cognitive processes may enhance our understanding of the 
mechanisms underlying CFS and may also point to possible interventions to alter or 
change illness representations. This review aims to explore whether people with CFS 
show biases in cognitive processes and whether these biases are symptom or illness 
specific, (i.e. related to negative illness representations) rather than reflective of those 
seen in anxiety and depression, as comorbid mood disorders are evident in approximately 
half of people with CFS (Deal & Wessely, 2000).  
 
The mental health literature has identified cognitive processing biases which can 
differentiate between anxiety (Bar-Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, Bakermans-Kranenburg, & 
van IJzendoorn, 2007) and depression (Mogg & Bradley, 2005). Anxiety is characterized 
by attentional bias for threatening stimuli presented subliminally for short periods of time 
(100ms or less) (Koster, et al., 2006); reflecting a bias in the initial orientation of 
attention. In depression attentional bias occurs for stimuli that reflect a negative view of 
the self which are presented under conditions that encourage elaborative processing, (i.e. 
relatively long stimulus duration; when the negative self-concept has been primed) (Dohr, 
Rush, & Bernstein, 1989; Donaldson, Lam, & Mathews, 2007; Mogg & Bradley, 2005). 
This reflects biases in top down processes which are involved in the effortful assimilation 
and organization of incoming information (Mogg & Bradley, 2005). It is currently unclear 
as to whether negative illness schema characteristic of CFS are related to either an 
elaborative processing bias as in depression or a more habitual initial orienting bias as 
seen in anxiety. 
 




This review is the first synthesis and analysis of studies in cognitive processing biases in 
CFS. Such a review is needed to expand the girth of self-report literature in CFS and 
provide a more complete profile of both explicit and implicit cognitions in CFS. This will 
not only help us elaborate the CB model of CFS but may also provide guidance as to how 
the common-sense model could be expanded to understand how illness schema drive 
information processing. The review will separately examine studies assessing attentional 
bias and interpretation bias. Studies will be grouped according to the methods they 
employ (explained in the methods section) and summarized collectively.  
 
The primary objective is to investigate whether people with CFS show biases in cognitive 
processing. Specifically, we wanted to ascertain (a) whether people with CFS have an 
attentional bias for health threatening stimuli; and a bias towards interpreting ambiguous 
information in an illness related manner, when compared to healthy controls or other 
illness groups (b) the nature of any biases (i.e. are these early orientation biases or 
elaborative processing biases?) The secondary objective is to determine if individual 
differences in anxiety and depression in CFS are related to cognitive processing biases. 
Finally, clear recommendations for future research in this area will be made. 
Methods 
Inclusion and exclusion criteria 
Studies were included if their primary aim was to assess cognitive biases in attention 
and/or interpretation; in a CFS group (defined using a standardized research and/ or 
clinical definition; Fukuda, et al., 1994; Sharpe, et al., 1991); compared to a healthy 
control group or other chronic illness group. Studies needed to be published in English. 
Studies were excluded if they were non-experimental, case methodologies, discussion 
and/or review papers; and where the studies primary aim was to assess 
neuropsychological markers of cognitive deficits i.e. motor functioning, visuospatial 




ability, verbal abilities and language, working memory, global functioning and cognitive 
reasoning. 
 
The methodologies used to investigate attentional biases are based on reaction times. The 
Modified Stroop task (see Williams, Mathews & MacLeod, 1996 for review) presents 
participants with emotionally toned words, displayed in different colours. The participant 
is required to rapidly name the colour of each word. Attentional bias is measured as the 
latency to name colours of ‘threatening’ words compared to neutral or positive words. A 
common criticism of the modified Stroop task is that it is more accurately a measure of 
‘interference effect’ as opposed to a biased attention (De Ruiter & Brosschot, 1994).  
 
The Visual probe paradigm (MacLeod, et al., 1986) measures attentional bias by 
presenting two cues, one threatening and one non-threatening, followed by a probe in the 
prior location of one of them (for reviews see Bar-Haim, et al., 2007). Quicker responding 
to probes replacing threatening cues as opposed to non-threatening reflects an attentional 
bias towards threatening information. Posner and colleagues (Posner, 1980; Posner, 
Walker, Friedrich, & Rafal, 1984) developed an exogenous cueing task; similar to the 
visual probe task, but with only one stimulus presented at a time. Attentional bias is 
measured as assessing two aspects of attention; reflecting either engagement (when the 
target is in the same location as the cue), or difficulty in disengagement of the emotive 
stimuli (when the response is quicker when the target is in the opposite location to the 
cue).   
 
Methodological variations of these tasks include masked exposure conditions to 
investigate the role of awareness, and manipulations of stimuli duration to investigate 
different stages of processing. Exposure durations of a second or more are viewed as 




assessing processes involved in the maintenance of attention, whereas shorter exposure 
durations (e.g. 100ms) intend to capture biases which operate in early, relatively 
automatic attentional capture (e.g. Bradley, Mogg, Falla, & Hamilton, 1998).  
 
Interpretative bias is a tendency to interpret ambiguous information in a negative, illness 
or symptom related way. Interpretive bias tasks rely on presenting participants with 
ambiguity which can be resolved with either positive or negative interpretations. Tests 
then assess whether people consistently generate positive or negative interpretations of 
ambiguous material, indicating a bias towards a given type of interpretation (Hirsch, 
Meeten, Krahé & Reeder, 2016). These tasks can be dichotomized into on-line tasks 
referring to immediate interpretation of stimuli; and off-line tasks, referring to later, more 
reflective interpretations. For example, Hirsch and Mathews (2000) conducted an online 
task measuring interpretation at the moment the ambiguity is first encountered; whereas 
Stopa and Clarke (2000) used an off-line task whereby participants were asked open 
questions after being presenting with ambiguous scenarios. Table 1 details the paradigms 
described above and the proposed cognitive mechanisms and stage of processing they tap 
into.   
 
Search Strategy  
The MEDLINE, PsychINFO, Web of Science (WOS) and Cinahl databases were 
searched for ‘chronic fatigue syndrome’ and alternate terms combined with attention bias 
and interpretation bias (and related terms). The references of all the obtained articles and 
relevant review articles were searched for additional relevant studies. The Electronic 
Theses Online Service (EThOS) providing access to UK theses (www. ethos.bl.uk) was 
searched to identify any relevant unpublished theses and authors were contacted for 
publications in press. A 17 item adapted version of the Downs and Black “Checklist for 




Measuring Quality” (Downs & Black, 1998) was used to assess the quality of the studies 
(See Appendix A).  
 
Results 
Twelve eligible studies were identified from eight articles (Figure 1). Three of these were 
PhD theses (Papitsch, 2005; Gillings, 2007; Arroll, 2009). The published studies 
reviewed were of high quality (scores 12-15 out of 17); unpublished studies were of 
poorer quality (10-12), suffering from inadequate sample matching and underpowered 
sample sizes. There was marked heterogeneity of the methodologies (i.e. different 
paradigms, stimuli, exposure conditions) each tapping into different aspects of cognitive 
processing, thus a meta-analysis would not be informative.  


























Figure 1. PRISMA Flow Diagram of Study Selection 
 
  
Articles identified through database 
searching =1,038 
 Medline (n= 353) 
 WOS (n= 398) 
 Psychinfo (n= 283) 
 CINAL (n= 6) 
 
 
Unpublished Articles = 8 
 ETHoS (n= 4) 
 Conference Proceedings (n= 3) 
 Identified in relevant literature 
(n= 1) 
Records after duplicates removed = 458 




Full-text articles assessed for 
eligibility = 22 
Full-text articles excluded = 
14 
 Stimulus used not 
illness related   
(n= 4) 
 Diary study 
measuring recall of 
previously reported 
fatigue (n= 2) 
 Neuropsychological 
study of cognitive 
deficits (n= 8) 
Articles included in qualitative 
synthesis = 8 
 
Total studies within articles=12  
 Attentional Bias (n=8)                     
 Interpretative Bias (n=4) 
Records excluded on tile & 



































Table 1. Cognitive processing paradigms  
Paradigm  Cognitive mechanism Proposed type of processing 
Modified Emotional 
Stroop task 
Interference effect (lack of 
inhibitory control) of 
emotive words on attention 
Masked task measures AB 
prior to conscious 
recognition, tapping into 
automatic processing; 
unmasked task measures AB 
when stimuli are visible 
allowing for more strategic 
processing. 
 
Visual Probe task Attentional bias towards 
threatening over neutral 
stimuli   
Stimuli presented for <500ms 
taps into early automatic 
orientation of attention. 
Stimuli presented for >500ms 
taps into later strategic 
processing. 500ms is viewed 
as having potential for 
automatic and strategic 
processing.  
 




ambiguous stimuli when 
first encountered 





ambiguous stimuli when 
there is opportunity for 
reflection 








Participant Characteristics  
Table 2 summarises the study demographics. Six articles used the US Centres for Disease 
Control and Prevention (CDC) criteria (Fukuda, et al., 1994) to define CFS; 2 articles 
(Creswell & Chalder, 2001; Gillings, 2007, unpublished) used the Oxford criteria 
(Sharpe, 1995), which requires the presence of mental as well as physical fatigue. Healthy 
controls were required to have no history of CFS, and no current acute or chronic 
illnesses. Two studies included an additional control group of participants with a chronic 
condition; diabetes (Creswell & Chalder, 2002) and arthritis (Gillings, 2007, 
unpublished).  
 
There were fewer males than females in the included studies which is in line with 
population based studies of CFS demographics (Wessely, et al., 1997). All studies 
included self-reported levels of anxiety and depression (Hospital Anxiety and Depression 
Scale, HADS; Zigmond, & Snaith, 1983) which ranged from normal to moderate levels 
representative of typical psychiatric comorbidity in CFS (Cella, White, Sharpe & 
Chalder, 2013). Martin and Alexeeva (2010) reported particularly high anxiety in their 
healthy control group which was controlled for in subsequent analysis. Illness duration 
ranged from 4- 16 years, with an average of 8.3 years.  
 
Papitsch (2005, unpublished) dichotomised their CFS group into those with and without 
co-morbid depression (defined as a cut off score of 9 or above on the HADS); and Arroll 
(2009, unpublished) dichotomised their CFS group into those with high and low 
symptomology using the Profile of Fatigue Related Symptoms (PRFS; Ray, Weir, 
Phillips, & Cullen, 1992) and Pennebaker’s Inventory of Limbic Languidness (PILL; 
Pennebaker, 1982).  
 




Four of the eight articles reported a measure of symptomology. Moss-Morris and Petrie 
(2003) and Hou et al. (2008) reported the PFRS (Ray, et al., 1992), a 54 item measure 
designed specifically to measure the intensity of a range of CFS related symptoms 
experienced over the last week. Data confirmed that CFS patients had significantly higher 
symptom scores than healthy controls. Papitsch (2005) reported the Fatigue Severity 
Scale (FSS; Krupp, LaRocca, Muir-Nash & Steinberg, 1989), a measure of fatigue 
severity and functional impairment, with a minimum score of 1 indicting no fatigue/ 
impairment and a maximum score of 7 indicating greater fatigue severity. Hou et al. 
(2014) reported symptom severity scores on the 14 item Chalder Fatigue Questionnaire 
(Chalder et al., 1993), which measures both mental and physical fatigue (0-42). All 
studies report high levels of fatigue severity on their respective scales.  




Table 2. Sample Characteristics 






















CFS, 24 (4) 
Diabetes, 20 (10) 

















the CDC criteria 
in the past year 














CDC criteria  CFS, 27 (7) 
CFS/D, 21 (5) 




















Oxford criteria  CFS, 26 (8) 
Arthritis, 36 (4) 
HC, 27 (5)  
6.57 (4.14) 




7.65 (4.12)  
5.33 (3.32) 
p<0.01 
NR NR --------- 
 
Hou, 2008 CDC criteria  
 
CFS, 11 (3) 
HC, 17 (6) 




NR PFRS 121.9 (58.68)  
38.83 (32.52) 
Continued 

























CDC criteria CFS, 21 (5) 
Low Symptoms, 14  
High Symptoms, 7  
HC, 10 (2) 
--------- 




7.14 (3.46)  
9.71 (5.28)  
---------        
--------- 
15.82 (10.63)  
15.79 (14.72)  
--------- 
NR ---------     
Martin, 2010  CDC criteria CFS, 33 (16) 







7.6 (6.7) NR ---------    
Hou, 2014 CDC diagnosis 
within 6 months  
CFS, 27(8) 
HC, 35 (15) 
9.6 (3.7) 
1.9 (2.8 






CFQ 28.9 (3.3) 
------- 
Notes: CFS/D=Chronic Fatigue Syndrome with co-morbid depression (defined as a cut off score of 9 or above on HADS scale); HC=Healthy Control 
group; NR= Not Reported; CFQ= Chalder Fatigue Questionnaire (Chalder, et al., 1993); † Controlled for in subsequent analysis; HADs Anxiety and 
Depression Scale score 0-7 normal range, 8-10 mild case, 11-15 moderate case, 26 or above represents severe case.  
Table 2. (Continued) 




Table 3. Summary of Attentional Bias Results 
Author, Year 
 
Task Stimuli Main between group findings Quality 







Positive and negative 
personally descriptive 
words v. neutral words  
Until 
response 
No CFS group had an attentional bias 
towards negative words compared to 
HC** which continued to approach 
significance when co-varied out HADS 






CFS related words v. 











CFS/ME related words v. 
negative emotional words 
v. neutral words 
Until 
response 








Fatigue, illness and 
depression relevant words 
v. neutral words v. positive 
words 
500ms No An attentional bias in the CFS/D group 
for illness words compared to HC 
(p=.05). No other group differences.  
10 
Hou, 2008 Dot- Probe 
(computer) 
Health threat words and 
pictures v. neutral words 
and pictures  
500ms Yes CFS group had an attentional bias 










Task Stimuli Main between group findings Quality 













No CFS group did not differ from HC in 
Stroop interference effect (p>.05). 
11 





Illness words v. social 
threat words v. neutral 
words  
100ms Yes No attentional bias (p=.41) 15 
Hou, 2014 Dot- Probe 
(computer) 
Health threat words and 




Yes CFS group had an attentional bias 
towards threat words (p=.05) but not 
pictures compared to HC. This effect was 
more pronounced for CFS participants 
with poor executive attentional control 
(p<.001). 
15 
Notes: CFS=Chronic Fatigue Syndrome; CFS/D=Chronic Fatigue Syndrome with co-morbid depression (defined as a cut off score of 9 or above on 




Table 3. (Continued) 




Table 4. Summary of Interpretative Bias Results 
Author, Year 
 
Task Stimuli  Main findings Quality 






30 homophones; 15 
ambiguous illness 
related interpretations 
and 15 unambiguous 
words. 
Participant had to write down 
first word that came to mind 
CFS participants made 
significantly more somatic 
interpretations than HC 
(p<.001)  
14 





Not primed. 17 two letter word fragments 
presented. Fragments consisted 
of beginnings of fatigue, illness 
and depression words. 
No interpretative bias in CFS 






Analysis 1  
(unpublished) 
Second word stem 
completion task  
No explicit priming 
but authors suggested 
that concepts were 
primed by previous 
word completion task 
(above) and a dot-
probe task using the 
same stimuli.  
As above plus 5 fragments 
pertaining to positive and 
neutral stimuli. Responses 
rated by 4 independent 
researchers as positive, 
negative, fatigue, illness or 
depression related. Analysed 
for generating the same words 
as in the first word stem task. 
No group differences in word 
type generated or recalled from 










Task Stimuli  Main findings Quality 
Score Priming Stimuli  Target Stimuli  
Papitsch, 2005 
Study 2, 
Analysis 2  
(unpublished) 
  Analysed for proportion and 
type of words generated which 
were not presented in the 
previous dot-probe task.   
No overall difference between 
groups in word type 
completions. However, post hoc 
analysis found both CFS groups 
generated a higher number of 
illness completions compared to 
controls.  
9 
Martin, 2010  Lexical decision 
task  
60 homophones with 
illness, social threat 
or neutral 
interpretations.  
4 types of target stimuli; non-
word, unrelated word, related 
non-threat word and related 
threat word. 
No interpretative bias in CFS 




Notes: CFS=Chronic Fatigue Syndrome; CFS/D=Chronic Fatigue Syndrome with co-morbid depression (defined as a cut off score of 9 or above on 




Table 4. (Continued) 




Do people with CFS show an attentional bias?  
Findings from the attentional bias studies are summarised in table 3.  
 
Studies using modified stroop paradigms.  Four CFS studies used the Emotional Stroop 
paradigm which measures interference of emotionally relevant stimuli (or inability to 
inhibit interference of emotional stimuli) (Arroll, 2009; Creswell & Chalder, 2002; 
Gillings, 2007; Moss‐Morris & Petrie, 2003). Two published studies used card versions 
of the modified Stroop task and found contradictory results (Moss-Morris & Petrie, 2003; 
Creswell & Chalder, 2002). Moss-Morris and Petrie (2003) presented three sets of words; 
CFS related, depression related and neutral words matched for length and frequency of 
use. CFS related stimuli were developed in conjunction with clinical experts and based 
on interviews with CFS participants. Moss-Morris and Petrie (2003) found the CFS group 
were slower in colour naming in general than healthy controls (p<.01) however the groups 
showed no significant differences in reaction times to the word categories (p=.42).  
 
Creswell and Chalder (2002) also used a card version of the modified Stroop task, 
however rather than somatic illness related stimuli they used positive and negative 
personal description words (e.g. calm, lazy) and matched neutral words. They found a 
statistically significant interference effect in the CFS population compared to healthy 
controls (p=.004); which continued to approach significance when controlling for anxiety 
and depression (p=.06). Further analysis revealed that negative personal descriptors (e.g. 
lazy, weak, foolish) significantly interfered with attention in the CFS group when 
compared to a healthy control group (p<.05) but not when compared to a diabetes group. 
Both chronic illness groups showed a bias for personally descriptive negative 
information.  
 




The two unpublished studies used computerized versions of the Stroop paradigm 
(Gillings, 2007; Arroll, 2009). Gillings (2007) used three sets of word stimuli; fatigue 
(e.g. exhausted), negative (e.g. lonely) and neutral. Gilllings (2007) found no significant 
differences between CFS participants, arthritis patients and healthy controls in terms of 
how they responded to stimuli, however, all groups responded faster to negative 
information than fatigue or neutral stimuli. Gillings (2007) provided no information on 
how stimuli were developed or selected and no measure of symptomology or illness 
duration.  
 
Arroll, (2009) used CFS related and neutral stimuli, selected solely on matched word 
length. They found the CFS group had slower reaction times to all stimuli compared to 
healthy controls (p=.07). There was a significant group difference in response times to 
the neutral and symptom related words (p<.05); the control group were slower to respond 
to symptom related stimuli than neutral stimuli (p<.05) but people with CFS were not. 
However, when these mean scores were used to calculate interference effects, they found 
no significant group differences (p>.05).  
 
Studies using visual probe and exogenous cueing paradigms.  Three studies used the 
Visual Probe paradigm in CFS (Hou, Moss-Morris, Bradley, Peveler, & Mogg, 2008; 
Hou, et al., 2014; Papitsch, 2005). 
 
Hou et al. (2008) used words and images relating to general health threats and contrasted 
these with matched neutral stimuli, presented for 500ms. This study found that people 
with CFS were quicker to respond to cues in the location of health threatening words and 
images compared to neutral stimuli; an attentional bias that was not found in the healthy 




control group. These findings were independent of anxiety and depression when HADS 
scores were entered as co-variants.  
 
A larger study by the same authors was able to detect more detailed sub-group results 
(Hou, et al., 2014). Using the same stimuli they found people with CFS had an attentional 
bias towards health threatening words, but not for threatening pictures presented for both 
500ms and 1250ms (Hou, et al., 2014), indicating attentional biases continue to occur at 
later stages of processing. There were no significant correlations between attentional bias 
scores and anxiety or depression. Hou et al. (2014) also measured attention processes 
using the Attention Network Task (Fan, McCandliss, Sommer, Raz, & Posner, 2002); an 
objective measure of the alerting network, orientation of attention, and executive attention 
control. There were no groups differences in alerting or orientating of attention however 
people with CFS had impaired executive attentional control (p=.01) compared to healthy 
participants which was associated with increased attentional bias for threat words 
(p<.001) but not pictures (F<1.) 
 
 One unpublished study employed a visual probe task (Papitsch, 2005). The CFS group 
was dichotomised into those with and without co-morbid depression and compared to a 
healthy control group. Papitsch (2005) used five sets of 12 words relating to fatigue, 
illness, depression, positive control and neutral words; presented for 500ms. Papitsch 
(2005) found no significant differences between groups in response to fatigue or 
depression words but a significant effect in relation to illness stimuli (p<.05), with 
depressed CFS patients responding slower to illness stimuli, whereas healthy controls 
responded quicker (p<.01). Planned contrasts also found CFS participants with 
concurrent depression had an attentional bias for depression related information when 
compared to non-depressed CFS participants (p<.05).  These effects were not controlled 




for anxiety despite the depressed CFS group reporting significantly higher anxiety than 
the non-depressed CFS group (p<.005) and healthy controls (p<.001). These findings 
should be treated with caution as this unpublished study was underpowered and had poor 
quality rating compared to the published studies in this review.   
 
Martin & Alexeeva (2010) employed an exogenous cueing task. Stimuli were presented 
for 100ms and consisted of neutral, social threat, and illness words; based on stimuli from 
Moss-Morris and Petrie (2003) and the pain literature (Keogh, Ellery, Hunt, & Hannent, 
2001). Before the exogenous cueing task all participants were randomly allocated to 
either a rumination induction (instructed to read/ think about present physical sensations, 
emotions and thoughts) or distraction induction (instructed to read/ think about neutral 
external matters, such as objects). Martin and Alexeeva (2010) found no support for an 
early attentional bias towards either illness related or social anxiety words in a CFS 
sample compared to healthy controls, even when participants were induced into a 
ruminative state.  
 
Do people with CFS show an Interpretation bias? 
Table 4 summarises the interpretative bias studies. Moss-Morris and Petrie’s (2003) 
asked participants to write down the first word that came to mind after hearing an 
ambiguous illness-related (e.g. weak/ week) or neutral (e.g. fish) word. Responses were 
rated by two independent researchers as either neutral or illness-related. Moss-Morris and 
Petrie (2003) found CFS participants were significantly more likely to interpret 
ambiguous words in a threatening manner than healthy controls (p <.001); an effect which 
remained when depression was controlled for. Illness related interpretations were 
significantly positively correlated with the somatic checklist and PFRS (p<.001); this 
relationship was independent of both level of depression and negative affect. 





Martin and Alexeeva (2010) used an online lexical decision task to measure interpretive 
bias after inducing a neutral or ruminative state. The lexical decision task required 
participants to quickly identify whether a string of letters (target) that appeared on screen 
was a word or non-word, whilst they listened to homophones with illness, depression or 
neutral interpretations. The study found there was a trend for CFS participants to be 
slower than controls to identify if the text was a word or non-word (p=.05) and neutral 
homophones produced significantly faster reaction times than illness and social threat 
homophones (p<.001). However, there was no significant interaction between group 
(CFS and healthy controls), homophones and the target (p=.68) regardless of induction. 
 
An unpublished study by Papitsch (2005) used an offline word stem completion task 
whereby participants were presented with the first three letters of a word and asked to 
complete it. The word stems had at least two possible completions, one of which was 
illness related (e.g. weak/ week). Papitsch (2005) conducted this task at two time points, 
before and after a visual-probe task. Two separate analyses were conducted. The first 
word stem completion task was assessed for the proportion of illness related completions 
compared to neutral or positive word completions. There were no significant differences 
between CFS participants with and without depression and healthy controls in the 
proportion of positive, negative, health-related or neutral word completions.  
 
The second word stem completion task was analysed for the types of responses generated 
and for the proportion of illness word completions which had not appeared in the previous 
visual-probe task. There were no significant differences between groups, however, there 
was a trend for depressed CFS participants to recall a higher proportion of depressed 
words than the control group (p=.06). There was also a trend for groups to differ with 




regard to illness related completions which had not appeared in the previous visual probe 
task (p=.05); with CFS participants generating a significantly higher number of health-
related word completions than healthy controls (p<.05). However, it should be noted that 
these unpublished interpretative biases studies score particularly low in the quality 
assessment (9/16) and as such results should be viewed with caution.   
 
Are cognitive biases associated with anxiety and depression? 
Group effects of attention and interpretation biases remained significant when controlling 
for HADS anxiety and depression scores (Cresswel & Chalder, 2002; Hou, et al., 2008; 
Hou et al., 2014; Moss-Morris & Petrie, 2003), suggesting cognitive biases in CFS are 
independent of self-reported mood and affect. One study compared CFS participants with 
and without co-morbid depression and found only depressed CFS participants showed 
cognitive biases for depression related stimuli (Papitsch, 2005), suggesting content 
specific processing in depression. However, these findings are based on a small number 
of studies, thus these findings are indicative only. 
 
Discussion 
This review shows preliminary evidence that CFS is associated with biases in attention 
and interpretation of negative or illness related information. These effects do not appear 
to be explained by the presence of comorbid anxiety and depression. It is also important 
to note that there was generally large heterogeneity in the CFS findings suggesting that 
cognitive processing biases may be more evident in some people with CFS than others.   
 
The nature of the attentional bias. The Stroop studies found little support for an 
interference effect of illness related stimuli in CFS populations. In contrast, findings from 
the Visual Probe studies indicated that, for people with CFS, health threatening and illness 




related information engages (500ms) and maintains (1250ms) their attention more than 
neutral information; an attentional bias effect was not found for 100ms (Martin & 
Alexeeva, 2010), indicating that in a CFS population, attentional bias may occur at the 
elaboration phase of the information processing system, rather than the initial orientation 
phase. Thus, cognitive biases in CFS may represent a specific cognitive strategy 
developed to avoid further injury and disability. Such a strategy requires an initial 
appraisal of the information which may explain the lack of attentional bias at earlier, pre-
attentive levels of processing (i.e. 100ms).  
 
Whilst illness specific biases were not related to anxiety and depression, there was some 
evidence that the existence of co-morbid depression in CFS may result in attentional bias 
to negative personal descriptors. This finding may represent a non-specific bias in a 
subset of patients who have developed depressive symptoms in response their illness. 
Arguably many of the stimuli used in the attentional studies thus far may not be integral 
to CFS; health threatening stimuli related to general health anxiety rather than CFS per 
se, and the effects here may relate to anxiety about health and symptoms in general as 
opposed to chronic fatigue specifically. Given that research shows attentional biases for 
personally salient concepts (Riemann & McNally, 1995), research is needed to optimize 
stimuli valence in CFS. Due to the heterogeneity of CFS (Cella & Chalder, 2010) these 
stimuli are likely to extend beyond fatigue related information. 
 
Additionally, there was some evidence for attentional bias to illness threat words as 
opposed to images, suggesting a verbal thought process, which may reflect a 
ruminative/worry thought pattern. The anxiety and depression literature has demonstrated 
that verbal worry takes up more attentional capacity and is associated with attentional 
bias (Stefanopoulou, Hirsch, Hayes, Adlam, & Coker, 2014; Williams, Mathews, & 




Hirsch, 2014). It may be that people with CFS think about their condition and symptoms 
verbally which reduces their attentional control and contributes to the development and/or 
maintenance of an attentional bias towards illness related information. This hypothesis is 
supported by Hou, et al.’s (2014) finding that poor attentional control was associated with 
attentional bias in CFS.  
 
The nature of the interpretation bias. An interpretative bias was found when 
participants had time to elaborate on the stimuli and generate their own responses (off-
line tasks; Moss-Morris & Petrie, 2003); but not when participants were required to make 
spontaneous automatic responses (on-line tasks; Martin & Alexeeva, 2010). This suggests 
that people with CFS may generate illness related interpretations when there is an 
opportunity to draw upon their existing illness schemas. This theory is further supported 
by Moss-Morris and Petrie’s (2003) finding that CFS patient’s interpretative bias scores 
were associated with their self-reports of how much they focused on symptoms. Symptom 
focusing and meta-cognitive beliefs about the helpfulness of symptom monitoring has 
been found to play a role in the persistence of CFS (Moss-Morris, Sharon, Tobin, & Baldi, 
2005; Wiborg, Knoop, Prins, & Bleijenberg, 2011), suggesting that this is a maladaptive 
coping strategy. It may be that interpretation biases form a part of this coping strategy by 
habitually processing information in an illness related way, activating symptom 
monitoring and perpetuating fatigue. 
 
Together the findings from these attention and interpretation studies suggest that people 
with CFS have illness related top down processing biases (i.e. biases in effortful 
assimilation and organization of incoming information) which affects how information is 
interpreted and attended to. The bias for illness stimuli, but not negative or depression 
related information would indicate that people with CFS (without self-reported comorbid 




depression) have developed illness specific schemas or representations based on previous 
experiences. It may be that illness specific rumination activates this illness schema which 
then filters incoming information for congruence, resulting in cognitive processing 
biases.  
 
Studies found these illness biases to be independent of anxiety and depression, indicating 
that attention and interpretative biases in CFS are not just a function of negative affect or 
con-current depression. However, it is important to note these studies used self-reported 
levels of distress as measures of anxiety and depression (Norton, et al., 2013). Further 
research is needed to explore the role of common comorbidities in CFS using clinical 
diagnostic assessments. 
 
These findings mirror those in chronic pain, whereby an attentional bias occurs for 
sensory pain information at later elaborative phases of processing (top-down processing) 
(Crombez, Van Ryckeghem, Eccleston & Van Damme, 2013); and a pain related 
interpretative bias is related to fear of pain, catastrophizing (Khatibi, Sharpe, Jafari, 
Gholami & Dehghani, 2015) and symptom reporting (Pincus and Morley, 2001). This 
suggests that illness specific representations affect how information is processed and that 
these processes may help maintain the severity of these symptom experiences.  
 
Methodological issues 
The stimuli selection processes varied substantially across the studies. Some researchers 
drew upon stimuli previously developed for pain and depression, which may not be 
relevant for this specific patient group. Largely the studies used health anxiety and a 
fatigue stimulus to tap into symptom related processing. However, other processing 
biases may also be relevant to CFS, for example biases for effort and repercussions of 




over-activity. Mediation analysis of behavioural interventions has shown that fear 
avoidance beliefs about activity as well as catastrophic thinking habits are relevant for 
CFS patients and the perpetuation of symptoms (Chalder et al., 2015). Research is needed 
to optimize stimuli valence in CFS and tap into the implicit processes maintaining a range 
of negative illness beliefs.  
 
Additionally, many papers failed to report how control stimuli were decided upon. 
Without such information, it is hard to determine whether the control and target stimuli 
are appropriately matched. One study failed to match words on frequency of use in the 
English language (Arroll 2009), an important consideration as unusual words take longer 
to process (Moss-Morris, et al., 1996). Furthermore, a variety of recruitment procedures 
were used from specialist clinics to support groups and the community, which may have 
introduced a recruitment bias or a self-selection bias.  
 
Given that no one measure of symptomology was used, this review cannot compare 
severity of symptom reporting.  Some studies reported mean illness durations over 11 
years; thus, cognitive biases may reflect the chronicity of their illness generally rather 
than a unique CFS effect. In order to account for this, two studies included other chronic 
illness groups (Gillings, 2007; Creswell & Chalder, 2002) but failed to use illness specific 
stimuli and illness duration or symptomology were not reported. Future research should 
compare CFS with another illness groups with similar levels of disability.  
 
Given that many of the studies just missed statistical significance, it is likely that small 
samples sizes limited their power to detect an effect. Additionally, the large standard 
deviations among the CFS groups in both self-report and laboratory cognitive measures 
indicates heterogeneity. Despite the small sample sizes, sub-group analysis provided 




some significant and intriguing findings. Sub-grouping in future studies may lead to a 
more detailed picture. It may be that only some people show an attentional bias, for 
example those with certain cognitive tendencies or poor attentional control.  
 
The methods used in these studies emphasize the interplay between effortful top down 
process and more habitual bottom up processes. The studies which used methods that 
required more elaborative processing or maintained attention, reflecting top down 
processes, found cognitive biases; whereas, those which used methods tapping into earlier 
stages of processing (e.g. the exogenous cueing task and lexical decision task), reflecting 
more habitual processing, did not. Collectively these findings suggest that in CFS 
cognitive biases occur at later stages of processing, which may reflect a cognitive strategy 
to avoid further injury and disability. However, the division between different stages of 
processing is not clear cut. For example, an attention bias at 500ms may represent initial 
orientating of attention or a maintained attention. Alternative methods, such as eye 
tracking, would be beneficial in exploring the time course of attentional biases.  The 
methods presented here present only a ‘snap shot’ of biases at predefined durations.  
 
The findings of this review are limited by a small number of studies. Nevertheless, the 
studies reviewed represent a novel approach to studying cognitive factors in CFS. By 
providing a synthesis of the findings to date, this review has highlighted several issues 
for future research to consider in order to forge a consistent approach to cognitive biases 
research. Replication studies are needed using the paradigms, with stimuli specifically 
developed to tap into patient group symptoms and illness related concerns.  
 
Conclusions 




Taken together, the results from the cognitive processing studies provide a preliminary 
profile of the underlying cognitive processes in people with CFS. Some people with CFS 
have attention and interpretation biases at elaborative stages of processing. These findings 
fit with Beck’s schema theory (1976) whereby underlying schema filter incoming stimuli 
and direct attention to congruent information; a robust finding in anxiety (Bradley et al., 
1998; Hayes & Hirsch, 2007; Mogg & Bradley, 2005) depression (Dohr, et al., 1989) and 
chronic pain (Pincus & Morley, 2001). People with CFS appear to have a dominant 
schema of their illness as having serious consequences, being uncontrollable and long 
lasting (Moss-Morris, 2005). These coupled with the belief that fatigue is a sign of 
physical damage and that activity will likely make it worse, may result in information 
processing biases for symptom related information. These biases in CFS were found to 
be relatively independent of anxiety, depression and negative affect. 
 
These findings reinforce and elaborate the current CB model of CFS (Chalder, et al., 
1996; Surawy, et al., 1995). The studies illustrate how negative illness schemas, as 
explained above, may bias how people process information and in so doing reinforce the 
unhelpful cycle of cognitions and behaviours. This review builds upon the existing self-
report research (i.e. symptom focusing activates the illness schema and primes the 
individual for making somatic biases) and neuropsychological studies, (i.e. poor 
attentional control allows attention to be more readily grabbed and maintained by schema 
congruent information). 
 
These experiential paradigms provide an additional method of studying constructs related 
to illness representations which occur at more implicit levels of processing. It may be 
interesting for researchers to explore these constructs in other groups of patients. In terms 
of CFS, further research is needed, using reliable and standardized methodology and 




illness specific materials, in order to identify whether cognitive processing biases are a 
reliable phenomenon in CFS. If these effects are replicable, future work will need to 
determine whether there is a causal link with chronic fatigue. To do this, studies are 
needed which measure biases pre and post treatment and assess the extent to which 
change in the bias predicts improvement. Manipulation of the bias itself can establish 
whether it moderates fatigue, which would indicate that the cognitive process has a causal 
role in the maintenance of CFS. Potentially, once this basic research is carried out, this 
knowledge could be translated into novel clinical interventions, for example cognitive 
bias modification training (see Hertel & Mathews, 2011) or attentional control 
functioning (see Siegle, Ghinassi, & Thase, 2007) to be used alongside existing 
treatments.  
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The Downs and Black instrument was selected as it was designed to assess non-
randomized designs and contained the highest number of relevant items for the needs of 
this review. However, as not all items were relevant to the studies included in this review 
(many relating to interventions), a modified version of the checklist was employed with 
the following items omitted: items 8 and 9 in the reporting scale, items 13, 14, 15, 17 and 
19 in the section on bias, items 23, 24 and 26 relating to confounding and item 27 
addressing power was replaced with an easier to use item. Item 4 in the reporting scale 
was modified to assess whether ‘the experimental tasks were clearly described’ as 
opposed to whether the ‘intervention’ was clearly described. The final checklist was made 
up of 17 items with a maximum score of 17 points (with higher points indicating superior 
quality) rather than the original 32 points. The checklist covered the categories of 
reporting, external validity and internal validity (bias). The checklist was administered 
by two independent researchers and cross checked for consistency. 
17 Item Quality Checklist: 
1. Is the hypothesis/aim/objective of the study clearly described? Must be explicit. 
2. Are the main outcomes to be measured clearly described in the Introduction or 
Methods section? If the main outcomes are first mentioned in the results section 
the answer should be no. All primary outcomes should be described as yes. 
3. Are the characteristics of the patients included in the study clearly described? In 
cohort studies and trials, inclusion and/or exclusion criteria should be given. In 
case-control studies, a case-deﬁnition and the source for controls should be 
given. 
4. Are the experimental tasks clearly described? 
5. Are the distributions of principal confounders in each group of subjects to be 
compared clearly described? A list of principal confounders is provided. 




6. Are the main findings of the study clearly described? Simple outcome data 
(including denominators and numerators) should be reported for all major 
findings so that the reader can check the major analyses and conclusions. 
7. Does the study provide estimates of the random variability in the data for the 
main outcomes? In non normally distributed data the inter-quartile range of 
results should be reported. In normally distributed data the standard error, 
standard deviation or confidence intervals should be reported. 
8. Have actual probability values been reported (e.g. 0.035 rather than <0.05) for 
the main outcomes except where the probability value is less than 0.001? 
9. Were the subjects asked to participate in the study representative of the entire 
population from which they were recruited? The study must identify the source 
population for patients and describe how the patients were selected. 
10. Were those subjects who were prepared to participate representative of the entire 
population from which they were recruited? The proportion of those asked who 
agreed should be stated. 
11. If any of the results of the study were based on “data dredging”, was this made 
clear? Any analyses that had not been planned at the outset of the study should 
be clearly indicated. Retrospective = NO. Prospective = YES 
12. Were the statistical tests used to assess the main outcomes appropriate? The 
statistical techniques used must be appropriate to the data. If no tests done, but 
would have been appropriate to do = NO 
13. Were the main outcome measures used accurate (valid and reliable)? Where 
outcome measures are clearly Yes/No/UTD described, which refer to other work 
or that demonstrates the outcome measures are accurate = YES. ALL primary 
outcomes valid and reliable for YES 




14. Were the patients in different intervention groups (trials and cohort studies) or 
were the cases and controls (case-control studies) recruited from the same 
population? Patients for all comparison groups should be selected from the same 
hospital. The question should be answered UTD for cohort and case control 
studies where there is no information concerning the source of patients. 
15. Were study subjects in different intervention groups (trials and cohort studies) or 
were the cases and controls (case-control studies) recruited over the same time? 
For a study which does not specify the time period over which patients were 
recruited, the question should be answered as UTD. Surgical studies must be 
<10 years for YES, if >10 years then NO 
16. Was there adequate adjustment for confounding in the analyses from which the 
main findings were drawn? In nonrandomised studies if the effect of the main 
confounders was not investigated or no adjustment was made in the final 
analyses the question should be answered as no. If no significant difference 
between groups shown then YES 
17. Did the study have sufficient power to detect a clinically important effect where 
the probability value for a difference being due to chance <5% 
 
 




Chapter 4 Developing illness-specific materials for experimental 
research 
4.1 Chapter overview 
 
This chapter is published in the following article: 
 
 Hughes, A. M., Chalder, T., Hirsch, C. R., & Moss-Morris, R. (2016). An attention and 
interpretation bias for illness-specific information in chronic fatigue syndrome. 
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Statement of contribution 
 
What is already known on this subject? 
Cognitive biases (e.g., tendencies to attend to negative information and/or interpret 
ambiguous information in negative ways) have a causal role in maintaining anxiety and 
depression. 
There is mixed evidence of cognitive biases in physical health conditions and chronic 
illness; one reason for this may be the heterogeneous stimuli used to assess attention 
and interpretation biases in these conditions. 
 
What does this study add? 
Steps for comprehensive/robust stimuli development for attention and interpretation 
paradigms are presented. 
Illustrative examples are provided from two conditions: chronic fatigue syndrome and 
breast cancer. 








Background: There is an abundance of research into cognitive processing biases in 
clinical psychology including the potential for applying cognitive bias modification 
techniques to assess the causal role of biases in maintaining anxiety and depression. 
Within the health psychology field there is burgeoning interest in applying these 
experimental methods to assess potential cognitive biases in relation to physical health 
conditions and health-related behaviours. Experimental research in these areas could 
inform theoretical development by enabling measurement of implicit cognitive processes 
that may underlie unhelpful illness beliefs and help drive health-related behaviours. 
However, to date, there has been no systematic approach to adapting existing 
experimental paradigms for use within physical health research. Many studies fail to 
report how materials were developed for the population of interest or have used untested 
materials developed ad-hoc. The lack of protocol for developing stimuli specificity has 
contributed to large heterogeneity in methodologies and findings. Purpose: In this article 
we emphasize the need for standardised methods for stimuli development and replication 
in experimental work, particularly as it extends beyond its original anxiety and depression 
scope to other physical conditions. Method: We briefly describe the paradigms commonly 
used to assess cognitive biases in attention and interpretation, then describe the steps 
involved in comprehensive/robust stimuli development for attention and interpretation 
paradigms using illustrative examples from two conditions; chronic fatigue syndrome and 
breast cancer. Conclusions: This article highlights the value of preforming rigorous 
stimuli development and provides tools to aid researchers engage in this process. We 
believe this work is worthwhile in order to establish a body of high quality and replicable 






Several decades of research in clinical psychology have identified that how people  
process incoming information, specifically having an attentional bias to threatening 
information (attentional bias) and a bias to interpret ambiguous information in a negative 
way (interpretation bias), plays a central role in the onset and maintenance of anxiety and 
depression (Beck, 2002; Beck & Clark, 1997; MacLeod, et al., 1986; Mathews & 
MacLeod, 2005; Mogg, Mathews, & Eysenck, 1992; Wilson, MacLeod, Mathews, & 
Rutherford, 2006). Within health psychology, there is burgeoning interest in applying 
these experimental methods to assess potential cognitive processing biases in physical 
health conditions, such as chronic pain (Pincus & Morley, 2001; Schoth, Nunes, & Liossi, 
2012), chronic fatigue syndrome  (Hughes, Hirsch, Chalder, & Moss-Morris, 2016a) 
irritable bowel syndrome and cancer (Chan, Ho, Tedeschi, & Leung, 2011) as well as 
health behaviours  such as eating, (Beard, Weisberg, & Primack, 2012; Dobson & Dozois, 
2004; van Beurden, Greaves, Smith, & Abraham, 2016), smoking (Bradley, Mogg, 
Wright, & Field, 2003) and alcohol use (Field, Mogg, & Bradley, 2005; Wiers, Eberl, 
Rinck, Becker, & Lindenmeyer, 2011). Experimental research in these areas could inform 
theoretical development by enabling access to levels and types of information processing 
that may underpin unhelpful illness representations and influence health behaviours 
(Sheeran, et al., 2016).   
 
To date, health psychology theories have often neglected the role of these less conscious 
processes in behaviour and coping (Sheeran, Gollwitzer, & Bargh, 2013); assuming 
behaviour is predominantly driven by conscious processing, for example the theory of 
planned behaviour (Ajzen, 2011). However, some prominent health psychology models 
acknowledge a role for more implicit processes. Leventhal’s self-regulatory model 





crucial to understanding human adaptation and response to illness and that, importantly, 
these illness representations can be activated by stimuli at any level. The role of explicit 
illness representation in adjustment to illness, adherence to treatment, and psychological 
and clinical outcomes has received vast empirical support across a range of conditions 
(Hagger & Orbell, 2003; Petrie & Weinman, 2006). However, the role of ‘nonconscious’ 
or implicit processes that may be activating these illness representations has been lesser 
explored, particularly in physical health and chronic illness.  
 
These more implicit levels of processing require alternative methods of assessment than 
self-report questionnaires. Clinical psychologists have led research in this field, 
developing computerized experimental methods to tap into how people implicitly process 
salient, emotive and threatening information. The rationale was that salient information 
to the individual would be preferentially processed above that of neutral information 
(Riemann & McNally, 1995; Tamir & Robinson, 2007; Yiend, 2010).  
 
These methods have been employed in research into health behaviours and to a lesser 
degree physical health conditions. The chronic pain literature in particular, has employed 
these experimental methods to test the role of hypervigilance to pain ( Crombez, Van 
Ryckeghem, Eccleston, & Van Damme, 2013) as well as pain related interpretations of 
ambiguous information (Schoth & Liossi, 2016). Experimental research has begun to be 
carried out in other long term conditions such as Chronic Fatigue Syndrome (Hughes, et 
al., 2016a), Irritable Bowel Syndrome (Afzal, Potokar, Probert, & Munafò, 2006; 
Chapman & Martin, 2011; Tkalcic, Domijan, Pletikosic, Setic, & Hauser, 2014) and fear 
of cancer recurrence (Butow, et al., 2015; Custers, et al., 2015; DiBonaventura, Erblich, 
Sloan, & Bovbjerg, 2010; Miles, Voorwinden, Mathews, Hoppitt, & Wardle, 2009). 





for the heterogeneous findings may be the suboptimal selection of stimuli materials to tap 
into salient concepts of the target population (Hendrikse, et al., 2015). Some studies have 
used materials developed for other populations, for example studies of attentional biases 
in CFS (Hou, Moss-Morris, Bradley, Peveler, & Mogg, 2008; Hou, et al., 2014; Hughes, 
et al., 2016a) have used materials developed for the general population to tap into heath 
threats  (Lees, Mogg, & Bradley, 2005), which may not be integral to the specific 
concerns of the population. More specific and distinct types of stimuli are needed in order 
to help refine our models and allow for stimuli specific predictions. Whilst some material 
development and validation work has been carried out in some studies (Andersson & 
Haldrup, 2003; Crombez, Hermans, & Adriaensen, 2000; Keogh, et al., 2001; Moss-
Morris & Petrie, 2003) many fail to thoroughly address this issue, selecting materials 
from previous literature without validation (Dehghani, Sharpe, & Nicholas, 2003), 
gaining ratings of stimuli from unrelated populations (Martin & Alexeeva, 2010; Tkalcic, 
et al., 2014), or failing to report how materials were selected or categorized (Asmundson, 
Carleton, & Ekong, 2005; Roelofs, Peters, Fassaert, & Vlaeyen, 2005).  
 
Given that patterns of processing biases are most pronounced for stimuli specifically 
related to the principle domain of concern that characterizes that particular disorder 
(Gotlib, Krasnoperova, Yue, & Joormann, 2004), it is essential that preliminary work is 
conducted to identify clinically relevant stimuli, salient to the particular clinical group 
and integral to the concepts in which they intend to tap into. We argue that a systematic 
approach to stimuli development across the experimental literature would enhance the 
content validity of the stimulus materials and enable further specificity in the conclusions 
drawn for experimental research in different populations.   
In this paper we briefly describe the paradigms commonly used to assess cognitive biases, 





attention and interpretation paradigms; providing tools to assist this process and 
illustrative examples from two conditions, CFS and breast cancer. These cases have been 
chosen as two distinct populations in which some experimental research has been 
conducted but produced inconsistent results. CFS is a condition of severe, debilitating 
and enduring fatigue (Fukuda, et al., 1994). Breast cancer is a specific life threatening 
event that can have an emotional impact of an individuals’ life for years to come (Ganz, 
et al., 2002). Cognitive processes may play a role in how people with both these 
conditions cope with on-going symptoms and specific health threats.  
 
Examples of methods of assessing cognitive processing biases 
 Attentional bias (AB) 
Three paradigms are commonly used to assess AB, the modified emotional Stroop task 
(Williams, Mathews, & MacLeod, 1996); the visual probe task (MacLeod, et al., 1986) 
and the exogenous cueing task (Posner, 1980; Posner, Walker, Friedrich, & Rafal, 1984). 
These tasks use reaction time to neutral versus emotive stimuli to determine an AB score. 
Emotive stimuli are either words or images relating to the concept of interest and salient 
to the participant group. For example, previous studies in chronic pain have used words 
such as ‘aching’ and images of people in pain. These salient, emotive or ‘threatening’ 
stimuli are paired with control stimuli which are usually neutral and/or positive. Quicker 
reaction time to threatening stimuli compared to control stimuli is thought to indicate an 
attentional bias for such information.  
 Interpretative bias (IB) 
There are a variety of IB paradigms in use (for review see, Hirsch, Meeten, Krahe, & 
Reeder, 2016). All require the participant to resolve some form of ambiguous information 
by inferring an interpretation. A commonly used IB task is ambiguous scenarios task 





scenarios, each starting with a title and ending ambiguously. After reading a selection of 
scenarios they are presented with a 'recognition test', where they rate four sentences (one 
positive interpretation, one negative interpretation and a positive and negative foil) to the 
degree to which they are similar or dissimilar in meaning to the original text. The rationale 
is that high similarity ratings of the recognition sentence relating to a negative 
interpretation of the text, is indicative of a more negative interpretation of the ambiguous 
information. The foil sentences are included to rule out the possibility of participants 
endorsing any material of a certain valence (positive or negative) without truly 
interpreting the text.  
 
In this paper we will describe steps involved in developing ambiguous and appropriate 
IB materials which can be used for any IB task, with specific examples of material 
development for the ambiguous situations task. IB materials need to be devised to allow 
for both positive and negative inferences to be generated. In order to assess interpretations 
that maintain a given problem, IB materials should focus on the type of ambiguity people 
face in everyday life at times when the central component of interest is operating (Hirsch, 
et al., 2016). All recognition statements should be realistic but distinctly positive or 
negative. The interpretation items should be equally credible resolutions to the ambiguous 
scenario. The foil items should be related to the original text but have an obvious factual 
inaccuracy. Examples of IB items such as those used in the ambiguous scenarios task are 
presented in Appendix C.  
 
Selecting appropriate materials to tap into central ambiguous concepts for a given 
physical health problem (hypothesis development & refinement) 
Before embarking upon the development of appropriate materials for experiments, 





theoretical rationale. For example, the fear avoidance model of chronic pain (Vlaeyen & 
Linton, 2000) proposes that fearful patients become increasingly vigilant to signals of 
bodily threat, which in turn leads to avoidance behaviour and increased disability. As 
such experimental research in chronic pain based on this theory have used materials 
which tap into bodily threat, e.g. words and images relating to the sensory (e.g. throbbing, 
sharp) and affective (e.g. agonizing, punishing) experience of pain (Crombez, Van 
Ryckeghem, Eccleston, & Van Damme, 2013; Roelofs, Peters, Crombez, Verschuere, & 
Vlaeyen, 2005). However, other applications of experimental research in areas of health 
and physical illness have often poorly defined theoretical concepts and have tended to tap 
into broadly defined concepts, such as general health anxieties (Hou, et al., 2008) or social 
threat (Chapman & Martin, 2011). These broader concepts are informative for exploring 
psychopathology but do not draw or build upon an illness specific theory driven approach. 
Experimental studies should be guided by a sound rational as to when, how and why 
cognitive biases may play a role in the specific group of interest. This theory driven 
approach should guide researchers to identify concepts of experimental interest.  
 
Stimuli development and testing  
The next step is to develop and pilot relevant materials. Materials need to map directly 
onto the key concepts pertinent to a given bias that may be central to the clinical problem. 
Given this may vary between people the materials need to span the main, common themes 
or aspects of the problem. Here we propose a systematic and robust approach to stimuli 
development and testing, with associated tools to aid researchers with this process 







Illustrative example 1 – CFS: In order to assess whether people with CFS have an AB 
for CFS-related stimuli and/or an illness related IB, appropriate materials that capture key 
aspects of CFS were developed. This research builds upon cognitive behavioural models 
of CFS which propose that physiological factors interact with cognitive and behavioural 
responses to illness to perpetuate symptoms and disability (Chalder, Butler, & Wessely, 
1996; Knoop, et al., 2010; Vercoulen, et al., 1998). Selective attention towards health 
threatening information and a tendency to interpret ambiguous information in a health 
threatening way, may also contribute to this vicious circle.  
 
Illustrative example 2 – Breast Cancer:  In order to determine whether disease-free 
breast cancer survivors attend to and interpret cancer and symptom related information 
following treatment, cancer related materials were developed that mapped onto key 
concerns of this population. The rationale was that a selective processing of threatening 
cancer information and interpretation of potentially cancer related information in a 
































Survey to rate salience 
completed by sample of the 
population (see appendix A) 
Select stimuli rated as most 




Extract materials  
Expand pool of materials across 
different key aspects of the 
physical health problem  
Qualitative interviews to 
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Are the positive and negative foils related to but factually inconsistent 
with the scenario? 
Are both the positive and negative interpretations realistic in relation to 
the scenario? 
Are the positive and negative interpretations equally likely to be 
endorsed? 
Does the scenario describe a realistic every day situation where key 
ambiguity may occur? 
 
























Is the scenario self-referential? 
Search existing literature 
Conduct exploratory interviews and focus groups to identify salient concepts 
where an interpretation may be generated 
Develop test materials  
 
Pilot test materials 
Think aloud sessions with sample of population 
Pilot IB task with patient population and control groups 







Identify relevant theory 





Step 1: Pooling materials 
As with any research, we begin with ‘what is known’ on the subject. Have any 
experimental studies been conducted in this area before? If so, what materials did they 
use? How were these materials selected? Are there any experimental studies in areas with 
some overlap with the area of interest? What explicit measures are used to assess the type 
of concepts of interest? In order to aid this process, we propose that researchers make 
materials easily available, to aid information sharing and replication, as well as being 
transparent about the conceptual model which led to the operationalisation of these 
stimuli.  
 
Example 1. Attention: As a starting point to developing AB materials to tap into CFS 
related concerns, we pooled materials from previous experimental studies in CFS (Hou 
et al., 2008; 2014; Moss-Morris & Petrie, 2003) as well as chronic pain (Schoth et al., 
2012) and general health anxiety (Lees, et al., 2005; Owens, Asmundson, 
Hadjistavropoulos, & Owens, 2004). Interpretation: In order to identify salient topics 
which may elicit an interpretation bias in CFS, we drew from the Cognitive Behavioural 
Responses Questionnaire (Cella, et al., 2013; Skerrett & Moss-Morris, 2006) and Illness 
Perceptions Questionnaire (Moss-Morris, et al., 2002; Weinman, Petrie, Moss-Morris, & 
Horne, 1996). 
 
Example 2.  Attention: Initial AB material was pooled from cognitive biases studies in 
cancer populations (Butow, et al., 2015; Custers, et al., 2015; Glinder, Beckjord, Kaiser, 
& Compas, 2007) as well as healthy populations with anxiety about cancer 
(DiBonaventura, et al., 2010). Interpretation: For the development of ambiguous 
situations for the IB task, initial topic areas were generated from searching cancer 






Step 2: Focus groups & interviews 
The pooling process results in an accumulation of potentially useful but non-specific 
materials. The next stage is to use qualitative methods to identify salient illness specific 
concerns and extract vocabulary or images directly generated by the patient or target 
group.  
 
Example 1. One to one interviews with CFS participants explored the experience of CFS 
using open questions and prompted interviewees to recall real-life examples that captured 
these experiences. A workshop with six clinically trained psychologists and cognitive 
behaviour therapists who specialize in the treatment of CFS, discussed the ways in which 
their patients typically described their experience of CFS and recurring themes salient to 
that experience. Attention: Fifty-six words used to describe CFS were extracted from the 
interviews and workshop. Interpretation: The real-life examples described by patients 
and clinicians were used to develop 40 ambiguous test items for the IB task, which tapped 
into the three overarching themes of (i) perceived effort (ii) catastrophic thinking (iii) 
misattributions of emotions and sensations. The test materials were short descriptions of 
an ambiguous scenario which could be interpreted in either a positive or somatic way 
(Appendix B1). 
 
Example 2.  Interviews with six breast cancer survivors explored issues of most concern, 
with open questions regarding their experiences and worries. Attention: Fifty-eight 
cancer-related words were identified from previous literature and interviews. 
Interpretation: Key themes associated with breast cancer survivorship were identified 
from the interviews; (i) fear of cancer recurrence (ii) symptom attribution (iii) concerns 





for the IB task were developed to tap into these themes. Test materials consisted of 
descriptions of an ambiguous situation and statements offered a positive or negative 
interpretation of the situation (Appendix B2). Test materials were piloted in the next step. 
 
Step 3: Piloting the face validity  
The next step is to pare down the accumulated specific and nonspecific materials by 
selecting items with the best face validity. Similar to the development of questionnaires, 
this process involves piloting materials with a sample of the target population and 
conducting think aloud sessions to examine if instructions are understood and interpreted 
in the expected way.  
 
Example 1. Attention: A survey was conducted to determine which of the 56 illness 
related words identified in steps 1 and 2 were likely to be of current concern, since this 
will enhance the likelihood that potential AB in CFS will be identified. Participants rated 
the salience of each word to their experience of CFS (Appendix A). Fifty-eight CFS 
participants completed the survey. Mean ratings were calculated per word, with higher 
scores reflecting a greater emotive valence. Twenty-four highest scoring words were 
selected for the AB task. Words with the highest ratings broadly related to symptom 
experience (e.g. ‘shattered’) and associated consequences (‘bedbound’). Interpretation: 
A second pilot survey was set up for the IB task which included patients with CFS and 
healthy controls. The survey consisted of 40 short ambiguous scenarios, with the last 
word left blank. Participants had to complete the last word, thus revealing their 
interpretation of the text (Appendix B1). For example, ‘You have planned to clean the 
downstairs of your house today and found this easier and quicker than you expected. You 
think if you carry on you will feel …. In this example potential completions could be 





completed the survey. The single word completions were rated by two independent 
researchers, as CFS-related, generally negative, neutral or positive. Inter-rater reliability 
was high (97% consensus). The scenarios which demonstrated the biggest difference 
between the groups in terms of CFS-related interpretations, and the scenarios which 
resulted in consistent conceptually related interpretations in the CFS group were 
developed into full text materials for the main IB task (Appendix C1).  
 
Example 2.  Attention: Stimuli for the AB task were rated for their relevance by 90 breast 
cancer survivors. Fifty-eight cancer related words, 64 general and 60 neutral words were 
separately rated on a 5 point scale for (i) the degree of threat (ii) and relevance to cancer. 
Twenty-four words that were most highly rated in terms of threat and cancer dimensions 
were selected for the AB task and matched by length and frequency to neutral words.   
Interpretation: To test the stimuli for the IB task, breast cancer survivors (n=8) were 
asked to complete a pilot version of the task whilst conducting a think-aloud session with 
a researcher. This revealed that participants were rating statements according to their own 
experiences rather than how closely each statement matched the original scenario. 
Subsequent revisions were made to the instructions of the task and piloted with 51 breast 
cancer survivors. This piloting demonstrated low internal reliability and frequent 
endorsement of foil statements; suggesting participants might be forgetting the content of 
the original scenarios. The task was revised to more clearly differentiate target statements 
from foils and include expanded titles to make it easier for participants to recall the 
content of each scenario and piloted with 44 breast cancer survivors. Twelve materials 







In order to test the relevant hypothesis, these illness specific materials need to be paired 
with control stimuli. The choice of control stimuli is very important as low frequency 
(unusual) words take longer to process (Moss-Morris, et al., 1996). However, many 
studies fail to report how control stimuli were decided upon (see Hughes, et al., 2016a for 
a discussion of this issue). In order to select the control stimuli for the CFS and cancer 
AB tasks, illness-related and control words were matched in terms of semantic properties 
that affect reading speed, including word length, number of syllables per word, and 
frequency of occurrence of each word in the English language. The open source ‘English 
Lexicon Project’ (Balota, et al., 2007) was used to identify neutral words with matched 
properties with a paired illness-related word. This is an important step as if words are not 
matched, one cannot unequivocally interpret differences in reaction time for illness-
related and control words as being due to the ‘saliency’ of the words.  
 
In tasks in which pictorial stimuli are used, illness-related and control stimuli should be 
matched in terms of basic perceptual features, such as overall complexity and brightness, 
which are likely to influence the allocation of attention, especially the rapid orienting of 
attention (Egeth & Yantis, 1997). Images should be rated, piloted and validated much in 
the same way as word stimuli.  
 
In terms of matched materials for the IB tasks, items need to be carefully worded to allow 
for a positive but realistic interpretation of the earlier text. These positive interpretation 
items should have similar length and semantic structure to the negative interpretation 
item. Similarly, to the AB task, if this is not achieved, one cannot rule out the effect of 






For cross-sectional studies, comparative control groups should be matched to the sample 
population on variables that may affect their performance on the experimental tasks such 
as, cognitive ability, age and dexterity. It may be necessary to include an additional 
clinical control group in order to allow further discrimination between findings being 
attributed to general clinical characteristics (e.g. pain across different diseases) or 
findings specific to a particular physical health condition.  
 
Other conceptual and experimental issues to consider 
How threatening is too threatening?  
In the real world it is adaptive for people to orientate towards highly threatening stimuli. 
Research has found that most people orientate towards high threat and away from mild 
threat (Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998; Mogg & Bradley, 1998); thus for group differences 
to be identified stimuli need to hold optimal levels of threat intensity for the population.  
 
Stimulus modality  
The optimal stimuli modality may differ according to the population being studied. For 
example, studies in CFS have found attentional biases for word stimuli but not images 
(Hou et al., 2008; Hou et al., 2014) whereas studies of chronic pain have identified an AB 
for pain related faces and words (Pincus & Morley, 2001; Schoth et al., 2012). This may 
indicate that in some conditions facial stimuli carry ecological relevance (Dear, Sharpe, 
Nicholas, & Refshauge, 2011), whereas in other conditions, such as CFS, patients think 
about their condition and symptoms verbally, thus linguistic stimuli hold greater 
ecological validity (Hou et al., 2008). However, it may be that these mixed findings are 
due to procedural variables that affected the presence and magnitude of an AB (Crombez, 







In AB tasks the duration of stimuli presentation or ‘stimulus onset asynchrony’ (SOA) is 
manipulated to tap into different stages of processing. Generally researchers have used 
SOA of 1000ms or more to infer the maintenance of attention and shorter SOA’s of 
200ms or less tap into earlier, more ‘automatic’ processing (Koster, De Raedt, Goeleven, 
Franck, & Crombez, 2005; Mogg, Bradley, De Bono, & Painter, 1997). Similarly, 
modifications of IB tasks allow researchers to tap into more automatic (e.g. Hirsch & 
Mathews, 2000) versus controlled processing (e.g. Stopa & Clark, 2000). Researchers 
should refer to literature in their field to help them decide the stage of processing they 
wish to tap into (see Hirsch, et al., 2016). However, it is important to note that the 
distinction between earlier and later stages, or automatic and controlled processing is not 
clear cut and these paradigms offer only a snap shot of cognitive processing at a given 
time. Further studies and alternative methodologies are needed to explore the interplay 
between stages of processing.  
 
Relatedly, these types of reaction time paradigms are restricted to assessing biases for 
words or images which hold an immediate or salient meaning. However, the concepts 
under scrutiny are often ones which cannot always be clearly and succinctly defined. For 
example, people with CFS often use metaphors or ‘as if’ statements to describe their 
symptoms. If singular words or images do not capture the distinctive sensory qualities of 
the object of threat they will not elicit a bias. Tasks which allow more vivid representation 
of the object of threat, such as the primary task paradigm (Crombez, Eccleston, Baeyens, 
& Eelen, 1998), could explore how the distinctive sensory qualities of the object of threat 
affects cognitive processing.  
 





Cognitive ability affects reaction time (Deary & Der, 2005), recall (Reijnders, van 
Heugten, & van Boxtel, 2013) and reading ability (Wang & Gathercole, 2013), thus 
affecting participants’ performance on experimental tasks. Children and adolescents 
(Burgaleta, Johnson, Waber, Colom, & Karama, 2014) can show meaningful cognitive 
ability changes within relatively short developmental periods. Other populations such as 
the elderly (Rebok, et al., 2014) and those on certain medications such as anticholinergic 
drugs (Fox, et al., 2014),  may have reduced cognitive ability. Researchers studying such 
populations should ensure they consider the level of sophistication of the language and 
that the SOAs are appropriate for the target population.  
 
Conclusions 
With experimental research in health psychology growing, there is an exciting 
opportunity for the field to identify key cognitive processes that may help maintain 
distress and guide development of novel interventions to target these mechanisms and 
improve well-being. In order to do this, the key processes need to be assessed with 
materials that map onto the cognitive processes specific to a given health problem. We 
believe that adopting the suggested approach detailed here will aid researchers as they 
begin adapting these paradigms for different populations. Materials used in experimental 
tasks should be subject to the same rigorous development and validation as self-report 
questionnaires to ensure materials are reliably tapping into the concept(s) of interest. We 
encourage researchers to make their materials available alongside published work to aid 
further transparency about the inferences that can be drawn from the study. This 
preliminary stimuli development work is essential in order to develop a body of high 






Traditional health psychology models have largely focused on the role of reflective 
intentioned action and beliefs (Sheeran, et al., 2013). Experimental research adds another 
dimension to these models by exploring the more implicit drivers of health behaviours 
and coping. Extant treatments have principally engaged conscious processes via explicit 
communication (e.g. persuasive information, problem solving, planning, and 
implementation intentions). Health psychology interventions may be optimized by 
additionally targeting these implicit processes. For example, reducing AB to food cues 
may in turn reduce impulsivity and thereby help regulate impulsive eating (Bongers, et 
al., 2015). There may also be a role for implicit processing in coping. For example, if 
survivors of breast cancer have persistent AB for cancer related information and tend to 
interpret ambiguous information as cancer related, they may consequently experience 
increased anxiety and fear or recurrence (Glinder, et al., 2007). Modifying these processes 
with cognitive bias modification (CBM) techniques will enable hypothesis testing and 
potentially indicate additional treatment targets, paving the way for new interventions. 
 
To date there is no single protocol for consistent and effective CBM. However, there are 
some promising findings in anxiety which indicate that when CBM is effective in 
changing an AB associated reductions in anxiety are observed (Linetzky, Pergamin-
Hight, Pine, & Bar-Haim, 2015; MacLeod & Clarke, 2015). CBM techniques may benefit 
from further specificity, identifying and targeting idiosyncratic content that is 
personalized and tailored to a specific patient. Such an approach could enable testing 
processing specificity in heterogeneous conditions such as CFS (Wilson, et al., 2001) in 
which the content of concern may be non-specific and vary markedly across patients.  
 
There are challenges to this material developmental work; it is time consuming, costly, 





interest. Nevertheless, we believe this work is worthwhile in order to establish a body of 
high quality and replicable experimental research within the health psychology literature. 
We hope this article highlights the value of preforming rigorous material/stimuli 






Templates for Attentional Bias stimuli pilot surveys 
 
Template 1. 
You will be asked to rate a list of words in terms of how personally emotive or distressing 
you feel they are. I.e. the degree to which the word brings to mind an unpleasant or 
distressing emotion related to your INSERT CONDITION. 
Recalling a time when you were experiencing your worst symptoms, please rate these 
words in the degree to which they bring to mind an unpleasant or distressing emotion 
related to INSERT CONDITION. 








Word  0 1 2 3 4 
Word 0 1 2 3 4 
 
Template 2. 
The following five pages contain lists of words. Some may be related to INSERT 
CONDITION, others less so. Please indicate on a scale from 1-5 how INSERT 
CONDITION related each word seems to you. Please give us your first impressions and 
try to work as quickly and accurately as possible. 












Word  0 1 2 3 4 
Word 0 1 2 3 4 
 
The following five pages contain lists of words. Some may appear threatening, others 
might not. Please indicate on a scale from 1-5 how threatening each word seems to you. 
Please give us your first impressions and try to work as quickly and accurately as possible. 










Word  0 1 2 3 4 
Word 0 1 2 3 4 
APPENDIX B 






B1. Pilot survey for CFS population 
Please imagine yourself in these scenarios and complete the sentences with the first word 
that comes to mind.  
 
For example:  ‘It is winter and you are outside. You notice yourself shivering 
which is a sign you are …cold’ 
 
1. You spent the afternoon shopping and by the time you get home you feel tired. 
You slept many hours that night and when you wake up you feel... 
 
2. You have planned to clean the downstairs of your house today and found this 
easier and quicker than you expected. You think if you carry on you will feel... 
 
3. A friend has just asked you to go for a walk with them. You think the walk 
would be... 
 
4. You are going on holiday tomorrow and have had a busy day packing. When 
your alarm wakes you up in the morning you feel... 
 
5. You have attended a family occasion and had an enjoyable time. It was a long 
day and by the end you feel very tired. You think in a couple of days you will 
feel...  
 
6. You usually get the bus to work but today you are feeling energetic and decided 
to walk. When you come home from work you feel more tired than usual. You 
think tomorrow you will feel.... 
 
B2. Pilot survey for breast cancer population 
Scenario Example 
TITLE: Results from a Blood Test 
SCENARIO: You completed treatment and go in to have a follow up blood test. The 
nurse calls to give you the results, but instead tells you that there are further tests that 
need to be run. You can tell from the tone of her voice if she is concerned.  
QUESTION: Did you receive a call from the nurse? (Yes/No) 
Recognition Example 
TITLE: Results from a blood test 





QUESTION: How similar is this to THE ORIGINAL DESCRIPTION you read? 
 Very similar in meaning 
 Fairly similar in meaning 
 Fairly different in meaning 







 Example of Interpretative Bias materials 
 
C1. IB materials for CFS population. 
 
 
Title: Weekend Break  
You and your partner booked to go on a weekend break. You stayed for 2 nights and 
fitted a lot in. You ended up doing a lot of sight-seeing around the city. As you travel 
home you think about how you found the weekend.  
Did you go on a break with a friend?  
1. You had an enjoyable and interesting weekend.  
2. You found the weekend exhausting.  
3. Your partner booked the holiday as a surprise.   
4. You had to come home from the holiday early.  
 
Title: Cleaning the House 
Last week you spent a day cleaning the house.  You hoovered all the carpets in the house 
and mopped the kitchen floor. A week later you notice the carpets are dirty and need 
hoovered again. You think about how you felt after the last time you cleaned. 
Did you clean the windows? 
1. You felt pleased with how nice the house looked after cleaning.  
2. You felt stiff and painful for days as you pushed your body too far. 
3. You completed the cleaning quicker than you had expected. 
4. You were unable to clean last week as you hurt your back.   
 





You decide to clean inside the windows today. You finish cleaning the windows 
downstairs quicker than you expected and move on to clean the upstairs windows. While 
climbing the stairs your notice how your shoulders and arms feel.  
Did you clean the inside windows?   
1. Your shoulders and arms feel like they have had a good workout.   
2. Your shoulders and arms feel stiff and painful after over doing things.   
3. You cleaned both the inside and outside windows quicker than expected.   
4. You fell off a ladder after cleaning the outside windows. 
 
Title: The exercise class  
You have started going to a beginners exercise class once a week at your local leisure 
centre. After a month you feel fitter and decide to enroll in the intermediate class. After 
attending the first intermediate class you notice your arms and legs are sore. You think 
about what this means. 
Do you have a personal trainer? 
1. Your limbs will be sore until you get used to your new exercise regime.  
2. You will be bed ridden for days as you have pushed your body too far. 
3. Your arms and legs feel stronger after a week of your new exercise regime.  
4. You decrease your exercise regimen as you are not fit enough to exercise twice a 
week. 
 
C2. IB materials for breast cancer population 
Title: Reading the newspaper 
You are reading a section of the newspaper and come across a headline about an article 
on cancer. You hesitate a moment and continue to read the article. The article tells you 
how likely people are to survive in the long-term if they are diagnosed with breast cancer. 





Q: Did you read the entire paper?   
1: The article makes you think your risk of being cured after breast cancer is high (Positive 
target) 
2: The article makes you think your risk of being cured after breast cancer is low 
(Negative target) 
3: The article makes you think your risk of being diagnosed with a stroke is high 
(Negative foil) 
4: The article makes you think your risk of being diagnosed with a stroke is low (Positive 
foil). 
 
Title: One year later 
You completed treatment a year ago and are reminded of when you were first diagnosed. 
You think back to how you felt then and compare this to where you are today. You reflect 
on how your experience of being diagnosed and treated for cancer has impacted your life 
as it is today.  
Q: Were you thinking about what to prepare for dinner?  
1: Cancer has impacted your life and is interfering with your ability to get on with life as 
usual (Negative target) 
2: Cancer affected your life during treatment, but it’s behind you now and you are moving 
on (Positive target) 
3: You remember the weather was very cold and rainy last year and you were often unwell 
(Negative foil) 
4: You remember the weather was good last year and you enjoyed spending time outdoors 
(Positive foil) 
 





You are being treated for cancer and you pick up a leaflet from the doctor’s about the 
disease. You read it and learn about risks and symptoms of breast cancer recurrence. As 
you read through the lists you recognise what your own risk might be and consider your 
prognosis.  
Q: Did you read about cancer on a poster?  
1: The leaflet says that most people who get cancer feel well most of the time (Positive 
foil) 
2: The leaflet says that most people who get cancer feel sick most of the time (Negative 
foil) 
3: The leaflet says that people who get cancer are likely to die from the disease (Negative 
target) 
4: The leaflet says that people who get cancer are likely to survive the disease (Positive 
target) 
 
Title: The biopsy 
You recently had a biopsy to test a lump on your neck for cancer. You are now sitting in 
your surgeon’s office and he tells you he has the biopsy report. You think you can tell by 
the look on his face what the results of the biopsy show.  
Q: Did the surgeon discuss chemotherapy with you?  
1: You can tell by the look on your doctor’s face that the result is good news (Positive 
target) 
2: You can tell by your doctor’s manner that he is relaxed and not rushed (Positive foil) 
3: You can tell by your doctor’s tone that he is very busy and in a hurry (Negative foil) 








Chapter 5 A cross-sectional study of cognitive biases and deficits in CFS 
and healthy controls 
5.1 Chapter overview  
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Background: Studies have shown that specific cognitions and behaviours play a role in 
maintaining chronic fatigue syndrome (CFS). However, little research has investigated 
illness specific cognitive processing in CFS. This study investigated whether CFS 
participants had an attentional bias for CFS-related stimuli and a tendency to interpret 
ambiguous information in a somatic way. It also determined whether cognitive processing 
biases were associated with comorbidity, attentional control or self-reported unhelpful 
cognitions and behaviours.  
Methods: Fifty-two CFS and 51 healthy participants completed self-report measures of 
symptoms, disability, mood, cognitions and behaviours. Participants also completed three 
experimental tasks, two designed specifically to tap into CFS salient cognitions: (i) 
Visual-Probe task measuring attentional bias to illness (somatic symptoms and disability) 
versus neutral words, (ii) interpretive bias task measuring positive versus somatic 
interpretations of ambiguous information and (iii) the Attention Network Test measuring 
general attentional control.  
Results: Compared to controls, CFS participants showed a significant attentional bias for 
fatigue-related words and were significantly more likely to interpret ambiguous 
information in a somatic way, controlling for depression and anxiety. CFS participants 
had significantly poorer attentional control than healthy individuals. Attention and 
interpretation biases were associated with fear/avoidance beliefs. Somatic interpretations 
were also associated with all-or-nothing behaviour and catastrophizing. Conclusions: 
People with CFS have illness specific biases which may play a part in maintaining 





processing, such as positive interpretation biases and more flexible attention allocation, 






Chronic Fatigue Syndrome (CFS) is a debilitating condition lasting over 6 months. 
Symptoms include fatigue, pain, sleep problems and poor concentration and memory 
(Fukuda, et al., 1994; Sharpe, et al., 1991). No single somatic cause has been identified. 
Although a virus or work stress may trigger the condition, cognitive, behavioural, 
affective and physiological factors are thought to perpetuate symptoms and disability 
(Surawy, et al., 1995; Burgess, et al.,2012; Chalder, 2013; Moss-Morris, et al., 2013). 
Self-report studies have found that negative illness representations, symptom 
interpretations and heightened symptom focusing contribute to the maintenance of CFS 
(White, et al., 1995; Knoop, et al., 2010, Moss-Morris, et al., 2011). Changing such 
cognitions, in particular fear avoidance beliefs and catastrophizing, have been found to 
mediate treatment response (Moss-Morris, et al. 2005; White, et al., 2011; Wiborg, et al. 
2011; Wearden & Emsley, 2013; Stahl, et al. 2014; Chalder, et al., 2015) 
 
Whilst self-report studies have identified certain cognitions as perpetuating factors, little 
is understood about the cognitive processes underlying these beliefs. Deary, et al. (2007) 
have suggested habitual processes, such as attention and misinterpretation, may play a 
role. For example, selectively attending to somatic information and habitually 
interpreting ambiguous information as health threatening may precede and perpetuate 
unhelpful cognitive and behavioural responses, such as fear avoidance beliefs, symptom 
monitoring and avoidance of activity. If so, targeting these cognitive processes in existing 






Little experimental research has been conducted in this area. A recent review of cognitive 
processing biases in CFS found a small number of published studies (n=5), many with 
methodological limitations including small sample sizes and poorly defined populations 
(Hughes, et al., 2016a). Results were often conflicting. Studies using a modified Stroop 
task found threatening content did not interfere with information processing in CFS 
(Moss-Morris & Petrie, 2003). However, studies using visual probe tasks indicate a 
selective attention towards health threatening stimuli occurs when stimuli are presented 
for longer durations (e.g. >500ms; Creswell & Chalder, 2002; Hou, et al., 2008; Hou, et 
al., 2014) but not when presented briefly (e.g. 100ms; Martin & Alexeeva, 2010). This 
may indicate that people with CFS have difficulties with attentional processes of 
disengagement, rather than the initial orientation of attention. Similarly, studies of 
interpretation biases using on-line tasks, which require participants to make an immediate 
and spontaneous interpretation of ambiguous information, have not found biases in CFS 
(Martin & Alexeeva, 2010). Studies that have used off-line interpretative bias tasks which 
allow participants time to form an interpretation have found biases in CFS (Moss-Morris 
& Petrie, 2003). This may indicate that people with CFS interpret ambiguous information 
in a somatic way when they have time to reflect on the material (i.e. off-line tasks) but 
not when the material is first encountered (i.e., online-tasks). These findings suggest that 
threat-related processing in CFS occurs at later, elaborative stages of processing. 
 
Furthermore, one study has shown a correlation between increased somatic 
interpretations of ambiguous information and self-reported somatic focus (Moss-Morris 





maladaptive beliefs and behaviours. However, these conclusions are deduced from a 
small body of evidence, employing different paradigms and subtle methodological 
variations, tapping into different cognitive content and mechanisms. Further research is 
needed to establish whether cognitive processing biases are a reliable phenomenon in 
CFS, the nature of such biases and how they relate to other self-reported cognitions and 
behaviours factors operationalised in the cognitive behavioural model of CFS.  
 
Most of the previous CFS studies used generic health threatening stimuli, which arguably 
are not integral to CFS. Some studies recruited participants from support groups, who 
may have different salient concerns to clinical CFS populations. Given the large 
heterogeneity in CFS (Cella, et al., 2011a), experimental research would benefit from 
exploratory work to first identify the salient illness-related concerns before assessing 
threat-related processing. Content specific processing is evident in depression and anxiety 
disorders (Fritzsche, et al., 2010; Pergamin-Hight, et al. 2015). Given the high prevalence 
of comorbid mood disorders in CFS (Cella, et al., 2013) it may be that cognitive biases 
are a function of depression and/or anxiety in the CFS population, rather than their CFS 
per se. However, recent research in CFS indicates that these biases are independent of 
mood and affect (Hughes, Chalder, Hirsch, & Moss-Morris, 2016b). These biases are 
associated with health related rather than mood related stimuli, suggesting that biases 
occur for themes central to the disorder. This is in keeping with cognition and emotion 






Whether these biases predispose illness or develop as a result of illness is unclear. 
Prospective and longitudinal studies in the chronic pain literature have associated 
attentional biases with poorer outcomes (Lautenbacher, et al. 2010; Todd, et al., 2016) 
and chronicity (Sharpe, et al., 2014). Similarly, it may be that people who have had CFS 
for some time, living with the ongoing uncertainty of a disabling and poorly explained 
condition, could reasonably become preoccupied with their illness. Over time this may 
result in biases in how information is attended to and processed. Research to date has not 
established whether there is a relationship between illness duration or severity and 
cognitive biases in CFS (Hughes, et al., 2016b). 
 
Some theories suggest threat-related processing is a result of difficulty in regulation and 
allocation of attention (Eysenck, et al., 2007). Both self-report and neurological studies 
suggest that people with CFS have difficulties with general attentional control (Cockshell 
& Mathias, 2010; Togo et al., 2015). One study (Hou et al., 2014) found that only CFS 
participants with poor attentional control had an increased attentional bias towards health 
threat. However, this study was small (n=14) and was likely underpowered to truly detect 
sub-group effects. Other studies in anxiety and pain have also indicated a moderating role 
of attentional control in both attentional biases (Heathcote, et al., 2015) and interpretation 
biases (Salemink & Wiers, 2012). There may be a subgroup of CFS patients who have 
particularly poor attentional control which may make them more prone to develop biases 
in cognitive processing. Research would benefit from the assessment of cognitive biases 
and effortful attentional control in CFS within larger samples to determine whether 





programs to improve attentional control may be clinically relevant (Jones & Sharpe, 
2014; Schoth, et al., 2013; Sharpe,et al., 2012; Sharpe, et al., 2015). 
 
The current study is the largest to date in this area and addresses many of the 
methodological limitations mentioned above. Stimuli were developed with CFS patients 
and clinicians to ensure that the tasks were tapping into CFS specific concerns and 
validated paradigms were selected to assess attention and interpretation biases. The main 
hypotheses are as follows: 1a) CFS participants, when compared to healthy controls, will 
have an attentional bias towards fatigue-specific somatic and disability related 
information presented for 500ms and an interpretive bias towards somatic rather than 
positive information, 1b) This difference between groups will remain even when 
controlling for comorbid mood disorders, 2) Attention and interpretation biases in CFS 
will be associated with/ moderated by deficits in attentional control, 3) Attention and 
interpretation biases in CFS will be associated with self-reported fear avoidance beliefs, 
catastrophizing about symptoms, symptom focusing, fatigue, disability and increased 
illness duration.   
Methods 
Participants  
Participants were included if they were 18 years or older, fluent in English, with normal 
or corrected-to-normal vision and good manual dexterity. CFS participants were recruited 
from specialist CFS services in London, Oxford and Dorset. To be included, they had to 





et al., 1994) criteria for CFS4, diagnosed by a consultant psychiatrist or experienced 
cognitive behavioural therapist, and confirmed by self-report questions. CFS participants 
were excluded if undergoing concurrent Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT) or 
Graded Exercise Therapy (GET).  
 
Healthy controls were recruited via online advertisements placed on public forums, such 
as Gumtree, and recruited on the basis that they had similar demographic characteristics 
of the CFS group. They were included if they had no previous or current diagnosis of 
CFS (Fukuda, et al., 1994; Sharpe, et al., 1991) ascertained through self-reported medical 
history and a current score of less than four on the Chalder Fatigue Scale (Chalder, et al., 
1993). Participants were excluded if they reported other persistent physical symptoms 
which may be associated with CFS, including irritable bowel syndrome, fibromyalgia and 
chronic pain. All participants were paid £20 for taking part. 
 
Sample size was determined by an a priori analysis using the G*Power analysis program 
(Erdfelder, Faul, & Buchner). Alpha was set at 0.05 with a corresponding power of 0.80 
to detect a standard medium effect size of Cohen’s f  0.25, resulting in a required sample 
size of 90 participants in total; 45 per group. This medium effect size was selected based 
on previous, similar studies, which found medium effect sizes between smaller groups of 
CFS and healthy controls in terms of attentional bias (Hou, et al., 2008), interpretation 
                                                 
4 Five CFS participants were admitted on the basis of a diagnosis meeting the CDC 
criteria; 47 were admitted meeting the Oxford CFS criteria depending on the clinical 
service through which they were recruited. Sensitivity analysis found the diagnostic 





bias (Moss-Morris & Petrie, 2003) and attentional control (Hou, et al., 2014). We over-
recruited by 15% to allow missing or extreme outliers in the data. 
 
Procedure  
The study was approved by Berkshire-B Research Ethics Committee (14/SC/0172). 
Following written informed consent, participants completed questionnaires at home and 
subsequently attended the laboratory to complete the computer tasks. Computer tasks 
were programmed using E-prime version 2.0 (Psychology Software Tools, Inc., USA). 
Experiments were conducted in a private room on a Toshiba Satellite-Pro Laptop (screen 
size 15.6 inches), which was attached to a stand and placed on a table to maintain a 4.0° 
visual angle for every task. Each task consisted of a practice and test trials which were 
completed in the absence of the experimenter. All participants completed the Visual 
Probe Task (VPT), followed by the Attention Network Task (ANT), Interpretative Bias 
(IB) task and clinical interview.  
 
Questionnaires 
Chalder Fatigue Questionnaire (CFQ; Chalder, et al., 1993; Cella & Chlader, 2010). 
The CFQ consists of 11 items measuring physical and mental fatigue on a four-point 
scale, ranging from ‘better than usual’ (0) to ‘much worse than usual’ (3). Items were 







Work and Social Adjustment Scale (WSAS; Mundt, et al., 2002). This five item scale 
measures the extent to which fatigue interferes with people’s ability to engage in activities 
of daily life including work and socialising, rated on a scale from 0 (“not at all”) to 8 
(“very severely impaired”). The scale has strong psychometric properties and is a valid 
and reliable measure in CFS (Cella, et al., 2011b). Cronbach’s alpha in the current study 
was .97. 
 
Cognitive Behavioural Responses Questionnaire (CBRQ; Skerrett & Moss-Morris, 
2006). The CBRQ consists of seven subscales. Five relate to cognitive responses to 
symptoms: catastrophizing, damage beliefs, symptom focusing, fear avoidance and 
embarrassment avoidance; rated on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 “strongly 
disagree” to 5 “strongly agree”, with two items on the fear avoidance scale reverse coded. 
Two subscales measure behavioural responses to illness: avoidance behaviour and all-or-
nothing behaviour, rated on a 5-point scale from 1 “never” to 5 “all the time”.  Higher 
scores indicate proneness to maladaptive responses to symptoms. The CBRQ was 
included to assess the relationship between self-reported beliefs and behaviours and 
cognitive biases. Cronbach’s alpha for the 7 subscales ranged from .85 to .97. 
 
Clinical Interview Schedule Revised (CIS-R; Lewis, et al., 1992). The CIS-R is a 
standardized, highly structured, valid and reliable psychiatric interview which produces 
depression and anxiety diagnostic categories according to ICD-10 criteria, as well as a 





used excluding the fatigue item normally contained within the interview. Cronbach’s 
alpha in the current study was .76. 
 
Information processing tasks 
Stimuli development for the Visual Probe Task (VPT, MacLeod, et al., 1986). This 
computerized task measures reaction times to the threating illness-related words and 
neutral word pairs matched for length and frequency of use. Faster reaction times to 
probes replacing (appearing in the location of) CFS-threatening words relative to probes 
replacing neutral words, indicates an attentional bias towards threat. In order to ensure 
illness words were salient to the experience of CFS, we conducted preliminary interviews 
with 6 CFS patients and a workshop with 6 experienced cognitive behavioural therapists 
specialising in CFS. The interviews and workshop explored the experience of CFS and 
elicited real-life examples which captured this experience. From this preliminary work 
we extracted 56 illness-related words which were subsequently rated for their saliency on 
an on-line survey by 58 CFS participants. Instructions were ‘Recalling a time when you 
were experiencing your worst symptoms, please rate these words in the degree to which 
they bring to mind an unpleasant or distressing emotion related to CFS.’ Ratings were: 
‘not at all distressing; neutral; moderately distressing; quite a bit distressing; extremely 
distressing’. Mean ratings were calculated per word, with higher scores reflecting a 
greater emotive threat valence. Twenty-four highest scoring words were selected for the 
VPT (see supplementary material), which broadly related to symptom experience (e.g. 






Visual Probe Task (VPT, MacLeod, et al., 1986). Threatening-neutral word pairs were 
presented in random order for 96 trials. Each trial started with a fixation cross (500ms) 
followed by two words (Arial point 18), appearing above and below the fixation. After 
500ms the words disappeared and one of them was replaced by an arrow. Participants 
were seated approximately 60cm from the screen and read the following instructions: 
‘You will see a fixation cross (+) in the centre of the screen. Please use this fixation cross 
to focus your vision. Two words will appear, one above and one below the centre of the 
screen, for a short duration of time. An arrow will appear in either one of the two locations 
of the previously shown words.’ Participants pressed ‘c’ to indicate the arrow pointing to 
the left and ‘m’ for the arrow pointing to the right. After reading the instructions 
participants completed 16 practice trials of neutral-neutral word pairs, before starting the 
experiment. Inter-trial interval was 500ms. Attentional bias scores were calculated as the 
standardized residual (i.e. difference score) of the mean reaction time (RT) to probes 
replacing the illness-related stimuli from the RT to probes replacing the neutral stimuli. 
To create the standardized residual score a regression analysis was conducted where 
reaction times to probes replacing neutral stimuli were entered as the dependent variable 
and reaction times to probes replacing illness related stimuli were entered as the 







Stimuli development for the Interpretative Bias (IB) task. Scenarios were conceived from 
the interviews and workshop described above and tested for saliency in a pilot survey. 
The survey consisted of 40 short ambiguous scenarios, with the last word left blank. 
Participants had to complete the last word, thus revealing an interpretation of the text 
(Appendix B). For example, ‘You have planned to clean the downstairs of your house 
today and found this easier and quicker than you expected. You think if you carry on you 
will feel (exhausted/ pleased)’. Twenty-six CFS and 26 healthy participants completed 
the survey. The single word completions were rated by two independent researchers as 
either CFS-related, generally negative, neutral or positive. The scenarios which 
demonstrated the biggest different between the CFS and control groups in terms of CFS-
related interpretations were selected to be developed into full text materials for the main 
IB task described above. See Hughes, Gordon, Chalder, Hirsch, & Moss‐Morris, 2016c 
for further details on the development of these CFS specific VPT and IB stimuli.  
 
Interpretative Bias (IB) task (Mathews & Mackintosh, 2000). This computerized task was 
adapted from Mathews & Mackintosh’s (2000) task used in anxiety. The task comprised 
of two phases: the initial encoding phase followed by a recognition phase. During the 
encoding phase, 10 ambiguous descriptions of everyday situations, each headed with a 
short title, were presented. Participants read all 10 scenarios whilst imagining themselves 
as the central character. After each scenario participants rated its ‘pleasantness’ and 
answered a comprehension question. An example scenario and comprehension question 
follows: 





Last week you spent a day cleaning the house. You hoovered all the carpets in the house 
and mopped the kitchen floor. A week later you notice the carpets are dirty and need 
hoovering again. You think about how you felt after the last time you cleaned. 
Did you clean the windows? 
After reading all ten scenarios participants are presented with a ‘recognition test’. The 
recognition phase was designed to test participant’s interpretations of the ambiguous 
scenarios made during the encoding phase. Participants were presented with the title of 
each scenario (e.g. ‘Cleaning the Windows’), followed by four sentences, presented 
individually, to be rated for recognition. For each scenario there were two “target” 
interpretations, which were possible positive or somatic (negative) interpretations of the 
scenario; and two foil sentences, one positive and one negative, which were not possible 
interpretations of the text. Foils were included to assess a potential response bias for 
endorsing any positive or negative information. Below is an example of the recognition 
phase which corresponds to the above scenario ‘Cleaning the House’: 
1. You felt pleased with how nice the house looked after cleaning. (Positive target/ 
interpretation) 
2. You felt stiff and painful for days as you pushed your body too far. (Somatic target/ 
interpretation)  
3. You completed the cleaning quicker than you had expected. (Positive foil) 
4. You were unable to clean last week as you hurt your back. (Negative foil) 
Participants were asked to rate independently how similar in meaning each sentence was 





description you read?’), from 1 (very different in meaning) to 4 (very similar in meaning). 
The scenarios in the encoding and recognition phases were presented in the same order, 
but the four recognition sentences were randomised for each scenario. For the analyses, 
mean similarity ratings were calculated for the positive and negative interpretations 
(targets) and foils separately. To obtain an interpretive bias index, mean similarity scores 
of positive interpretations were subtracted from mean similarity scores from negative 
interpretations (higher scores indicate a stronger threat-related interpretive bias). 
 
Attention Network Test (ANT; Fan, et al., 2002, Fan, et al., 2005). The ANT measures 
three aspects of attention: altering, orientating and attentional control.  As a previous 
study only found differences between CFS and healthy participants on attentional control 
(Hou et al., 2014), we only included attentional control in this study. The ANT consists 
of six demo trials, 12 practice trials and 72 experimental trials. Participants are presented 
with a string of five congruent (→→→→→) or incongruent (→→←→→) arrows and 
are required to determine the direction of the central arrow. Attentional control is 
calculated by subtracting the mean RT on congruent flanker trials from the mean RT on 
incongruent flanker trials. Higher scores indicate poorer attentional control5.  
 
Data preparation and analytical procedure 
RT data were excluded from trials with errors and outliers (<200 ms, and >2000 ms) in 
the VPT and ANT. One CFS participant and two healthy controls were excluded from 
                                                 





the VPT analysis due to excessive missing data (>3SD above the group mean) consistent 
with other studies (Brown, et al., 2014; Hou, et al., 2014). Analysis was performed using 
the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) version 21.  
 
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of normality indicated that the distributions of the ANT 
attention control scores and age were skewed; bootstrapping (set at 1000 resamples) was 
performed on attentional control data and a Mann-Whitney test was used to assess group 
differences in age. All other data met assumptions of normality. Gender, employment, 
education and symptom measures (CIS-R, WSAS and fatigue) were compared between 
groups using chi-square or t-tests. The CFS group were significantly older than healthy 
controls so age was controlled for in subsequent analysis6. Separate ANCOVAs were run 
for attentional bias and attentional control scores, with group as the between-subjects 
factor. The means of the IB task were entered into a three way mixed ANCOVA, with 
group as between group factor, target type (target sentence v foil sentence) and sentence 
valence (positive v negative sentence) as within-subjects factors and age as covariate 
(hypothesis 1a). These ANCOVAs were rerun with total CIS-R scores7 entered as 
covariates to identify whether cognitive biases in CFS were independent of comorbidity 
(i.e. hypothesis 1b). Post hoc ANOVAs and t-tests were used to clarify significant results. 
To determine if attentional control acted as moderator of attention and interpretation 
                                                 
6 There were no differences in results when analyses were conducted without controlling 
for age. 
7 CIS-R total scores were used as a continuous score of psychological distress as opposed 





biases in CFS, an interaction term was created between centred attentional control scores 
and group. The interaction term was entered as a criterion variable along with group in 
separate linear regressions with attentional bias scores and interpretation bias index as the 
predictor variables (hypothesis 2). Pearson correlations were also carried out between 
self-reported symptom measures and attention and interpretation bias scores, within the 
CFS group (hypothesis 3).  
 
Results 
Eighty people with CFS were invited to participate in the study; 56 agreed (response rate 
= 70%). After screening for eligibility the final sample consisted of 52 CFS participants 
and 51 healthy controls.  
 
Clinical and demographic measures 
Group characteristics and clinical measures are presented in Table 1. CFS participants 
and controls did not differ with respect to gender, employment, or years in education; 
however, the CFS group were significantly older than healthy controls. As expected the 
CFS group had significantly higher rates of comorbid depression and anxiety (CIS-R); 
and significantly higher scores on all clinical measures compared to controls. Scores and 
reaction times for the experimental tasks are presented in Table 2.  
 
Visual Probe Task: attentional bias in CFS versus control group  
The CFS group had slower overall mean RT on the VPT than controls; (614.99 vs. 





scores in both groups; positive scores indicate an attentional bias toward CFS stimuli. 
The ANCOVA showed a significant main effect of group when controlling for age, F(1, 
97) =9.98; p=.002; ηp2 =.09; the CFS group had a significant attentional bias towards 
threat stimuli compared to healthy controls. This effect remained when controlling for 
CIS-R distress, F(1, 96) =4.24; p=.04; ηp2 =.04. Post hoc contrasts of overall mean bias 
score against zero for each group showed a significant bias towards threat in the CFS 
group [one-sample t(50)=2.13, p=.038, 95% CI (.62, 21.33]; while the healthy control 
group showed a significant bias towards neutral stimuli  [t(48)=-3.7, p=.004, 95% CI (-
21.74, -4.52]. 
 
Recognition Task: interpretative bias in CFS versus control group  
There was a significant Group x Target x Valence interaction, F(1, 100) = 20.94, p<.001, 
ηp2 =.17. To further explore this effect we conducted a mixed model ANCOVA with 
group as the between-subjects factor, valence (somatic or positive target) as the within-
subjects factor and age as covariate for targets and foils separately. The ANCOVA for 
targets demonstrated a significant Group × Valence interaction, F(1, 100) = 25.83, 
p<.001, ηp2 =.21; which  remained when controlling for comorbid distress, F(1, 99) = 
4.38, p=0.04, ηp2 =.10. Independent samples t-tests showed the CFS group endorsed 
positive interpretations significantly less than healthy controls, t(101)= -3.8, p<.001; and 
somatic (negative) interpretations significantly more than healthy controls, t(91)= 2.13, 
p=.04. The ANCOVA for foils demonstrated no significant main effects, F(1, 100)= .05, 





significantly more than somatic interpretations; CFS group, F(1,51) = 39.43, p<.001, ηp2 
=.45, health control group, F(1,50) = 166.26, p<.001, ηp2 =.78. 
 
Attention Network Test: attentional control in CFS versus control group 
The CFS group had slower overall mean RT on the ANT compared to healthy controls 
(649.33 vs. 556.63ms), t(101)=3.88, p<.001. Figure 2 illustrates the mean ANT 
attentional control scores of both groups. The CFS group had significantly poorer 
attentional control (i.e. higher ANT scores) than healthy participants, controlling for age; 
F(1, 100) =4.05; p=.05; ηp2 =.04.  
 
Relationship between attentional control and attention bias  
There was no significant correlation between attentional bias scores and attentional 
control in either the CFS group, r(51)=.08, p=.59; or the healthy control group, r(49)=.30, 
p=.12. To examine if attentional control acted as a moderator of attentional bias in CFS, 
an interaction term was created between group (CFS, healthy controls) and centred 
attentional control scores. The interaction term and group were entered as predictor 
variables in a linear regression with attentional bias as the criterion. There was no 
significant interaction between attentional bias scores and group; β=.25, t(97)=1.45, 
p=.15, 95% CI (-.11, .008). 
 
Relationship between attentional control and interpretation bias 
In order to assess the relationship between interpretation biases and attentional control an 





positive interpretations from the mean similarity scores of the negative interpretations 
from the recognition task. There was no significant correlation between interpretative bias 
index and attentional control in either the CFS group r(52)=.12, p=.41; or the healthy 
control group, r(51)=.23, p=.10. To test the moderating role of attentional control on the 
relationship between group (CFS and healthy controls) and interpretative bias, a linear 
regression analysis was performed with the interpretative bias index as the dependent 
variable and group and the interaction term between group and centred attentional control 
as the predictors. Attentional control was not a significant moderator of the relationship 







Table 1. Comparisons between CFS patients and controls on demographic and clinical 
variables 






Age (years), median (range) 37 (45) 32 (46) U=1025, p=.05 
Female, n (%) 32 (62) 32 (63) 2=.02, df=1, p=.90 
Employed, n (%) 36 (69%) 35 (69%) 2=.0004, df=1, p=.95 
Years in education (mean, SD) 17.32 (5.33) 17.2 (2.8) t(101)=.14, p=.89 
Illness duration (months), mean (SD) 67 (88) _  
CFQ, mean (SD) 26.8 (4.7) 10.7 (3.3) t(91.8)a=20.16, p<.001 
WSAS, mean (SD) 23.4 (8.8) 0.5 (2.2) t(57.5)a=18.2, p<.001 
Total CIS-R score, mean (SD) 16.87 (8.77) 2.51 (.39) t(70.4)a=10.78, p<.001 
CIS-R Anxiety disorders, n (%) 9 (17%) 2 (4%) 2=.4.84, df=1, p=.03 
CIS-R Depressionb, n (%) 20 (39%) 0 _ 
CIS-R Mixed anxiety and depression, 
n (%) 
9 (17%) 1 (2%) 2=.6.92, df=1, p=.01 
CFS, Chronic fatigue syndrome; CFQ, Chalder Fatigue Questionnaire; WSAS, Work and 
Social Adjustment Scale.; CIS-R, Clinical Interview Schedule revised, all CIS-R scores 
excluded the fatigue scale contained in the interview.  
 aDegrees of freedom were corrected after Lavene’s test 














Visual probe task 
   Reaction time to threat words (ms) 
    
609.35 (113.76) 577.68 (641.02) 546.89 (61.56) 529.58 (564.21) 
   Reaction time to neutral words (ms) 619.24 (124.11) 504.69 (653.79) 538.69 (68.09) 519.54 (557.84) 
Attentional control task     
   Reaction time on congruent trials (ms) 588.86 (136.58) 550.83 (626.88) 510.25 (80.34) 487.65 (532.84) 
   Reaction time on incongruent trials (ms) 722.85 (172.48) 674.83 (770.87) 615.94 (95.81) 588.99 (642.89) 
Interpretative Bias Task     
   Similarity rating of somatic interpretation 2.24 (.59) 2.08 (2.41) 2.02 (.41) 1.91 (2.14) 
   Similarity rating of positive interpretation 2.75 (.42) 2.63 (2.56) 3.05 (.42) 2.93 (3.17) 
   Similarity rating of negative foil  1.46 (.30) 1.38 (1.54) 1.48 (.23) 1.42 (1.54) 











Figure 2. Mean attentional control scores in CFS and healthy control groups. Higher 











































































Relationship between cognitive biases and self-reported beliefs, fatigue and disability 
Table 3 shows correlations within the CFS group between self-reported symptoms, 
beliefs and behaviours, and cognitive biases (attention and interpretation biases). 
Attentional bias was significantly, positively correlated with fear/avoidance beliefs.  
Somatic interpretations were significantly positively correlated with all/nothing 
behaviours, fear/avoidance beliefs and catastrophizing. Positive interpretations were not 
correlated with any cognitive or behavioural illness responses (CBRQ). There were no 
significant correlations between self-reported fatigue (CRQ), disability (WSAS) or illness 





Table 3. Correlations between cognitive biases and self-report measures in the CFS 
group. 












CFQ  .03 .25 .05 
WSAS .22 .26 -.01 
Illness duration -.03 .15 .27 
CBRQ Cognitive sub-scales    
   Fear/ avoidance . 42** .40** .09 
   Catastrophizing .08 .42** .13 
   Damage beliefs -.11 .04 -.19 
   Symptom focus .04 .27 .18 
   Embarrassment   .02 .08 .10 
CBRQ Behavioural sub-scales    
   All or nothing  .20 .28*    .01 
   Avoidance/ rest .10 .23 .07 
CFS, Chronic fatigue syndrome; CFQ, Chalder Fatigue Questionnaire; WSAS, Work and 
Social Adjustment Scale.; CBRQ, Cognitive Behavioural Responses Questionnaire; 








This study investigated cognitive processing biases and attentional control, and their 
relationships with CFS. Our hypotheses, that CFS participants would have an attentional 
bias towards salient, illness-related information and an interpretive bias towards somatic 
rather than positive information, were supported. These effects were independent of 
comorbid anxiety and depression. Although the CFS group had poorer attentional control 
than healthy participants, this was not related to cognitive processing biases. As 
hypothesised, somatic interpretations in the CFS group were significantly associated with 
self-reported fear/avoidance beliefs and catastrophizing, but not symptom focusing. 
There was also a significant relationship between somatic interpretations and all/nothing 
behaviours. Attentional bias scores only correlated with fear/avoidance beliefs. Neither 
bias was significantly associated with fatigue or disability although correlations were in 
the hypothesised direction. 
 
The finding of an attentional bias for CFS specific (somatic and disability related) 
information presented for 500ms adds credence to the somewhat ambiguous findings of 
previous, smaller studies in this area. These attentional biases may reflect a strategy to 
continually monitor, review and evaluate pertinent threats in the environment as opposed 
to an initial orientation or hypervigilance to threat (e.g. for stimuli presented for 100ms), 
as seen in anxiety disorders (Pergamin-Hight, et al., 2015) and other persistent physical 
symptoms such as irritable bowel syndrome (IBS) (Chapman & Martin, 2011). This 
attentional strategy may have developed in order to evade further injury or relapse, as 





the CFS group, or attentional bias may pre-empt such beliefs. These findings parallel 
similar findings in chronic pain (Crombez, Van Ryckeghem, Eccleston, & Van Damme, 
2013; Heathcote, et al., 2015).  
 
Our CFS specific off-line task found people with CFS had a bias to interpret information 
in a more somatic and less positive way than healthy controls. An advantage of this 
paradigm is that it allows a broader range of illness-related materials to be used than 
previous paradigms such as homophones. Furthermore, it is grounded in everyday 
ambiguous situations, which are more likely to reflect more ‘real-world’ interpretations 
(Hughes, et al., 2016b; Hirsch, et al., 2016). The groups did not differ in their rejection 
of false interpretations (foils), thus ruling out the effects of a general threat-based 
response bias. These findings are consistent with previous off-line tasks (Moss-Morris & 
Petrie, 2003) suggesting that interpretation biases in CFS occur when there is opportunity 
for reflection, when the participant has time to draw upon their illness-related schemas.  
 
In the CFS group, somatic interpretations were associated with maladaptive illness 
responses, which previous research has identified as key mechanisms of change in 
behavioural treatments for CFS (Stahl, et al., 2014; Chalder, et al., 2015). The relationship 
between these beliefs/behaviours and cognitive biases highlights the role of implicit 
processing within the cognitive behavioural model of CFS. This may be a reciprocal 
relationship. For example, believing that symptoms and activity have serious 
consequences may encourage biases in cognitive processes to develop. Equally cognitive 





such as overdoing things when symptom free and needing to rest for prolonged periods 
in response to symptoms (all-or-nothing behaviour) (Moss‐Morris & Petrie, 2003); thus 
contributing to the maintenance of fatigue (Chalder, et al., 1996). The nature of these 
relationships should be further explored by studies employing longitudinal designs. 
 
We were unable to replicate the finding that attentional bias in CFS is associated with 
poor attentional control (Hou, et al., 2014). These contradictory findings may be 
methodological; our CFS and healthy control groups had poorer attentional control than 
Hou, et al.’s (2014) sample. This, coupled with the fact that people with CFS need more 
time to process information than healthy adults (Cockshell & Mathias, 2010), may mean 
that longer exposure conditions are required before effortful attentional control exerts its 
influence on attentional processing in CFS. A recent pain study showed that self-reported 
attentional control moderated the relationship between pain catastrophizing and 
attentional biases in a community sample of adolescents (Heathcote, et al., 2015). It may 
be that subjective self-reports of attentional control taps into a different construct to the 
objective and neutral measure (consisting of judging the direction of arrows in an array) 
of attentional control used in this study.  
 
We were also unable to detect a relationship between interpretation bias and attentional 
control. Salemink and Wiers (2012) identified a moderating role of objectively measured 
attentional control in interpretation biases in anxiety, when psychological arousal is 
temporal and situational (state anxiety), but not when arousal is enduring and 





attentional control (as measured here) moderates threat processing for some individuals 
when anxiety, pain, or in this case fatigue, is temporary and situational but not necessarily 
when symptoms are enduring, as is the case with CFS. Perhaps when symptoms are 
enduring, it is context dependent attentional control that is key to how threatening 
information is processed. This corresponds to other accounts of threat processing which 
suggest the threat evaluation process is idiosyncratic and dynamic i.e. people 
preferentially process information which is salient to their current and specific concerns 
(Mogg & Bradley, 2016; Pool, et al., 2016; Van Damme, et al., 2010; Riemann & 
McNally, 1995). Further measures of attentional control are needed which account for 
context dependent factors, such as saliency of threat and the individual’s current goals/ 
priorities, to fully explore a dynamic relationship between attentional control and threat 
processing. 
 
Correlations between cognitive biases and self-reported fatigue were not significant, 
though in the expected direction. There were no significant correlations between 
cognitive biases and illness duration. Large prospective and longitudinal designs are 
needed to fully explore how cognitive biases develop and potentially change over time. 
Cognitive biases did correlate with maladaptive beliefs and behaviours, which other 
research has identified are proximal treatment outcomes (Chalder, et al., 2015). The 
potentially maintaining role of these biases should be explored through bias modification 
studies and pre-post treatment designs. It may be that existing treatments for CFS modify 
these cognitive biases (Price, et al., 2011; Waters, et al., 2012); or it may be that 





techniques and treatment outcomes could be optimized by specifically targeting cognitive 
biases with computer based Cognitive Bias Modification (CBM) techniques.  
 
CBM techniques aim to alter patterns of information processing by means of simple 
computerized training programmes. Attentional bias modification techniques, for 
instance, typically use a modified version of the dot-probe task whereby the probe 
consistently appears in the location of the neutral or positive information (MacLeod et 
al., 1986). Similarly, interpretative bias modification tasks reinforce positive or neutral 
interpretations of ambiguous information through repeated training towards positive/ 
neutral resolutions of ambiguous information (see Hirsch, et al., 2016 for a recent review). 
In this way, studies in anxiety have shown an attentional bias towards threat can be 
reduced, with associated reductions in symptoms (MacLeod & Mathews, 2012). 
 
Recently CBM has been applied with pain patients; one study successfully modified 
interpretation biases in pain patients and found that those who were trained to interpret 
information in a threatening way hesitated for longer on a cold pressor task than those 
who were trained for benign interpretations (Jones & Sharpe, 2014). Studies have also 
identified some potential in the application of attentional bias modification to pain 
conditions (Sharpe, et al., 2012). However, the mechanisms of change are still unclear. 
Further research is needed to understand the mediating and moderating variables for 
successful modification of biases that could lead to therapeutic benefits in the future. 





maintaining key aspects of CFS, and may in time help ameliorate biases in CFS, with 
potential associated benefits of reduced fear avoidance and catastrophizing.  
 
This study found attention and interpretation biases in the CFS group remained when 
psychological comorbidity was controlled for, suggesting cognitive biases in CFS are not 
a function of negative mood or affect but rather intrinsic to the condition itself. These 
findings are consistent with studies in chronic pain (Crombez, Viane, Eccleston, 
Devulder, & Goubert, 2013) and IBS (Chapman & Martin, 2011), suggesting that 
cognitive biases in persistent physical conditions depend on the relevance of the stimuli 
to the individual's illness concerns and beliefs, rather than anxiety or depression per se. 
Thus CBM techniques need to be tailored to tap into illness specific concerns (Hughes et 
al., 2016b; Pergamin-Hight, et al., 2015) and may further benefit from exploring the 
within-person variability in the temporal expression of attention and interpretational 
biases (Hirsch & Mathews, 2000; Heeren, et al., 2015). 
 
Although this study has several strengths, including the use of well-established 
diagnostic, symptom and cognitive processing measures, there are limitations. One 
limitation is the lack of clinical control group, thus the obtained cognitive biases in CFS 
may reflect the chronicity of illness generally rather than a unique CFS effect; although 
the use of CFS specific stimuli makes this unlikely. Secondly, the groups were not 
adequately matched in age. Age is associated with increased reaction times on cognitive 
tasks and less cognitive flexibility (Jurado & Rosselli, 2007) thus we controlled for age 





attention; we cannot determine whether attention is initially captured (e.g. 100ms) and 
then maintained for 500ms or whether this occurs later within the 500ms window. 
Attentional bias may be better understood as a dynamic process in time rather than a static 
trait (Heeren, et al., 2015). Similarly, though we can conclude interpretative biases occur 
at later stages of processing in CFS, interpretation biases may also occur at earlier stages 
than our off-line task can assess. Future research should also employ on-line interpretative 
bias tasks (Hirsch & Mathews, 2000) and utilize advances in eye tracking technology, 




This is the largest study to date measuring cognitive processing biases in CFS and the 
first to use materials developed with CFS patients to tap into illness specific concerns. 
The findings suggest that people with CFS have illness specific biases in how information 
is attended to and interpreted, which are associated with specific, illness beliefs and 
behaviours. Cognitive processing biases in CFS may independently play a part in 
maintaining symptoms by driving and reinforcing maladaptive illness beliefs and 
behaviours. Enhancing adaptive processing, such as positive interpretation biases and 







Table 1A.  Attentional Bias Task Stimuli 
Illness related words Matched Neutral Words 
bedridden buttercup 
collapse  transmit 
immobilised  calligraphy 
fatigue pockets 
exhausted  messenger 
disabled  calendar 
drained pitched 
limited  created 
aches  domes 
anxious  whistle 
Incapacitated infinitesimal 
painful  trumpet 
impaired  polished 
restricted  newspapers 
debilitating  articulation 
housebound  grapevines 
weak  zone 
powerless  triangles 
unwell  russet 
frustrated  settlement 
tired  brief 
disheartened  stewardesses 
feeble inland 









Online pilot survey for the interperative bias task materials. 
 
We would like to know more about how CFS has affected your daily life.  
Please imagine yourself in these scenarios and complete the sentences with the first word 
that comes to mind.  
 
For example:  ‘It is winter and you are outside. You notice yourself shivering which is a 
sign you are …cold’ 
 
You have been on your feet more than usual today and when you go to bed you notice 
that your legs are aching. You think tomorrow your legs will be… 
 
You spent the afternoon shopping and by the time you get home you feel tired. You slept 
many hours that night and when you wake up you feel... 
 
You have had an argument with your partner and have developed a head ache, which is a 
sign of... 
 
Recently your job has been so demanding that you have worked straight through your 
lunch hour. Today is Friday and your boss has asked you to work late. You think at the 
weekend you will... 
 
Your friend invites you to their birthday party however it doesn't start until 8pm and you 
have to get up early the next morning, so you decide not to go. This is... 
 
Today you went grocery shopping and bought ingredients for dinner. When you get home 
you are... 
 
You have planned to clean the downstairs of your house today and found this easier and 
quicker than you expected. You think if you carry on you will feel... 
 
You have stayed late at work a few evenings this week in order to meet a deadline. 
Monday is a bank holiday so you have a long weekend ahead. You think next week you 
will feel... 
 
A friend has just asked you to go for a walk with them. You think the walk would be... 
 
You have had a busy morning and are running late for picking up your children from 
school. You are rushing to get to school on time and think you might... 
 
You teach at a primary school. This lunch break it was your turn to stand and watch the 
children in the playground. You sit down for the rest of the afternoon and in the evening 






You have been invited to a wedding at the weekend. It's not close to home so you would 
have to travel by car and stay overnight at a hotel nearby. You think the weekend will 
be... 
 
You are running late for an appointment and have taken public transport to get there. You 
arrive at your station to find the lifts and escalators are out of order. Passengers have been 
advised to either get off at the next stop for disabled access or use the stairs. You think if 
you take the stairs you will probably be... 
 
You have been unable to complete a project in the expected time as you are too... 
 
Your child is the lead in the school play and the school have asked you to make a costume 
for them. Another parent offers to help you, which makes you feel... 
 
You have been working hard all day to get the house ready for some guests who are 
coming to stay tomorrow night. You feel... 
 
You are going on holiday tomorrow and have had a busy day packing. When your alarm 
wakes you up in the morning you feel... 
 
Yesterday you went for a walk with a friend. This morning you notice your legs are stiff. 
You think today will be... 
 
You used to have 20/20 vision but recently you have had trouble focusing your eyesight. 
You think it is because you are... 
 
You are chatting with a friend and are having trouble finding the right word. You think 
this is due to your... 
 
Although you got quite a bit done at work today, you leave work early because you were 
feeling particularly exhausted. You think to yourself tomorrow will be... 
 
You've had a very busy day at work and even skipped your lunch break. On your way 
home you begin to feel light-headed because you are... 
 
At the weekend you went to a party and stayed out quite late. By Monday you think you 
will feel... 
 
You are walking up a hill on a warm sunny day; you get out of breath and feel quite warm. 
When you get to the top of the hill you are sweaty from the exertion. You think it is 
probably because you are... 
 
Last night you slept poorly and this morning you are having difficulty concentrating. You 






You have had a busy day and when you sit down to watch TV with your family in the 
evening you fall asleep. You think that this is because you are... 
 
You are walking up the stairs and notice you are out of breath because you are... 
 
You have had an argument with a family member and your heart is racing because of 
your... 
 
You are in a meeting at work and when you speak you notice you have palpitations 
because of your... 
 
You are giving a presentation at work and forget some of your words because you are... 
 
You notice your neighbour spraying their roses with insecticide. The next day you have 
itchy eyes and a runny nose and think this is because... 
 
You have attended a family occasion and had an enjoyable time. It was a long day and by 
the end you feel very tired. You think in a couple of days you will feel...  
 
Recently you have had more energy than usual and have been able to meet up with people 
you haven't seen in a quite some time. Yesterday you met up with a friend and went for 
dinner. The next day you feel... 
 
You are going to a family occasion at the weekend. You think it will be a lot of... 
 
You are meeting up with an old school friend. You ask them if they would meet you 
locally. They will think you are... 
 
Tomorrow is your son's birthday and you are throwing a birthday party for him. You are 
preparing the decorations and food. You have to ask your neighbour for help because you 
are... 
 
You have had a busy day at work and have a number of tasks to get done before the end 
of the day. You ask a colleague for help because you are... 
 
You used to play a lot of football and your local team has asked you to referee a match 
for a charity event. You think this is... 
 
In the last few days you have developed a sore throat and are feeling achy. You think 
these are symptoms of a... 
 
You usually get the bus to work but today you are feeling energetic and decided to walk. 
When you come home from work you feel more tired than usual. You think tomorrow 







Chapter 6 A cross-cultural replication study of cognitive biases and 
deficits in CFS  
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Purpose: This study aims to replicate a UK study, with a Dutch sample to explore 
whether attention and interpretation biases and general attentional control deficits in 
Chronic Fatigue Syndrome (CFS), are similar across populations and cultures.   
Methods: Thirty-eight Dutch CFS participants were compared to 52 CFS and 51 healthy 
participants recruited from the UK. Participants completed self-report measures of 
symptoms, functioning and mood; as well as three experimental tasks (i) Visual-Probe 
task measuring attentional bias to illness (somatic symptoms and disability) versus 
neutral words, (ii) interpretive bias task measuring positive versus somatic interpretations 
of ambiguous information and (iii) the Attention Network Test measuring general 
attentional control. 
Results: Compared to controls, Dutch and UK participants with CFS showed a significant 
attentional bias for illness-related words and were significantly more likely to interpret 
ambiguous information in a somatic way. These effects were not moderated by attentional 
control. There were no significant differences between the Dutch and UK CFS groups on 
attentional bias, interpretation bias or attentional control scores.  
Conclusions: This study replicated the main findings of the UK study, with a Dutch CFS 
population; indicating that across cultures and populations people with CFS demonstrate 
biases in how somatic information is attended to and interpreted. These illness-specific 







Self-report studies have identified that how people perceive and respond to symptoms, 
can play a role in maintaining Chronic Fatigue Syndrome (CFS) (Cella, et al., 2013; 
Moss-Morris & Chalder, 2003; Silver, et al., 2002; Stahl, et al., 2014). Experimental 
studies have explored how people with CFS attend to and interpret illness-related 
information at earlier, more implicit levels of processing (Hou, et al.,  2008; Hou, et al.,  
2014; Hughes, et al.,  2016b; Martin & Alexeeva, 2010; Moss‐Morris & Petrie, 2003). A 
recent review of this experimental literature concluded that findings were mixed due to a 
lack of  standardized methodology, small sample sizes, and illness-specific materials 
(Hughes, et al.,  2016a).  
 
Subsequent to this review the authors developed CFS-specific experimental tasks by 
tailoring materials to tap into concepts central to the disorder (Hughes, et al., 2016c). A 
large (n=103) cross-sectional study using these tasks, found people with CFS, showed an 
attentional bias to information related to fatigue and associated consequences; and tended 
to form less positive and more somatic interpretations of ambiguous information 
(Hughes, et al.,  2016b). Effects were independent of comorbid psychological distress. 
Contrary to an earlier, smaller study in CFS (Hou, et al.,  2014), this larger study found 
that illness-specific processing biases were not associated with general attentional control 
deficits. 
 
In order verify these findings they need to be replicated in another CFS population using 





(Koole & Lakens, 2012), yet a recent, high profile publication found poor rates of 
replication success across a range of classic psychological research (Collaboration, 2015). 
Replication in experimental research is particularly pertinent given the range of 
methodologies employed. Subtle variations in experiments can have implications for the 
processes which are being tapped into (Hughes, et al., 2016c). Furthermore, experimental 
methods can be prone to error that can arise from errors in millisecond timing and 
programming (Hirsch, Meeten, Krahé, & Reeder, 2016; Plant & Quinlan, 2013; 
Sigurjónsdóttir, Sigurðardóttir, Björnsson, & Kristjánsson, 2015). Thus, exact 
replication, using the same experimental protocols, is needed to establish whether 
findings are reliable and can be extrapolated across populations (Hirsch, et al., 2016; Plant 
& Quinlan, 2013; Sigurjónsdóttir, et al., 2015).  
 
The aim of this study was to determine whether we can replicate the findings from the 
UK study (Hughes et al., 2016b), with a Dutch CFS cohort to establish whether cognitive 
processing biases are a reliable finding across populations and cultures (Collaboration, 
2015). Experimental data obtained from a newly recruited Dutch CFS cohort were 
compared to the data from CFS and healthy participants recruited from the UK who took 
part in our previous study (Hughes, et al., 2016b). No study to date has assessed these 
cognitive processes in a CFS population from outside the UK. Given that self-report 
studies have identified Dutch and UK CFS participants have similar symptom profiles 
(Hickie, et al., 2009), illness beliefs and responses to symptoms (White, et al., 2011b), it 






The main hypotheses are: 1) The Dutch CFS group will show significant biases and 
control deficits compared to the healthy control group but equivalent biases and 
attentional control to the UK group with CFS 2) Attention and interpretation biases will 
be independent of levels of anxiety and depression 3) Attentional control will not 




38 Dutch CFS participants were recruited from a specialist CFS treatment service of the 
Radboud University Medical Centre. Inclusion criteria were, meeting Centre for Disease 
Control (CDC) criteria for CFS (Fukuda, et al., 1994; Reeves, et al., 2003), being over 18 
years old, able to read and write Dutch and not having received psychological treatment 
for CFS. The 38 Dutch CFS participants were compared to the 52 UK CFS participants 
and 51 UK healthy controls described in the original study. For details of the UK 
participant recruitment see the original study (Hughes, et al., 2016b). 
 
Procedures 
The Dutch CFS group followed the same protocol as that of the UK CFS and healthy 
controls (Hughes, et al., 2016b). Participants provided demographic information on age, 
gender and employment status and completed Dutch versions of questionnaires and 








Chalder Fatigue Questionnaire CFQ (Cella & Chalder, 2010; Chalder, et al., 1993) was 
used as a measure of fatigue severity, consisting of 11 items scored 0-3.  
Work and Social Adjustment Scale WSAS (Mundt, Marks, Shear, & Greist, 2002) 
measured everyday functioning, using 5 items (rated 0–8)8.  
Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale HADS (Zigmond & Snaith, 1983) measured levels 
of depression and anxiety, using 14 items (Norton, Cosco, Doyle, Done, & Sacker, 2013).  
 
Information processing tasks 
Materials for the information processing tasks were translated from English to Dutch; 
back translated to ensure they retained meaning; and piloted with Dutch participants 
(Appendix A). 
 
1. Visual Probe Task (VPT) (MacLeod, et al., 1986) assessed attentional bias (AB). 
Participants completed 16 practice trials followed by 96 experimental trials. Each trial 
starts with a fixation cross in the centre of the screen (500ms), followed by two words 
(illness-related v. neutral), appearing above and below the fixation. After 500ms the 
words disappear and one is replaced by an arrow. Participants identify the direction of 
the arrow by pressing ‘C’ for left and ‘M’ for right. AB scores are calculated as the 
standardized residual (difference) between reaction times (RT) to probes replacing the 
                                                 
8 Both English and Dutch versions of the CFQ (Cella & Chalder, 2010; Chalder, et al., 
1993a) and WSAS have been validated for use with CFS populations (Cella, et al., 2011b; 





illness-related stimuli and RT to probes replacing neutral stimuli. Positive values 
demonstrate an AB to CFS-threatening stimuli.  
 
2. Recognition task (Mathews & Mackintosh, 2000) assessed interpretation bias (IB). 
Participants read 10 ambiguously phrased scenarios, followed by a short comprehension 
question. After reading all 10 scenarios participants are presented with the title of each 
scenario in turn and asked to rate 4 new sentences in terms of how similar or dissimilar 
they are to the original text (1= not at all similar - 4= very similar). The sentences contain 
a positive interpretation and an illness-related interpretation of the original scenario. 
Recognition items also include two ‘foils’ or false statements. Foils are included so that 
not all items are related to the original text, thereby providing greater face validity for the 
task. For the purpose of this study we analysed mean scores on the interpretation items 
only. An IB index was also calculated as mean similarity ratings of illness-related 
interpretations minus positive interpretations. Higher scores indicate an increased somatic 
interpretation.  
 
3. Attention Network Task (ANT) (Fan, McCandliss, Sommer, Raz, & Posner, 2002) 
assessed general attentional control9. Participants are presented with a string of five 
congruent (→→→→→) or incongruent (→→←→→) arrows. Participants’ identify the 
direction of the central arrow by pressing different keys. Attentional control is calculated 
                                                 
9 The Attention Network Task measures three aspects of attention: orientation, altering 
and attentional control. For the purpose of this study we have reported only the trials 





by subtracting the mean RT on congruent trials from the mean RT on incongruent trials. 
Higher scores indicate poorer attentional control. 
 
Analysis 
To test whether there was a main effect between groups, separate one-way ANOVAs 
were conducted with group (Dutch CFS, UK CFS and healthy controls) as the between-
subjects factor and AB and attentional control scores as the dependent variables. The 
means of the IB task were entered into a two-way ANOVA, with group as the between 
subjects factor and valance (positive and somatic interpretation scores) as the within 
subjects factor. Post-hoc ANOVAs and t-tests were used to clarify significant results 
(hypothesis 1). ANOVAs were rerun with HADS anxiety and depression scores 
separately as co-variates (hypothesis 2). To examine if attentional control acted as a 
moderator of AB or IB, an interaction term was created between group and centred 
attentional control scores. The interaction term and group were entered as predictor 





Table 1 shows the Dutch and UK CFS groups had equivalent levels of fatigue (CFQ), 





of anxiety compared to the UK CFS group, t(87)=-3.71, p<.00110. UK and Dutch CFS 
patients did not differ from healthy controls in terms of gender11 and employment (all 
p>.05). Healthy participants were significantly younger than either UK CFS participants, 
U=1025, p=.05; and Dutch CFS participants, t(63.83)=2.09, p=.04. Age was not 
correlated with any of the main outcomes so was not controlled for in subsequent 
analyses. As expected, UK and Dutch CFS groups had significantly higher rates of 
anxiety, depression and disability compared to healthy participants (all p<.05).  
                                                 
10 Sensitivity analysis found no effect of controlling for HADs anxiety in subsequent 
analyses. 
11 Though gender was not significantly different across groups, the Dutch CFS group had 
21% more females than the UK CFS group. Sensitivity analysis found no effect of 





Table 1. Demographic variables and scores on self-report measures and information 
processing tasks for the Dutch and UK CFS patients and UK healthy controls 
 Dutch CFS 
 group 
n=38 





Age (years M, SD) 40 (13) 39 (12) 34 (10) 
Female, n (%) 16 (42%) 32 (62%) 32 (63%) 
Employed, n (%) 24 (65%) 36 (69%) 35 (69%) 
CFQ, M (SD) 24.97 (4.05) 26.83 (4.71) 10.7 (3.3) 
WSAS, M (SD) 23.6 (7.29) 23.38 (8.81) 0.5 (2.2) 
HADS anxiety, M (SD) 6.41 (3.86) 9.96 (4.84) 4.69 (3.43) 
HADS depression, M (SD) 9.0 (4.28) 8.44 (4.0) 2.04 (2.38) 
Visual probe task, M (SD) 12    
   Attentional bias score .28 (1.16) .22 (.90) -.20 (.82) 
Interpretation bias task, M (SD)    
   Somatic interpretations 2.28 (.51) 2.24 (.59) 2.02 (.41) 
   Positive interpretations 2.69 (.39) 2.74 (.49) 3.05 (.42) 
Attentional control task, M (SD)    










   Attentional control score 140.25 
(104.02) 
133.62 (73.58) 105.70 (50.4) 
                                                 
12 One Dutch CFS participant had excessive missing data due to errors and outliers (>3 
SD from the group mean) on both the VPT and ANT, this participant was excluded from 
both these analysis, consistent with other studies. One UK CFS participant was removed 






CFS, Chronic fatigue syndrome; CFQ, Chalder Fatigue Questionnaire; WSAS, Work and 
Social Adjustment Scale.; HADS, Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale.  
 
VPT: Attentional bias in UK and Dutch CFS groups and healthy controls 
A one-way ANOVA with AB scores showed a significant main effect of group, F(2, 136) 
=3.46; p=.03; ηp2 =.05. Compared to healthy controls the Dutch CFS group had a 
significant AB towards illness-related stimuli, F(1, 84)=4.98; p=.03; ηp2 =.06. There were 
no differences in AB scores between Dutch and UK CFS groups, F(1, 86)=.07; p=.80; 
ηp2 =.001. The main effect remained when controlling for anxiety, F(3, 136) =3.25 p=.04; 
ηp2 =.05, but disappeared when controlling for depression, F(3, 136) =1.17; p=.31; ηp2 
=.02. 
 
Recognition task: Interpretation bias in UK and Dutch CFS groups and healthy controls  
There was a significant group x valence interaction F(2, 138)=16.84, p<.001, ηp2=.20, 
which remained significant when controlling for anxiety, F(3, 136)=12.60, p<.001, 
ηp2=.16; and depression F(3, 136)=10.44, p<.001, ηp2=.13. The Dutch CFS group 
endorsed positive interpretations significantly less than healthy controls, t(87)=-4.17, 
p<.001, 95% CI (-54, -.19); and somatic interpretations significantly more than healthy 
controls, t(87)=2.61, p=.01, 95% CI (.06, 45). There was no significant differences 
between the CFS groups in ratings of somatic, t(88)=.36, p=.72, 95% CI (-.19, .28) or 
positive interpretations, t(88)=-.71, p=.48, 95% CI (-.23, .11).  
 





There was a non-significant trend towards a main effect of group on attentional control 
scores, F(2, 138)=2.72, p=.069, ηp2=.04. Separate ANOVAs indicated the Dutch CFS 
group had significantly poorer attentional control than healthy participants, F(1, 
87)=4.29, p=.04, ηp2=.05; but equivalent attentional control to the UK CFS group, F(1, 
88)=.126, p=.72, ηp2=.001.  
 
Moderating role of attentional control on attention and interpretation biases 
A linear regression with AB scores as the criterion and the interaction term and group as 
predictor variables, found attentional control did not moderate the relationship between 
group and AB; b=<.02, SEb=.001, β=.31, t(136)=.1.58, p=.12, 95% CI (-.00,.004). A 
separate linear regression with IB index as the criterion found attentional control was not 
a significant moderator of the relationship between group and IB; b=-3.85, SEb=.001, β=-
.01, t(140)=-.05, p=.96, 95% CI (-.002, .001). 
 
Discussion 
This is the first CFS study to show replication of illness-specific cognitive biases in a 
population outside of the UK. These findings indicate cognitive biases in CFS are evident 
across different cohorts and cultures when using illness-specific materials [12]. In line 
with our previous study (Hughes, et al., 2016b) attentional control did not moderate AB 
or IB, suggesting, attentional control is not a mechanism through which these processes 
occur. In this study, differences between groups in AB disappeared when controlling for 
depressed mood using the HADS. This is atypical of depression, where AB is found at 





Furthermore, the original study found AB was independent of comorbid distress (Hughes, 
et al., 2016b), as measured by a clinical interview schedule (Lewis, Pelosi, Araya, & 
Dunn, 1992). These differences may be a reflection of the HADS capturing fluctuating 
mood whereas the CIS-R assessed clinical psychological comorbidity.  
 
By carefully conducting a replication of previous experimental research this study offers 
protection against false positives (Collaboration, 2015). Replication in this area is 
particularly pertinent given that a recent systematic review of experimental studies in CFS 
found mixed results due to a range of methodologies and unspecific materials (Hughes, 
et al., 2016a). Furthermore, large heterogeneity has been identified in CFS (Cella, et al., 
2011a). The successful replication of the original findings indicates that cognitive 
processing biases are a robust finding in CFS populations and furthermore can be 
extended across cultures. 
 
This study adds to existing literature by comparing populations with CFS from the UK 
and Netherlands (Worm-Smeitink, et al., 2016). Findings indicate cognitive and 
behavioural factors, including cognitive processing biases, have a role to play in CFS, 
across cultures. However, the current study is limited by a lack of Dutch healthy control 
group. In addition, a clinical comparison group would be enlightening to further explore 
whether attention and interpretation biases occur in other fatigued populations or are due 
to the chronicity of illness. Replication studies such as this pave the way for progress in 





research to explore whether these cognitive processes change over time, following 






Table 1. Rated Dutch stimuli for the visual probe task 







Afgemat gebraad koolsla 
moedeloos omstreken motorblok 
Sloom place mails 
Slopend lengtes 
Strijd blanke gratis 
hoofdpijn speelgoed 
uitputting platenzaak sleutelgat 
Futloos trommen cijfers 
Beperkt cheques portier 
Slaperig voorruit 















Chapter 7 Cognitive predictors of treatment outcomes in Chronic 
Fatigue Syndrome 
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● Illness-specific biases in attention and interpretation have been identified in 
CFS. 
● Attentional biases pre-treatment predicted greater improvement in physical 
functioning after CBT or GET  
● Attentional malleability pre-treatment also predicted better functional outcomes 
in CFS post-treatment. 









This study investigates whether cognitive processes of attentional bias, attentional 
malleability and interpretation bias, predicts response to treatments for Chronic Fatigue 
Syndrome (CFS). Patients with CFS who received either Cognitive Behavioural Therapy 
(CBT) or Graded Exercise Therapy (GET) for CFS completed measures of fatigue and 
physical functioning pre- and post-treatment. Patients also completed experimental tasks 
to assess attentional bias towards CFS information, (visual-probe task), malleability of 
attentional bias (assessed via extent of change on attentional bias over a brief attentional 
bias training) and interpretation bias of ambiguous material (recognition task), pre-
treatment. Cognitive processing variables were entered as predictors in regression 
analyses, with post-treatment fatigue or functioning scores as the outcome variables, and 
pre-treatment scores as covariates. Fatigue and functioning significantly improved after 
both CBT and GET. Pre-treatment attentional bias and an increased attentional 
malleability predicted better functioning, but not fatigue, post-treatment. Interpretation 
bias did not predict either fatigue or functioning outcomes. These findings suggest both 
attentional biases towards CFS material, and attentional malleability, are important 
factors in predicting treatment outcomes in CFS. This knowledge can help us understand 
the cognitive characteristics of those most likely to benefit from current treatment 









Chronic fatigue syndrome (CFS), also known as myalgic encepholitis (ME) is a 
debilitating condition, defined as severe mental and physical fatigue persisting for 6 
months or more (Fukuda, et al., 1994; Sharpe, et al., 1991). Secondary symptoms include 
muscle pain, multi-joint pain, headaches and poor concentration and memory (Fukuda, et 
al., 1994). Although no single somatic cause has been identified, biological as well as 
cognitive and behavioural factors are thought to contribute to the aetiology of the 
condition (Burgess, et al., 2012; Cella, et al., 2013; Deary, et al., 2007; Knoop, et al.,  
2010; Surawy, et al., 1995). 
 
Current recommended treatments for CFS are Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT) and 
Graded Exercise Therapy (GET) (NICE, 2007). These treatments focus on changing 
precipitating factors, such as reducing all-or-nothing behaviours and increase activity 
levels;  alongside cognitive changes such as changing beliefs about  the harmfulness and 
controllability of symptoms, in order to reduce levels of fatigue and disability (Chalder, 
et al., 2015; Price, et al., 2008; Stahl, et al., 2014). Several systematic reviews have 
identified both CBT and GET are the most promising treatments for CFS in secondary 
care (Chambers, et al., 2006; Edmonds, et al., 2004), with comparable treatment effects 
(White, et al., 2011b). A large randomized control trial found compared to standard 
medical care alone, CBT and GET moderately improved fatigue and physical functioning 
in CFS (White, et al., 2011b). Non-randomized studies have also found CBT and GET 
are effective in routine clinical practice (Flo & Chalder, 2014); however, effects can be 
slightly less than in randomized control trials (Quarmby, et al., 2007). 
 
Although these treatments seem to be effective for some people with CFS, around 40% 





et al., 2013). Unfortunately, we still know little about why certain people respond well to 
current treatments for CFS whilst others do not. The aim of this study is to explore facets 
of cognitive processing as potential predictors of response to cognitive and behavioural 
based treatments for CFS (GET and CBT). Specifically, we will assess the role of key 
cognitive processes that differentiate those with and without CFS, namely attentional 
biases and interpretation biases. Identifying cognitive processes that predict treatment 
outcome may also elucidate ways in which CFS treatments can be developed, tailored or 
optimized for people who do not respond well to current treatment protocols. 
 
A small body of experimental research has identified cognitive processing biases in how 
people with CFS attend to and interpret information (Hughes, et al., 2016a; Hughes, et 
al., 2016b). Hughes, et al. (2016b) found that people with CFS preferentially attend to 
illness related information (attentional bias) and tended to interpret ambiguous 
information as less positive and more illness related (interpretation bias), compared to 
healthy individuals. Interestingly, these cognitive biases were associated with self-
reported cognitive and behavioural responses to symptoms (catastrophizing, fear 
avoidance and all-or-nothing behaviours); factors which previous studies have identified 
as predicting increased fatigue and disability (Moss-Morris, 2005) and moderating  
treatment outcomes (Flo & Chalder, 2014). These relationships suggest that cognitive 
processes may have a role to play in precipitating or perpetuating cognitive and 
behavioural factors in CFS (Hughes, et al., 2016b). Exploring whether cognitive 
processing biases predict treatment outcomes may provide further understanding about 
who will respond best to current treatments. 
 
Several studies within the anxiety literature have explored whether attentional biases 





attentional vigilance towards threat or a difficulty disengaging from threatening 
information, predicts reduced anxiety following CBT (Barry, Sewart, Arch, & Craske, 
2015; Calamaras, Tone, & Anderson, 2012; Niles, Mesri, Burklund, Lieberman, & 
Craske, 2013; Waters, Mogg, & Bradley, 2012). One potential reason for this finding is 
that an attentional vigilance to threat is a key maintaining factor in anxiety. If treatments 
are able to target and modify the problematic attentional bias, participants will show 
associated anxiety reduction. Another  hypothesized mechanism is that an attentional 
vigilance pre-treatment facilities engagement with certain aspects of treatment; for 
example, extinction learning which requires a sustained attention on a feared stimuli in 
order to challenge the anticipated adverse event associated with it (Waters & Kershaw, 
2015). A similar pattern of findings may be observed in CFS; an attentional vigilance to 
illness-related information could be maintaining core illness beliefs and behaviours; thus 
treatments which modify this bias would be helpful. Additionally, an attentional vigilance 
may be benefical when engaging with some aspects of treatment for CFS, for example 
behavioural experiments which aim to  test out beliefs and encourage alternative coping 
responses. 
 
Not only is attentional bias potentially important in predicting treatment outcomes, it has 
also been shown that changing an attentional bias can reduce distress. A task developed 
by McLeod MacLeod, et al., (2002)- the Attentional Bias Modification task (ABM)- has 
been used to modify attentional biases. Using this paradigm, studies in anxiety disorders 
have found that when an attentional bias towards benign information is successfully 
induced, greater redcutions in anxiety are observed (Linetzky, et al., 2015; Mobini, 
Reynolds, & Mackintosh, 2013). For example, Schmidt, Richey, Buckner, and Timpano 
(2009) invetisgated the impact of ABM training on patients with daignoses of generalised 





(thus reducing their attentional bias to threat), exhibited significantly greater reductions 
in social anxiety compared to patients who recived a placebo training procedure. 
Furthermore, ABM studies have also shown that there are individual differences in the 
degree to which people alter their attentional bias over the course of ABM, with some 
individuals showing greater levels of attentional malleability than others. Studies have 
now begun to assess, not just attentional bias, but the role of attentional malleability in 
anxiety disorders and treatment outcome. 
 
Attentional mallebaility is defined as the ability or readiness to adopt an attentional bias 
(Clarke, et al.,  2008). It is measured in terms of the degree of change of attentional biases 
from before, to after, brief ABM training. Using this approach, Clarke, et al. (2008) found 
those with more malleable attention (measured as an ability to adopt an attentional bias 
towards threatening information), were more likely to naturalistically develop an 
attentional preference for threat when exposed to extended mild stress (i.e. the first 
semester at university); which in turn predicted an elevation of trait anxiety. In another 
study, Clarke, et al. (2012) showed that higher attentional malleability (again measured 
toward threatening information) predicted a better response (i.e. larger reductions in 
anxiety) to a course of group CBT for people with SAD. Thus, people with high 
attentional malleability may be more at risk of developing attentional biases and anxiety 
in response to stressful environments. However, these same people may also be more 
likely to benefit when exposed to environments (i.e. treatment) which promote the 
adoption of a reverse processing bias. This supports the  bias plasticity account of 
cognitive processing (Clarke, et al., 2012), which suggests that an increased attentional 






However, these studies have only assessed malleability towards threatening information. 
Measuring the degree of malleability towards neutral information would be informative 
to assess whether facilitating more benign processing has associated benefits. The bias 
plasticity account  (Clarke, et al., 2012) suggests that malleability is a non-valenced 
construct; it is the ‘malleability’ of attention that is important, not the direction attention 
is trained in. This is further supported by a genetic study which mapped attentional 
malleability onto a genetic marker, they termed a ‘platicity gene’ (a serotonin transporter 
gene, 5-HTTLPR) (Fox, et al., 2011). This ‘plasticity gene’ was associated more 
mallebale attention, both towards and away from threatening information. There were 
also some tentitive indications that those with this ‘plasticity gene’ are more responsive 
to, and therefore get more benefit from environments that provide the opportinity to 
change their attention; for example ABM (Fox, et al., 2011). Thus, the finding that 
increased attentional malleability predicts better treatment response should hold true 
regardless of the whether malleability is measured towards threatening or neutral stimuli. 
In order to test malleability as a non-valenced construct within CFS, participants in the 
current study were randomized to conditions whereby attention was briefly trained 
towards either a threatening or neutral stimuli. Consistent with the bias plasticity account 
we hypothesized that higher attentional malleability would be associated with better 
response to treatments for CFS.  
 
Another cognitive bias evident in individuals with CFS, is the tendency to interpret 
ambiguous information in a particularly negative, illness-related way (interpretation bias) 
(Hughes, et al., 2016a; Hughes, et al., 2016b) The degree of intepretation bias may predict 
response to treatment for CFS, but to our knowledge no study to date has assessed this. 
Previous findings in CFS indicate that interpretation bias is associated with unhelpful 





catastrophic thinking styles and symptom focusing (Hughes, et al., 2016b; Moss-Morris 
& Petrie, 2003). Given this, we might expect interpretation bias predicts how an 
individual will respond to treatments which target these cognitive and behaviouiral 
responses to symptoms. It could be that negative interpretation bias reinforces cognitive 
and behavioural responses to symptoms, thus making them more resistant to change 
through current treatments. Alternativly, it could be that patients who have a negative 
interpretation bias prior to treatment may have a better response to treatment given the 
opportiity to modify their bias; e.g. through behavioural experiments. If so, having 
intepretation bias pre-treatment may predict better treatment outcome.  
 
The current study was designed to identify cognitive processes that predict outcome of 
treatments for CFS (CBT and GET). Measuring ‘habitual’ cognitive characteristics using 
experimental paradigms will establish whether these processes are associated with change 
in fatigue and functioning post treatment. This may provide information about why some 
patients with CFS respond to treatments, whereas others do not. This is the first study to 
test whether illness-specific biases in cogntive processing predict response to treatment 
for CFS. It is also the only study to assess the concept of attentional malleability in this 
population. From the previous literature we expected to find that individual differences 
in these facets of cognitive processing predict how an indivdiual will respond to 
treatment. Specifically, we hypothesise that in CFS, the extent of attentional biases 
towards illness specific information would predict better fatigue and functioning post 
treatment. Furthermore, greater attenional malleability would also predict a better 
response to treatment (i.e. reduced fatigue and increased functioning post treatment). We 
expect that indivdiual differences in interpretation biases pre-treatment will predict 
treatment response (i.e. levels of fatigue and physical functioing post treatment). 





help or hinder treatment response, our hypothses regarding interpretation biases are 




Participants were those that had previously been included in our cross-sectional study 
(Hughes, et al., 2016b) in which just their pre-treatment attention and interpretation bias 
scores were reported. Participants recruited from consecutive outpatient clinics between 
October 2014 and August 2015. They were selected in accordance with the Oxford 
(Sharpe, et al., 1991) criteria for CFS, which was diagnosed by a consultant psychiatrist 
or experienced cognitive behavioural therapist, and confirmed by self-report questions. 
Routine blood tests (NICE, 2007) indicated that there were no other medical condition 
that would explain the fatigue. 
 
To be eligible for this follow-up study, participants needed to have received at least three 
sessions of either CBT or GET at one of three specialist CFS services in London or 
Oxford, and to have completed pre and post treatment assessments. Twenty-six people 
were included in this follow-up study. All participants were aged 18 or older, fluent in 
English, with normal or corrected-to-normal vision and good manual dexterity. The study 
was approved by Berkshire-B Research Ethics Committee (14/SC/0172).  
 
Outcome variables 
The outcome variables were self-reported levels of fatigue and day-to-day functioning. 
Fatigue was measured with the Chalder fatigue questionnaire (Likert scoring 0, 1, 2, 3; 
range 0–33; lowest score is least fatigue) (Chalder, et al., 1993) and physical functioning 





Sherbourne, 1994) (version 2; range 0–100; highest score is best function). These two 
primary outcome measures are valid and reliable and have been shown to be sensitive to 
change in previous RCTs in CFS (Edmonds, et al., 2004; Malouff, et al., 2008; Price, et 
al., 2008; White, et al., 2011b). 
 
Predictor Variables 
For the current analyses, attentional bias, attentional malleability and interpretation bias 
at baseline were assessed as predictors of treatment outcome. This data was collected pre-
treatment. Pre-treatment attention and interpretation bias scores are reported in Hughes, 
et al. (2016b).  
 
Visual Probe task (MacLeod, et al., 1986) 
The visual probe task (VPT) is a computerised measure of attentional bias. Each trial 
begins with a 500ms fixation point followed by two simultaneously presented words (one 
neutral and one illness-related) above and below the fixation for 500ms. One word is then 
replaced with an arrow (probe) for 500ms. Participants are asked to indicate the direction 
of the arrow by pressing keys ‘c’ for left and ‘m’; for right, as quickly as possible while 
avoiding mistakes. The arrow appeared in the prior location of the neutral and illness-
related word an equal number of times. For details of the material and experimental 
procedure see Hughes, et al. (2016b). Attentional bias is calculated as the standardized 
residual (difference score) of reaction times (RT) to probes replacing neutral words minus 
the RT’s to probe replacing CFS-related words.13 Positive values indicate an attentional 
bias to CFS-threatening words. 
                                                 
13
 To create the standardized residual score a regression analysis was conducted where reaction times to 
probes replacing neutral stimuli were entered as the dependent variable and reaction times to probes 






Malleability (MacLeod, et al., 2002) 
The VPT described above was adapted to assess attentional malleability using the same 
design as Clarke, et al. (2008) and Clarke, et al. (2012). This  involves assessing 
attentional bias after a brief period of training to determine the extent to which 
participants are able to adopt the designated attentional bias. For this purpose, the VPT 
was extended to include two additional blocks; a training block of 192 trials and post-
training block of 48 trials. Participants were randomized to receive either training towards 
neutral words or training towards threatening words. For those trained towards neutral/ 
benign stimuli, probes consistently appeared in the prior location of the neutral word for 
the 192 trials. For those trained towards threatening stimuli, probes consistently replaced 
threatening/ illness-related words. In the post-training block the probe appeared in the 
prior location of the threatening or neutral word an equal number of times. The purpose 
of the post contingency block was to assess the attentional bias post training. Consistent 
with MacLeod, et al., (2002) the stimuli for the training block was the same as that in the 
VPT (see above). A new set of stimuli were used for the post-training block in order to 
assess generalisation of training to new, novel stimuli (see supplementary material).  
 
To assess the degree to which participants’ attention is malleable to change via training, 
we calculated an attentional malleability index. As we are interested in malleability per 
se and not malleability in relation to valence of training, we calculated attention 
malleability scores separately for those in the threat training and neutral training 
conditions. Scores were calculated as follows: 
Malleability scores for those in the threat training condition= post training RT to 





Malleability scores for those in neutral training condition= post training RT to 
threat- post training RT to neutral 
Higher scores, regardless of the training condition (threat or neutral), are indicative of 
greater malleability of attentional biases.  
 
Interpretative bias task (Mathews & Mackintosh, 2000) 
The interpretative bias task is an ambiguous scenario recognition task (Mathews & 
Mackintosh, 2000) which has two phases, the encoding phase and the recognition phase. 
During the encoding phase participants are presented with ten ambiguous scenarios, each 
beginning with a title. Participants are asked to read each scenario as though they are the 
main protagonist. After reading the scenario they are then asked to rate how pleasant the 
scenario was (scale of 1-10) and answer a brief comprehension question to ensure the text 
has been read and understood.  
 
After reading all ten scenarios the recognition phase begins. Participants are presented 
with the title of a given scenario and asked to rate four new sentences to the degree to 
which they are similar in meaning to the original text (1=, very different in meaning, to 
4= very similar in meaning). The four sentences relate to (i) a positive interpretation of 
the scenario (ii) an illness related interpretation of the scenario (iii) a positive sentence 
which is factually incongruent to the scenario (positive foil) (iv) a negative sentence 
which is factually incongruent to the scenario (negative foil). Foils were included to make 
the purpose of the task more obscure. The foils were not analysed. For the analysis, mean 
similarity ratings for the interpretation items were calculated. Higher scores indicate 
increased endorsement of that type of interpretation. For details of the stimuli and 







After obtaining written informed consent, participants completed questionnaires at home 
and then attended the laboratory to complete the cognitive processing tasks on a laptop 
computer. This data is reported in Hughes, et al. (2016b). For the current follow-up study 
participants completed questionnaires up to two weeks after their final treatment session. 
Primary outcomes were also assessed at the time of drop-out, and used when no other 
outcome data were available.  
 
Treatments  
All treatments were provided as part of routine clinical practice at specialist CFS services 
in the UK. Treatments were administered by trained Cognitive Behavioural Therapists, 
Clinical Psychologists or Physiotherapists. Patients were allocated CBT or GET based on 
the patient preference, assessor recommendation and local authority funding. All 
treatment centres followed standardized CBT and GET treatment protocols (White, et al., 
2011b), which are designed to be delivered over 14 sessions over 24 weeks. Most 
treatments were delivered face-to-face but some were provided by telephone. Treatment 
was provided individually, although participants could be accompanied if they wanted. 
 
Cognitive Behavioural Therapy  
The aim of CBT for CFS is to change the behavioural and cognitive factors assumed to 
play a role in the perpetuation of the participant’s symptoms and disability (White, 
Sharpe, Chalder, DeCesare, & Walwyn, 2007).  
 
The behavioural component of CBT includes setting a baseline of current activity levels 
and sleep/wake patterns and using these to set goals to develop more consistent patterns, 





First – unhelpful thoughts in relation to fatigue such as catastrophizing and fear-
avoidance beliefs are identified and patients are taught methods of challenging these and 
coming up with alternatives.  Second- symptom focusing is discussed, linking the 
patient’s thoughts, feelings (physical and emotional) and behaviour, using their own 
examples. Third- other factors which may negatively influence the patient’s ability to 
cope with their illness, such as low self-esteem or beliefs about perfectionism, are 
identified and addressed. Where applicable patients complete ‘sleep diaries’, ‘unhelpful 
thoughts diaries’ and ‘alternatives to unhelpful thoughts diaries’; as well as writing out a 
plans for each week in an ‘activity programme’ and recording their activities in a ‘weekly 
activity diary’. These are reviewed with their therapist during treatment sessions.  
 
CBT treatment for CFS is usually structured as course of 10-14, one to one sessions 
between the person with CFS and a trained health professional (NICE, 2007). 
 
Graded Exercise Therapy 
The aim of GET in relation to CFS is to help the participant gradually engage and 
participate in physical activity and aerobic exercise. Emphasises is on reducing fear of 
exercise through systematic desensitisation and reverse muscle and fitness depletion (i.e. 
deconditioning), that is assumed to be perpetuating the fatigue and disability.  
(Edmonds, McGuire, & Price, 2004). The rational is that reversing deconditioning and 
improving fitness and physical functioning will alter the persons perception of effort and 
enable the body to gain fitness and strength; leading to a reduction in symptoms and an 
increase in activity capacity (Fulcher & White, 1997). 
 
Therapeutic strategies consist of establishing a baseline of achievable exercise, followed 





an assessment of the patient’s current physical capacity, and mutual negotiation of 
meaningful and functional physical goals, a baseline of physical activity is agreed upon 
and commenced, at a manageable low level of intensity. The duration of physical 
activity/exercise is then increased slowly, once every 1–2 weeks. Intensity is increased 
by encouraging the patient to speed up the pace of their walk, increase the resistance on 
exercise machines or do an activity faster, using their heart rate monitor (HRM) as a 
guide. If increased symptoms occur after an increment, the patient is encouraged to stick 
at the current level until symptoms reduce, and then increase afterwards. However, 
activity is mutually reviewed on a regular basis, and plans may be adjusted depending on 
the patient’s general health and symptoms. Patients are encouraged to see symptoms as 
temporary and reversible, as a result of their current physical weakness, and not as signs 
of progressive pathology (White, et al., 2007).  
 
GET is usually delivered on a one to one basis by a trained exercise therapist, usually a 
physiotherapist (NICE, 2007). The number of sessions vary according to the treatment 
protocols used. The GET protocol used at the specialist CFS clinics in this study provided 
a course of 10-14 sessions (White, et al., 2007).  
 
Analytic strategy 
To assess the effect of treatment on primary self-reported outcomes, paired t-tests within 
the CBT and GET groups were conducted with pre and post treatment fatigue (CFQ) and 
functioning (SF-36) scores. To examine whether cognitive processes assessed at the start 
of therapy served to positively or negatively predict improvement in fatigue and/or 
functioning in response to specialist CFS treatments (CBT and GET), multiple linear 
regressions were conducted. Separate linear regressions were conducted with the criterion 





regression, predictor variables included: the type of treatment14; pre-treatment scores of 
the criterion measure in order to account for “baseline” levels; and the pre-treatment 
cognitive processing score of interest (attentional bias, attentional malleability or 




Figure 1 illustrates the recruitment into the study. Fifty-two CFS participants were 
recruited into the cross-sectional study (Hughes, et al., 2016b), of these 40 were eligible 
for the current study as they were assigned either CBT or GET at one of the three 
recruitment sites, based in London or Oxford15. Of the 40 participants eligible to 
participate, 4 dropped out of treatment before completing the minimum of 3 treatment 
sessions; 3 were still in treatment at the time of analysis; and 7 were lost to follow up. 
There were no significant differences in demographics (age, t(50)=-.65, p=.52; 
gender; 2=.33, df=1, p=.57) or illness factors (illness duration, t(50)=-.24, p=.81; 
fatigue, t(50)=.33, p=.76; functioning, t(50)=-.13, p=.90; distress, t(50)=.68, p=.50) 
between those who were included in the final analysis (n=26) and those who were not 
(n=26). The group characteristics and clinical measures of the final sample (n=26) are 
presented in Table 1. There were no significant differences between CBT and GET 
groups at baseline, in terms demographics (age, gender, employment), clinical variables 
                                                 
14
 Sensitivity analysis found no difference in effects when treatment centre or number of 
treatment sessions were entered as predictor variables in the linear regression analyses; 
therefore, these variables were not included in the regression models. Treatment type was 
included in the regression models but was not a significant predictor of fatigue or 
functioning in any of the models. 

















Complete baseline questionnaires and experimental/ 
cognitive tasks 
Post treatment questionnaires (n=26) 
CBT (n=19) 
 GET (n=7) 
 
Participants assigned treatment at the clinic (n=40) 
CBT (n=27) 
 GET (n=13) 
 
Dropped out after < 3 sessions (n=4) 
Still on waitlist (n=3) 
Lost to follow- up (n=7) 
- 4 unable to contact  
 - 3 declined to participate  
Time 2 
Attending treatment clinics outside of the 
study recruitment sites (n=7) 
Did not receive funding for treatment 
(n=5) 





Table 1. Comparisons between CBT and GET groups on demographic variables and pre-
treatment clinical variables 





Age (years), M (SD) 39 (12) 34 (5) t(22.79)a=1.53, p=.28 
Female, n (%) 13 (68%) 4 (57%) 2=.29, df=1, p=.59 
Employed, n (%) 12 (63%) 6 (86%) 2=1.22, df=1, p=.27 
Years in education, M (SD) 15 (5) 15 (3) t(24)=-.03, p=.97 
Illness duration (months), M (SD) 70.59 (89.78) 45.29(62.08) t(24)=.69, p=.50 
HADS distress 20.37 (7.18) 16.42 (6.45) t(24)=1.27, p=.22 
CFQ, M (SD) 27.26 (5.28) 26.14 (1.12) t(19.37)a =.679, p=.60 
SF-36, M (SD) 47.11 (2.97) 45.71 (15.12) t(24)=.14, p=.89 
Number of treatment sessions, M 
(SD)  
9.63 (4.07) 10.71 (4.11) 2=8.42, df=1, p=.30 
CFS, Chronic fatigue syndrome; CFQ, Chalder Fatigue Questionnaire; SF-36, Short-
Form 36 physical functioning scale;  HADS, Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale. 
aDegrees of freedom were corrected after Lavene’s test 
 
In order to assess the predictors of treatment efficacy it was necessary to first test whether 
treatments did indeed result in decreases in fatigue and increases in functioning. In order 
to do so, paired t-tests were conducted with participants’ fatigue and functioning scores 
pre and post treatment. Table 2 shows that both CBT and GET resulted in significant 
improvements in fatigue (CBT; t(18)=6.31, p<.001, 95% CI 6.91, 13.86; GET; t(6)=2.66, 
p=.017, 95% CI .45, 10.93), as measured by the Chalder fatigue scale (Chalder, et al., 
1993) and functioning (CBT; t(18)=-.266, p=.04, 95% CI -20.93, -2.40; GET; t(6)=3.49, 
p=.01, 95% CI -28.0, -4.91) measured by the SF-36 (McHorney, et al., 1994) from 





difference in the size of fatigue reduction and improvements in functioning across the 
course of treatment.  
 
Table 2. CFS patients means and standard deviations for the outcome variables at 
baseline and after completing treatment 
 CFQ SF-36 
 Pre Post Pre Post 
 M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) 
















CBT, Cognitive behavioural therapy; GET, graded exercise therapy; CFQ, Chalder 
Fatigue Questionnaire; SF-36, Short-Form 36 physical functioning scale  
 
Predictors of treatment outcome 
Pre-treatment scores on the attentional bias task, malleability task and interpretation bias 
task are presented in Table 3. Linear regressions of predictors of post-treatment fatigue 
are presented in Table 4; and linear regressions of predictors of post-treatment physical 
functioning are presented in Table 5. 
 
Table 3. Reaction times and scores on the cognitive tasks (CBT and GET groups 
combined) 
 Mean (SD)  
n=26 
Visual Probe Task  
   RT to threat pre-training block  611.04 (94.39) 
   RT to neutral pre-training block 615.12 (92.76) 
Malleability score  .75 (64.22) 





 Mean (SD)  
n=26 
   Positive interpretation 2.75 (.44) 
   Somatic interpretation 2.32 (.57) 
   Positive foil 1.55 (.31) 
   Negative foil 1.45 (.22) 
RT, reaction time 
 
Table 4. Summary of linear regression analyses of predictors of post treatment fatigue 




3.69 2.95 .25 1.25 .22 
.54 .28 .38 1.96 .06 
-.46 1.36 .07 -.34 .74 




3.74 2.86 .25 1.31 .20 
.52 .27 .36 1.89 .07 
-.02 0.2 -.15 -.81 .43 
Variable B SE (B)  β t p 
Treatment type 
Pre-treatment fatigue 
Positive interpretation bias 
2.84 3.08 .19 .92 .37 
.29 .28 .21 1.02 .32 
2.22 3.16 .15 .70 .50 
Variable B SE (B)  β t p 
Treatment type 
Pre-treatment fatigue 
Somatic interpretation bias 
2.74 3.15 .19 .86 .40 
.21 .29 .21 .97 .34 
-.033 2.43 -.03 -.14 .89 
 





Table 5. Summary of linear regression analyses of predictors of post treatment physical 
functioning 




1.80 7.33 .03 .25 .81 
.84 .16 .71 5.28 <.001 
9.83 3.39 .40 2.90 .008 




7.71 7.13 .14 1.08 .29 
.881 .16 .74 5.52 <.001 
.16 .05 .40 2.99 .007 
Variable B SE (B)  β t p 
Treatment type 
Pre-treatment functioning 
Positive interpretation bias 
8.67 7.87 .17 1.10 .28 
.81 .18 .72 4.65 <.001 
2.64 8.01 .05 .75 .50 
Variable B SE (B)  β t p 
Treatment type 
Pre-treatment functioning 
Somatic interpretation bias 
9.30 7.74 .18 1.20 .24 
.45 .18 .67 4.12 <.001 
-6.15 6.24 -.16 -.98 .34 
 
1. Does attentional bias prior to treatment predict fatigue and physical functioning post 
treatment?  
To assess whether attention bias pre-treatment predicts improvement in fatigue post 
treatment a multiple linear regression was conducted with treatment type, pre-treatment 





entered as the dependent variable. Attentional bias at the start of therapy did not predict 
change in fatigue, b=-.46, SEb=1.36, β=.07, t(25)=-.34, p=.74, 95% CI (-2.35, 3.28). 
 
To assess whether attention bias predicted change in functioning pre to post therapy a 
separate linear regression was conducted with SF-36 measured post-therapy as the 
criterion and treatment type, pre-treatment SF-36 score, and attentional bias as the 
predictors. Pre-treatment attentional bias significantly predicted functioning post therapy, 
over and above the other variables; b=-9.83, SEb=3.39, β=.40, t(25)=2.90, p=.008, 95% 
CI (2.79, 16.86). 
 
2. Does attentional malleability prior to treatment predict fatigue and physical 
functioning post treatment? 
The degree to which individuals changed their pattern of attention as observed on the 
malleability index (M=.71, SD=64.22) was highly variable, suggesting that, as expected, 
there was considerable individual difference in attentional malleability.  
To examine whether attentional malleability at the start of treatment predicts symptom 
change across therapy, separate linear regressions were conducted with treatment type, 
baseline fatigue or functioning and malleability scores as predictors of the fatigue and 
functioning post treatment. Malleability pre-treatment did not predict change in fatigue 
pre to post therapy, b=-.02, SEb=.02, β =-.15, t=-.81, p=.43; but did predict change in 
functioning pre to post therapy, b=.16, SEb=.05, β =.40, t=2.99, p=.007, 95% CI (.05, 
.26). 
 
To rule out any possibility that this finding is a result of the relative contribution of the 
pre-training attentional bias, the linear regression predicting change in functioning was 





type was not included as this variable did not have a significant impact on the previous 
model. The model remained significant, F(3,22) = 19.52, r=.85, p= <.001. Malleability 
remained a significant predictor of change in functioning pre to post treatment, over and 
above that of attentional bias, b=.14, SEb=.04, β =.35, t=3.11, p=.005, 95% CI (.05, .23). 
Furthermore, attentional bias did not serve to significantly predict the malleability score, 
r(24)=.41, ns. 
 
3. Does interpretation bias prior to treatment predict fatigue and physical functioning 
post treatment? 
To investigate whether interpretation bias pre-treatment predicted improvement in fatigue 
or functioning post treatment, separate linear regressions were conducted with post 
treatment fatigue (CFQ) and functioning (SF-36) as the criterion, and treatment type, pre-
treatment scores and pre-treatment interpretation bias scores entered as predictors. There 
was no significant effect of pre-treatment positive interpretation bias scores on fatigue 
b=2.22, SEb=3.16, β=.15, t(25)=.70, p=.50, 95% CI (-4.35 8.78); or functioning, b=2.64, 
SEb=8.01 β=-.05, t(25)=.33, p=.75, 95% CI (-14.01, 19.29). There was also no significant 
effect of pre-treatment negative interpretation bias scores on fatigue, b=-.33, SEb=2.43, 
β=-.03, t(25)=-.14, p=.89, 95% CI (-5.39, 4.72); or functioning, b=-6.15, SEb=6.24, β=-
.16, t(25)=-.98, p=.34, 95% CI (-19.12, 6.83). 
 
Discussion 
The aim of the present study was to examine facets of cognitive processing, specifically 
attentional bias, attentional malleability and interpretation bias, as predictors of response 






Attentional bias emerged as a significant predictor of physical functioning post-treatment, 
with those who have greater illness-related attentional biases showing greater 
improvement in functioning over the course of treatment. This reflects similar findings 
reported in the anxiety literature which has found that an attentional bias towards threat 
predicts better response to CBT (Reinholdt-Dunne, Mogg, Vangkilde, Bradley, & 
Esbjørn, 2015; Tobon, Ouimet, & Dozois, 2011). Attentional malleability was also a 
predictor of improved functioning pre- to post- treatment, even when controlling for 
attentional bias. This is consistent with Clarke, et al.  (2012) which identified attentional 
malleability predicted treatment response in social anxiety disorder; suggesting that 
individual differences in the readiness to adopt a different pattern of attention (i.e. 
malleability) is associated with individual differences in response to therapy. In keeping 
with the non-directional account of plasticity, the current study trained attention both 
towards threatening and neutral stimuli. By operationalising malleability in this way, this 
study has indicated that malleability, irrespective of training direction, is an important 
predictor of treatment outcome in CFS. This supports findings by Fox, et al.  (2011) who 
also measured malleability both towards and away from threat and found tentative 
evidence that people with anxiety who had more malleable attention benefited more in 
terms of reductions in anxiety following ABM than those with low malleability. 
Interestingly Fox, et al. (2011) also identified genetic markers that map on to attentional 
malleability.  
 
Considering the findings of interpretation bias, contrary to our hypothesis interpretation 
bias did not predict changes in fatigue or functioning over the course of treatment. This 
corresponds with cross-sectional study data, which found that somatic interpretations 
were not related to fatigue or physical functioning in CFS (Hughes, et al., 2016b). 





Previous studies have identified that changing these unhelpful symptom responses are 
key mediators of effective treatments for CFS (Chalder, et al., 2015; Moss-Morris, et al., 
2005; Stahl, et al., 2014; Wearden & Emsley, 2013). Given this, it would be interesting 
to know if interpretation biases have a casual role in maintaining some of these cognitive 
and behavioural responses in CFS. Future research should consider whether interpretation 
biases help mediate treatment responses in CFS, and examine the relationship between 
interpretation bias and other key mechanisms of change.  
 
Returning to consider attentional bias and the broader implication of these significant 
findings, the fact that attentional processes predicted post-treatment functioning, may be 
indicative of a mutually reinforcing relationship. It may be that an attentional bias to 
threat is maintaining disability (i.e. reduced physical functioning) for some people with 
CFS. Thus, engaging in techniques which modify this bias in turn reduces disability. It 
may be that over the course of the illness people with CFS have learnt a fearful and 
avoidant response to activity and fatigue triggering stimuli (Nijs, et al., 2013), which in 
turn reduces every-day functioning (Knoop, et al.,  2010; Moss-Morris, 2005; Silver, et 
al.,  2002). For some people, this fear and avoidance of activity may be extrapolated to a 
strategy of attentional vigilance for feared, illness-related information, which people 
engage in to pre-empt and circumvent further injury (Hughes, et al., 2016b). If treatments 
for CFS address the underlying mechanisms that are sustaining the unhelpful fear 
avoidance responses, associated reductions in attentional bias may be observed; which in 
turn may reduce fear and increase activity and in so doing improves levels of functioning. 
Alternatively, those with an increased attentional bias may more readily be able to engage 
in behavioural techniques that require an attentional focus on the threat (e.g. extinction 





studies are needed to explore whether changing these biases are a mechanism of treatment 
for CFS. 
 
This study identified that in CFS people have differing degrees of attentional malleability. 
Furthermore, similar to findings in the anxiety literature, the more malleable attention, 
the more benefit is gained from treatment (Fox, et al.,  2011; Clarke, et al.,  2012) Why 
might attentional malleability be important in treatment? One hypothesis is that the more 
malleable the individuals’ attention, the more ability they have to shift an attention or 
interpretation bias. If these biases are problematic, i.e. they are maintaining some core 
aspect of the condition, then attenuating the bias would produce therapeutic effects. This 
assumes that current treatment protocols for CFS provide the conditions under which 
cognitive biases change. Clarke, et al. (2012) showed that people with SAD who were 
more malleable pre-treatment, had greater reductions in attentional biases and anxiety 
following CBT. Given this, it may be the case that those with CFS who have higher 
attentional malleability are more able to reduce unhelpful attentional biases through 
current cognitive and behavioural based treatments for CFS (i.e. GET and CBT), and may 
also benefit more from treatment. Since attentional malleability has been identified as an 
important predictor of outcome in CFS, research is needed to establish whether current 
treatments can be optimised for those with poor malleability and/or whether certain 
treatments are more effective for those with poor versus greater attentional malleability.  
 
The nature of this non-randomized study includes the potential for a number of 
confounding variables (e.g. numerous treatment centres, different therapeutic 
approaches). However, sensitivity analysis found no effect of treatment centre or 
treatment type. Furthermore, consistent with previous studies (White, et al., 2011b), CBT 





CBT and GET may engage different mechanisms to achieve these treatment effects. For 
example, Chalder, et al. (2015) found that fear avoidance beliefs were the strongest 
mediator for both CBT and GET for CFS, but more so for GET. This may be a result of 
GET engaging with fear-avoidance more directly through behavioural techniques. Given 
this, cognitive processes in CFS could influence treatment outcomes differently 
depending on the specific treatment received. Indeed, a previous study found that 
attentional vigilance to threat predicted better outcomes in CBT for anxiety, but not ACT 
(Niles, et al., 2013). The current study lacked the sample size to explore differences 
between treatments (CFS=19, GET=7). It may be that one treatment targets cognitive 
biases whereas the other does not. If this is the case, there may be important implications 
for how patients are assigned to different treatments. For instance, an individual who has 
an attentional bias that maintains some core aspect of their condition may benefit form a 
treatment that specifically targets this problem. Cognitive processing characteristics 
could be one way to match patients to the most personally efficacious treatment. 
 
 This study identified cognitive characteristics that predicted increased physical 
functioning. This is an important outcome for CFS, a condition defined by its debilitating 
effects (Fukuda, et al., 1994; Sharpe et al., 1991). However, the facets of cognitive 
processing studied in this research did not predict improvements in fatigue. Further 
research is needed to establish what factors can predict fatigue outcomes in CFS and 
whether cognitive processes play a role. Whilst cognitive biases may not have a direct 
relationship with fatigue, they may interact with other mechanisms of treatment; for 
example, self-reported cognitions and behaviours. 
 
This study is the first to experimentally assess whether cognitive processing can predict 





of current treatments provided in routine clinical practice in improving fatigue and 
functioning in CFS (Quarmby, et al., 2007; Stahl, et al., 2014); and importantly indicate 
that facets of cognitive processing, namely attentional bias and attentional malleability, 
predict some of these treatment effects. Further work is needed to explore whether these 








Table 1. Materials for the VPT (MacLeod et al.,  2002) 
Illness related words Neutral Words 
Set 1. Set 1. 
bedridden buttercup 
collapse  transmit 
immobilised  calligraphy 
fatigue pockets 
exhausted  messenger 
disabled  calendar 
drained pitched 
limited  created 
aches  domes 
anxious  whistle 
Incapacitated infinitesimal 
painful  trumpet 
Illness Related Words Neutral Words 
Set 2 Set 2 
impaired  polished 
restricted  newspapers 
debilitating  articulation 
housebound  grapevines 
weak  zone 
powerless  triangles 
unwell  russet 
frustrated  settlement 
tired  brief 
disheartened  stewardesses 
feeble inland 








Chapter 8 Do cognitive processes change over the course of treatment? 
8.1 Chapter overview 
This chapter reports on preliminary follow-up data of participants who took part in the nested 
longitudinal study. The chapter assesses whether cognitive biases and attentional control 
capacity changed over the course of treatment for CFS (CBT or GET); and the extent to 
which changes in these domains relates to treatment outcomes. 
 
8.2 Introduction 
Our previous studies have established that people with CFS have illness-specific attention 
and interpretation biases, compared to healthy individuals (Chapter 5 and Chapter 6). 
Associations between cognitive biases and factors which perpetuate fatigue and disability, 
suggest these cognitive processes maybe important in the autopoietic cycle of symptom 
maintenance in CFS. Our previous study (7) illustrated that certain cognitive processes also 
predict how an individual will respond to treatments for CFS. Having pre-existing attentional 
vigilance towards illness-related information (attentional bias) and more malleable attention, 
predicted larger reductions in disability post-treatment. Interpretation bias did not predict 
treatment outcomes. These findings may indicate that having an attentional vigilance towards 
illness-related information is a maintaining factor of disability for some people with CFS. 
Thus, by engaging in treatments which modify this bias, disability is reduced. Those with 
more malleable attention may be more able engage in treatments which modify their 
attentional habits and thus show better treatment responses. An underlying assumption of 






The finding that interpretation biases were not related to treatment outcomes indicate that an 
individual’s pre-exiting interpretation habits are not important for predicting fatigue or 
disability. Does this mean interpretation biases are not an important factor to address during 
treatment? Our earlier cross-sectional findings suggest otherwise; illness-related 
interpretations were associated with more negative responses to illness, indicating that 
interpretation biases may be important for changing these proximal treatment outcomes. 
While pre-existing illness-related interpretation biases may not predict treatment outcome 
(Chapter 7) it may still be important to change these interpretation biases in therapy, as the 
ability to make a range of interpretations of ambiguity is thought to be adaptive (Clarke, 
Nanthakumar, Notebaert, Holmes, Blackwell & MacLeod, 2014; Koole, Schwager, & 
Rothermund, 2015; Troy, Wilhelm, Shallcross, & Mauss, 2010).  
 
Consistent with other research, our previous studies also showed that people with CFS had 
poorer attentional control compared to healthy individuals (Cvejic, Birch, & Vollmer-Conna, 
2016; Hou, et al., 2014; Hughes, et al., 2016b; Togo, et al., 2015). Attentional control is an 
individual’s capacity to direct and control the focus of their attention (Fan, et al., 2002). 
Previous studies have shown that those with CFS who have poorer attentional control, show 
increased disability (Schmaling & Betterton, 2016) and mental fatigue (Capuron, et al., 
2006). Although attentional control was not associated with symptoms or disability in our 
CFS sample improving attentional control may still be an important outcome in treatment for 
CFS. One experimental study with CFS participants successfully improved working memory 
and restored general attention control back to average normative levels (Maroti, Westerberg, 





indeed malleable. However, the degree to which changes in attentional control may relate to 
improvements in other domains (e.g. symptoms) is unclear. 
 
It could be that existing CFS treatments, directly or indirectly, modify these cognitive 
processes. Indeed, modifying habitual cognitive processing may be a mechanism through 
which CFS treatments are effective. To date, no study has experimentally assessed whether 
treatments for CFS shift biases in cognitive processing. However, experimental studies in the 
psychopathology literature, and in anxiety in particular, provide some promising indications. 
The following section will highlight some of the key findings in these areas. 
 
8.2.1 Modification of cognitive processing in cognitive and behavioural treatments for 
anxiety 
Several studies have assessed whether CBT augments attentional biases in anxiety disorders. 
Findings indicate that over the course of CBT patterns of attention shift; starting with a bias 
towards threat at baseline and shifting attention away from threat after treatment (Reinholdt-
Dunne, et al., 2015; Tobon, et al., 2011). Some studies have found that this shift in attentional 
biases is associated with larger improvements in symptoms post treatment (Legerstee, et al., 
2010; Mogg, Bradley, Millar, & White, 1995; Pishyar, Harris, & Menzies, 2008; Waters, et 
al., 2012). However, this is not always the case; some studies show no change in attentional 
bias following psychological therapies; whilst others find even when psychological 
treatments do reduce attentional biases, this is not necessarily correlated with improved 
outcomes (Tobon, et al., 2011). Perhaps some treatment protocols tap into and modify these 
biases whereas others do not. For example, Niles, et al. (2013) found attentional biases in a 





to acceptance and commitment therapy (ACT); though both treatmeant were effective at 
reducing anxiety. The authors supposed that these treatments operated via different treatment 
mechanims. Whereas, CBT may facilitate attentional focus away from anxiety provoking 
information, the theraputic effect of ACT may operate through differement mechansims, for 
example it may focus on more flexible attention rather than changing an attentional bias.  
 
Fewer studies have experimentally measured whether interpretation biases change over the 
course of psychological treatments. Those that have, have been conducted in the anxiety 
literature, using a range of methodologies and treatment protocols. Broadly, findings suggest 
that  anxious patients who receive treatments such as CBT and group anxiety management, 
make fewer negative interpretations of ambiguous information post treatment (Bowler, et al., 
2012; Eysenck, et al., 1991; Franklin, Huppert, Langner, Leiberg, & Foa, 2005; McNally & 
Foa, 1987). Several authors have also found that computerized cognitive behavioural therapy 
(cCBT) can significantly reduce negative interpretations in populations with high social 
anxiety (Bowler, et al., 2012; Butler, Mobini, Rapee, Mackintosh, & Reynolds, 2015). 
Bowler, et al. (2012) also included a treatment arm which specifically aimed to modify 
interpretation biases via computerized training called cognitive bias modification for 
Interpretation biases (CBM-I). The findings indicated that both cCBT and CBM-I modified 
people’s interpretation of ambiguous information. Interestingly, however, when participants 
were under increased mental load, those who had received CBM-I maintained the change in 
interpretation biases, whereas those who received cCBT did not. This suggests that, whilst 
cognitive and behavioural treatments can successfully reduce interpretation biases, this 






Another key cognitive process is attentional control (Fan et al., 2002); the capacity to execute 
goal directed attentional deployment.  People vary in the extent to which they can control 
their attention, which importantly is amenable to change (Derryberry & Reed, 2002). Studies 
with healthy and anxious populations indicate that attentional control can be accessed and 
enhanced by a range of psychological therapies and therapeutic techniques, including 
cognitive behavioural therapy (Hadwin & Richards, 2016), mindfulness (Chambers, Lo, & 
Allen, 2008) and exercise (Colcombe & Kramer, 2003; Colcombe, et al., 2006); although, 
how these diverse treatments achieve these effects is still unclear. Nevertheless, it seems 
likely, that CBT and GET for CFS would show similar improvements in attentional control 
capacity. Indeed, an fMRI study with CFS patients observed that following CBT participants 
had significant increases in grey matter volume localized in the lateral prefrontal cortex; (De 
Lange, et al., 2008) an area associated with attentional control functions (Miller & Cohen, 
2001). This raises the possibility that current evidenced treatments for CFS may improve 
attentional control, with associated neuroplastic changes.  
 
Given that psychological treatments for anxiety are successful in modifying cognitive biases 
and attentional control, it is conceivable, that cognitive and behavioural treatments for CFS, 
may too modify these processes.  
 
8.2.2 Do changes in cognitive processing relate to changes in symptoms?  
Cognitive processes appear to be malleable via psychological treatment. However, are 
changes in cognitive processing a benign bi-product of treatment or do they reflect 





need to explore whether changes in cognitive processing are related to changes in core 
symptoms and associated disability. 
 
Studies which experimentally manipulate cognitive biases through computerized training- 
cognitive bias modification (CBM)- have been fundamental in addressing these questions. 
CBM techniques are specifically designed to target and alter patters of information 
processing (i.e. attention and interpretation biases) by means of consistently training attention 
or interpretation in a certain way. For example, CBM techniques to reduce attentional biases 
(CBM-A) typically use a modified version of the visual probe task (MacLeod, et al., 2002) 
(which the current research used to assess attentional biases in previous chapters), whereby 
a selective attention towards neutral over threatening information is repeatedly reinforced. 
Similarly, CBM for interpretation biases typically use a version of the ambiguous scenarios/ 
recognition task (Mathews & Mackintosh, 2000) (which the current research used to assess 
interpretation biases in previous chapters), whereby positive or benign interpretations of 
ambiguity are consistently reinforced through repeated training towards positive/ neutral 
resolutions of ambiguity. (For recent reviews see (Amir & Conley, 2014; Hirsch, et al., 
2016b). Using these CBM methodologies, converging evidence in the anxiety literature 
indicates that reducing attention and interpretation biases has associated benefits of symptom 
reduction for people with clinical and non-clinical anxiety disorders (Linetzky, et al., 2015; 
Mobini, et al., 2013). Similar effects have been observed for mood disorders (Gold, Montana, 
Sylvia, Nierenberg, & Deckersbach, 2016). For example, a CBM-A study with people with 
clinical depression found a reduced attentional bias to negative emotive information, was 
associated with a reduction in depressive symptoms, which was maintained at 3 months 





found that depressed participants who had been trained to interpret ambiguous situations 
positively, demonstrated clinically significant reductions on measures of anxiety, repeated 
negative thoughts, and disability; which were partially mediated by the change in 
interpretation bias. Thus, it seems changing these cognitive biases can have some associated 
benefits in symptom reduction in anxiety and depression.  
 
However, CBM techniques are not always effective at shifting the bias, and even when they 
do, associated symptom reduction is not always observed (Menne-Lothmann, et al., 2014; 
Price, et al., 2016b). This suggests a more complex relationship between cognitive biases and 
symptoms, which is likely to be dependent on a range of factors. One contributing factor to 
these inconsistencies may be the diverse range of methods utilized in CBM protocols. For 
example, CBM-A is more likely to be effective at reducing an attentional bias under 
laboratory conditions (Clarke, Notebaert, & MacLeod, 2014; Linetzky, et al., 2015; 
Mogoaşe, et al., 2014) and when conducted with clinical populations (Bar-Haim, et al., 
2007). Similarly, CBM-I training is thought to be effective only when ambiguity is evoked 
(Clarke, Nanthakumar, Notebaert, Holmes, Blackwell & MacLeod, 2014) during ‘active’ 
training (i.e. the individual is required to resolve the ambiguity) (Hoppitt, Mathews, Yiend, 
& Mackintosh, 2010), and is more likely to be effective when the training involves imagery 
(Hirsch, et al., 2016b; Holmes, Lang, & Shah, 2009). Thus, while CBM has shown that 
cognitive biases are malleable constructs and may have some causal/ maintaining roles to 
play in psychopathology, CBM has not yet established the optimal conditions in which 
change in cognitive biases can be elicited and importantly, how precisely these changes 






A more diverse range of methods have been used to modify general attentional control (Tang 
& Posner, 2009) (as discussed earlier in this chapter, section 8.5.1). Studies have found that 
not only is attentional control plastic (i.e. malleable) and trainable but that improvements in 
executive attentional control transfer to other general cognitive abilities (such as, fluid 
intelligence and working memory) (Posner, Rothbart, & Tang, 2015; Rueda, Rothbart, 
McCandliss, Saccomanno, & Posner, 2005; Shipstead, Redick, & Engle, 2012). These 
cognitive abilities are important for everyday functioning (Royall, et al., 2002), such as 
multitasking  (Diamond, 2013). Thus, improved attentional control is itself a clinically 
relevant outcome.  
 
Several studies have also shown that improved attentional control is related to other self-
reported improvements. For example,  Fox, Dutton, Yates, Georgiou, and Mouchlianitis 
(2015) conducted a computerized attentional control training task and found that as 
attentional control improved, so did the ability to suppress worry-related intrusive thoughts. 
In another study using a different attentional control training design, increased attentional 
control when processing emotional information, was associated with reduced rumination and 
associated depressed mood (Cohen, Mor, & Henik, 2015). These studies suggest 
improvements in attentional control may reduce emotional reactivity. However, both studies 
were conducted with unselected samples and Fox, et al. (2015) failed to significantly improve 
attentional control at the population level. Larger studies with clinical samples are needed to 
assess whether changes in objective attentional control correspond with improvements that 






In the anxiety and depression literature at least, changing cognitive biases and enhancing 
attentional control, appears to be associated with some reduction in symptoms and emotional 
reactivity. These findings suggest that cognitive biases and attentional control may play a 
causal role in the maintenance of anxiety and depression (Cisler & Koster, 2010; MacLeod 
& Mathews, 2012; Mogg & Bradley, 2016). Thus, specifically targeting these cognitive 
processes is important for reducing symptoms and improving outcomes in emotional 
disorders. However, this may not be the case for CFS. Our previous studies found no 
relationship between cognitive biases or attentional control and primary symptoms and 
disability (Chapter 5, Chapter 6 and Chapter 7), though we did find some relationships 
between attentional biases and mood in CFS (Chapter 5). Nor were cognitive biases 
associated with improvements in fatigue or functioning post treatment (Chapter 7). Thus, 
shifting cognitive biases and improving attentional control in CFS may not necessarily 
directly result in better outcomes for the patient. In physical health conditions (such as CFS 
and pain), cognitive biases are more closely associated with other precipitating or 
perpetuating factors (e.g. fear and avoidance of activity) or proximal treatment outcomes 
(e.g. changes in unhelpful cognitions and behaviours). 
 
8.2.3 Do changes in cognitive processing relate to changes in other maintaining factors? 
Theoretical models of pain (e.g. the fear-avoidance model of pain and threat-interpretation 
model) hypothesise that cognitive biases play a role in maintaining some key aspects of pain; 
specifically, fear avoidance beliefs and catastrophizing (Crombez, et al., 2012; Leeuw, et al., 
2007; Todd, et al., 2015). Cross-sectional studies go some way in supporting this hypothesis. 
For example, several studies have found that those who catastrophize and who are highly 





difficulty disengaging from pain stimuli, and more negative pain/ illness related 
interpretations of ambiguity (Asmundson, et al., 1997; Heathcote & Jacobs, 2015; Heathcote, 
et al., 2017; Heathcote, et al., 2015; Keogh, et al., 2001; Keogh, et al., 2003; Vancleef, et al., 
2015; Vancleef & Peters, 2006).  Experimental pain research using CBM techniques is just 
beginning. Several CBM-A studies with people with chronic pain suggests that training 
patients to habitually avoid pain-related information (i.e. training attentional avoidance) is 
associated with reduced anxiety sensitivity and pain related fear (Carleton, et al., 2011; 
Schoth, et al., 2013; Sharpe, et al., 2012). This may indicate that there are mutually 
reinforcing relationships between cognitive factors which maintain pain (e.g. pain related 
fear) and pain specific cognitive processing biases (e.g. attentional bias towards pain stimuli). 
Thus, when one of these factors is modified it is accompanied by changes in the other. A 
similar cyclical relationship may be occurring in CFS. Indeed, Chapter 5 showed that illness-
specific processing biases in CFS were associated with fear and avoidance of activity, 
catastrophizing and all-or-nothing behaviours; factors which previous research has indicated 
are maintaining factors of fatigue and disability in CFS (e.g. Edwards, et al., 2001; Heijmans, 
1998; Moss‐Morris, et al., 1996)  
 
Given this association between cognitive biases in CFS and self-reported cognitions and 
behaviours, it follows, similar to findings in the pain literature, that a change in one domain 
would be mirrored by a change in the other. That is, changes in self-reported, unhelpful 
cognitions and behaviours would be associated with changes in habitual cognitive 
processing. We know that self-reported cognitive and behavioural responses to symptoms 
change over the course of treatment for CFS (Chalder, et al., 2015; Heins, et al., 2013; Moss-





Furthermore, changes in these cognitive and behavioural responses, such as changing fearful 
beliefs about the consequences of activity and reducing symptom focusing, have been 
highlighted as key mechanisms of treatment outcomes (Chalder, et al., 2015; Moss-Morris, 
et al., 2005; Stahl, et al., 2014; Wearden & Emsley, 2013; Wiborg, et al., 2011) (as discussed 
in Chapter 1, section 1.5.8). It may be that during treatment, changes also occur at a more 
habitual level. Changes in how an individual habitually attends to and interprets incoming 
information, may be driving or supplementing changes in how an individual copes with and 
responds to their symptoms. Indeed, treatments for CFS claim to target some of these more 
habitual processes; a stated aim of CBT for CFS is to reduce hypervigilance to symptoms 
(NICE, 2007) and help participants interpret symptoms differently (White, et al., 2007). 
However, thus far studies have relied on self-report measures to tap into these constructs. 
Not only are these methods subject to demand but they are also only able to reflect explicit 
‘top-down’ cognitions and behaviours, which participants can recognize and report on. In 
order to assess more habitual or ‘bottom-up’ processes, such as how an individual selects and 
processes incoming information, experimental measures are needed. 
 
As discussed in Chapter 2 (section 2.3) theoretical models propose a nuanced interaction 
between ‘bottom-up’ cognitive processes (e.g. attention and interpretation biases), and ‘top-
down’ cognitions and behaviours (Clark & Beck, 2010; Everaert, Koster, & Derakshan, 
2012; Hirsch, et al., 2006), whereby cognitive processing (i.e. how a person selects and 
encodes incoming information at a habitual level) interacts with and shapes cognitive and 
behavioural products (i.e. explicit, self-reported beliefs and behaviours). In CFS, for instance, 
believing that symptoms are damaging and must be avoided (i.e., a person’s ‘illness schema’; 





develop; such as, a hypervigilance for illness related information (attentional bias), or 
habitually interpreting ambiguous information as illness related and threatening 
(interpretation bias). These biases may reinforce the already salient concern that symptoms 
are pervasive, uncontrollable and damaging, and thus shapes how the individual responds to 
symptoms (e.g. symptom focusing, fear and avoidance of activity). In this way, attention and 
interpretation biases in CFS may have a bidirectional or mutually reinforcing relationship 
with unhelpful cognitions and behaviours. Alternatively, these relationships may be 
sequential; i.e. cognitive biases may encourage unhelpful responses to symptoms; or 
unhelpful responses may encourage the development of cognitive bias heuristics- 
information processing shortcuts derived from experience, to make processing salient 
information more efficient.  
 
If changes in one domain (i.e. illness beliefs and behaviours) are reflected in changes in 
anther (i.e. cognitive processing biases), it would support the hypothesis of a dynamic, 
interwoven relationship between top-down and bottom-up processing in CFS. Exploring 
whether more habitual or ‘bottom-up’ cognitive processes also change over treatment, may 
illuminate other mechanisms of treatment and provide further insight into how identified self-
reported treatment mechanisms (e.g. changing fear avoidance beliefs, catastrophizing and 
symptom focusing) may operate.  
 
8.2.4 Aims 
This study is an extension of the follow-up study reported in Chapter 7. The previous study 
assessed whether pre-treatment cognitive biases and general malleability of attention, 





investigate whether current treatments for CFS (CBT and GET) are able to change cognitive 
biases (attention and interpretation) or improve an individual’s attentional control capacity. 
These concepts were chosen for investigation as previous literature had identified that they 
were amenable to change (as reviewed above). I will also assess whether changes in these 
cognitive processes are associated with treatment outcomes of fatigue, functioning and mood 
as well changes in self-reported cognitive and behavioural illness responses. Changes in 
cognitive processing that accompany reduced symptomology would support the theory that 
biases in cognitive processing and deficits in general attentional control play a role in 
maintaining some core aspects of CFS. Changes in cognitive processing that accompany 
changes in self-reported cognitions and behaviours would support the interwoven 
relationship between explicit top-down coping responses and habitual bottom-up information 
processing.   
 
8.2.5 Hypotheses 
The main hypothesis are as follows: 
1) Cognitive biases will be reduced and attentional control will improve pre to post 
treatment (CBT or GET) for CFS 
2) Changes in cognitive biases will be associated with  
a. changes in fatigue, functioning, and mood, as well as  








Participants were those that had been included in the follow-up study detailed in Chapter 7. 
To be included in this follow-up analysis participants were required to have completed both 
questionnaires and experimental measures at two time points, pre and post treatment. This 
resulted in the loss of six participants who had completed post-treatment questionnaires but 
could not attend the laboratory to complete the post-treatment cognitive tasks (Figure 4). The 
current study therefore includes 20 participants. All participants had a diagnosis of CFS and 
received at least 3 sessions of either CBT or GET within routine clinical practice.  Details of 
the recruitment procedure and inclusion criteria are provided in Chapter 5 and a description 







   
Attending treatment clinics outside 
of recruitment sites (n =7) 
Did not receive funding for 
treatment (n =5) 
Unable to travel (n =6) 
Complete post treatment experimental/ cognitive tasks in the lab 
(N=20) 
CBT (n =13) 




Received < 3 sessions (n =4) 
Still on waitlist (n =3)  
Lost to follow- up (n =7) 
- 4 unable to contact  
- 3 declined  
Participants assigned treatment at the clinic (N=40) 
CBT (n =27) 
 GET (n =13) 
 
Complete post treatment questionnaires (N=26) 
CBT (n =19) 
 GET (n =7) 
 
Complete pre-treatment baseline questionnaires and 










The full list of questionnaires can be found in Appendix B. For this study change scores on 
self-reported measures of fatigue functioning; anxiety and depression as well as change in 
cognitive and behavioural responses to symptoms were analysed. Fatigue was measured with 
the Chalder Fatigue Questionnaire, (CFQ) (Chalder, et al., 1993). Anxiety and depression 
were measured with the Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale, (HADS) (Zigmond & 
Snaith, 1983). Maladaptive responses to symptoms were measured with the subscales on the 
Cognitive Behavioural Responses to illness Questionnaire, (CBRQ) (Skerrett & Moss-
Morris, 2006), subscales included; catastrophizing, damage beliefs, symptom focusing, fear 
avoidance and embarrassment avoidance, avoidance behaviour and all-or-nothing behaviour. 
These measures have been described in detail in preceding Chapter 5 and Chapter 7. 
 
Change in physical functioning was measured by change scores on the Short-form Health 
Survey, SF-36 (McHorney, et al., 1994). The SF-36 was used in both follow-up analysis (the 
previous Chapter 7 and the current Chapter 8). It was chosen as it is a valid and reliable 
measure, that  has been shown to be sensitive to detecting change in functioning in CFS in 
previous randomized control trails (Edmonds, et al., 2004; Malouff, et al., 2008; Price, et al., 
2008; White, et al., 2011b). It was also the routine measure of functioning used across all the 
recruitment sites, and thus allowed for a direct comparison between this data and others 
collected at these treatment centres. The SF-36 is a self-rating questionnaire measuring 
functioning in everyday life. It consists of eight subscales: (1) physical functioning, (2) role 
limitations due to physical problems, (3) bodily pain, (4) general health perceptions, (5) 





emotional well-being. Subscale scores range from 0 to 100 with higher values representing 
better functioning.  
 
8.3.1.1.1 Cognitive tasks 
Experimental cognitive tasks, attentional bias, interpretation bias and attentional control were 
conducted on a laptop computer in a private testing room. A brief summary of the key 
methods is provided here as the tasks have been presented in detail in Chapter 5.  
 
A Visual Probe Task (McLeod, et al., 1998) (VPT) assessed attentional biases for illness-
related words, relative to neural words.  An attentional bias score was calculated as the 
difference in reaction times in responding to probes (arrows) replacing illness-related words 
and probes replacing neutral words. Faster reaction times to probes replacing illness-related 
stimuli relative to neural stimuli, is indicative of an attentional biases towards illness-related 
information. Higher scores indicate an increased attentional bias.  
 
An ambiguous recognition task (Mathews & Mackintosh, 2000) assessed positive and 
negative interpretation biases. Participants read 10 ambiguous scenarios, imaging themselves 
as the main protagonist. Later in the task participants are presented with positive and negative 
/illness-related resolutions of these ambiguous scenarios and asked to rate how similar they 
are in meaning (1= very different, 4= very similar) to the original text. Mean similarity ratings 
were calculated separately for positive and negative/illness-related interpretation biases. 






The materials for the above cognitive bias tasks were developed to tap into CFS relevant 
concerns. The development process is described in detail in Chapter 4. As participants in this 
study completed these tasks twice, different sets of materials were used in each testing 
session. The sets of material were randomized for each participant, as to avoid order effects, 
should one set of materials be superior to the other16.  The full sets of materials for both the 
attention and interpretation bias tasks are available in Appendix C. 
 
The Attention Network Test (Fan, et al., 2002; 2005)17(ANT) assessed general attentional 
control ability. Attentional control is represented by the latency between reaction times to 
correctly identify the direction of a central arrow, in a string of 5 congruent or incongruent 
arrows. Higher attentional control scores indicate greater difficulty in screening out the 
flanking arrows, and thus poorer attentional control.  
 
8.3.2 Procedure  
Participants completed questionnaires at home and subsequently (within 5 days) attended the 
laboratory to complete the cognitive tasks. All participants completed the questionnaires and 
cognitive tasks at two time points; up to 3 weeks before starting treatment (pre) and up to 2 
weeks after finishing treatment (post). Participants received either CBT or GET for CFS as 
part of routine clinical practice. The CFS treatments were described in Chapter 5. 
 
                                                 
16 Controlling for stimuli sets had no effect on the attention or interpretation bias analyses. 
1717 The Attention Network Test (Fan et al. 2002; 2005) measures three facets of attention:  
altering, orientating and attentional control. For the purposes of this study only the attentional 





8.3.3 Data preparation and analytical procedure 
On the VPT and ANT reaction time data were excluded from trials with errors and outliers 
(<200 ms, and >2000 ms). One CFS participant and two healthy controls were excluded from 
the VPT analysis due to excessive missing data (>3SD above the group mean) consistent 
with our previous studies (Chapter 5 and Chapter 6) and in-line with others (Brown, et al.. 
2014; Hou, et al., 2014). Analysis was performed using the Statistical Package for Social 
Sciences (SPSS) version 21 (USA).   
 
To investigate change in cognitive processes over the course of treatment, paired t-tests 
within the CFS groups were conducted with pre and post treatment scores on the attentional 
bias, interpretative bias and attentional control tasks (hypotheses 1). To investigate whether 
changes in treatment outcomes were related to changes in cognitive processing, bivariate 
Pearsons’ correlations were conducted with change scores from pre to post treatment on self-
report measures (hypotheses 2). Effect sizes are interpreted following Cohen (1988); an r of 
.1 represents a 'small' effect size, .3 represents a 'medium' effect size and .5 represents a 'large' 
effect size. Due to the small and unequal sample sizes of those receiving CBT and GET, 
comparisons between treatment groups would not have been meaningful. Thus, for 
hypothesis testing participants receiving either CBT or GET were analysed as one group.  
 
8.4 Results 
Participants (n =20) had a mean age of 38 (SD=10). Seventeen (85%) were female. The mean 
illness duration was 6 years (SD=7.8). Participants received an average of 10 treatment 





8.4.1 Does attentional bias, interpretation biases and attentional control change following 
CFS treatment? 
Paired t-tests (Table 3) found attentional control scores significantly reduced pre to post 
treatment (p=.003), indicating an improvement in general attentional control over the course 
of treatment, consistent with our hypothesis (hypothesis 1). However, contrary to our 
hypothesis none of the illness-specific processing biases significantly changed over the 
course of treatment (all p>.05). There was a slight decrease in attentional biases pre to post 
treatment (M=-.09, SD=.87) as hypothesised, though this was not significant (p=.68). 
Positive interpretations remained relatively stable (M=-.01, SD=46) showing no significant 
change pre to post treatment (p=.91). Whereas, there was a slight increase in illness-related 
interpretations (M=.08, SD=.64), indicating a non-significant change (p=.60) in illness-
related interpretations in the opposite direction than expected. However, there were large 
standard deviations in the degree to which these processes changed over the course of 
treatment, indicating heterogeneity in the malleability of these processes in this sample of 





Table 3: Means and standard deviations on the cognitive tasks at baseline and follow up (n=20). 




Lower 95%CI Upper 
95%CI 
t-score 
Attentional Bias score .29 (.84) .21 (.93) -.09 (.87) -.50 .33 -.42 
Illness-related 
interpretation 
2.27 (.57) 2.35 (.52) .08 (.64) -.22 .38 .53 
Positive interpretation 2.73 (.45) 2.72 (.41) -.01 (.46) -.23 .21 -.11 
Attentional control score 138.85 (54.23) 101.50 
(25.70) 
-37.35 (49.65) -60.59 -14.12 -3.36** 






8.4.2 Are changes in cognitive processing related to primary outcomes and mood? 
Before assessing whether the degree of change in cognitive processing are associated with 
changes in fatigue, functioning and mood (hypothesis 2a), it first needs to be established 
whether treatments were effective at improving these primary treatment outcomes. Paired t-
tests showed significant improvements in fatigue, functioning, anxiety and depression pre to 








Table 4 Change in CFS patients (n= 20) self-report measures pre to post treatment  
 Pre-treatment  Post-treatment Average change 95% CI  
 M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) Lower Upper t-score 
CFQ 26.69 (4.98) 18.50 (6.82) -8.19 (7.44) 5.18 18.89 -5.62** 
SF-36 45.77 (21.85) 57.80 (24.13) 12.03 (16.97) -11.19 -5.19 3.62** 
HADS depression 9.00 (4.53) 6.43 (4.81) 2.57 (4.50) .52 4.62 2.62* 
HADS anxiety 11.25 (5.26) 940 (4.83) 1.85 (3.80) .07 3.63 2.17* 
CBRQ cognitive responses        
Fear avoidance beliefs 20.68 (5.50) 17.60 (4.32) -3.08 (4.27) -4.84 -1.32 -3.61** 
Catastrophizing 20.08 (5.20) 16.68 (5.15) -3.40 (4.61) -5.30 -1.50 -2.87** 
Damage beliefs 15.76 (2.83) 13.64 (4.25) -2.12 (3.69) -3.64 -.60 -2.87* 
Symptom focusing 20.48 (6.51) 17.40 (5.56) -3.08 (5.53) -5.36 -.80 -2.79* 
Embarrassment avoidance 18.52 (5.13) 17.32 (5.51) -1.20 (5.03) -3.28 .88 -1.19 
CBRQ behavioural responses       
All-or-nothing behaviour 13.60 (4.93) 12.08 (5.51) -1.52 (4.77) -3.49 .45 -1.59 
Avoidance and rest 20.44 (5.13) 17.20 (4.73) -3.24 (4.76) -5.20 -1.28 -3.41* 
CFQ, Chalder Fatigue Questionnaire; SF-36, Short-form Health Survey; HADS, Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale; CBRQ, 





To assess whether these changes in self-reported outcomes related to changes in cognitive 
processing (hypotheses 2) bivariate Pearsons’ correlations between change scores were 
conducted (Table 5).  
 
There were no significant correlations between improved fatigue (CFQ) and functioning (SF-
36) and the degree of change on any of the cognitive processing measures; attentional bias, 
interpretation biases (positive or illness-related) or attentional control (all p>.05). However, 
there were small to medium non-significant correlations between fatigue (CFQ) and changes 
in positive interpretations (r=.29, p=.27) and attentional control (r=.20, p=.43), suggesting 
that the degree to which participants’ positive interpretations increased and attentional 
control improved was associated with reductions in fatigue. There were also small to medium 
sized non-significant correlations between functioning (SF-36) and changes in 
interpretations; with reduced illness-related interpretations (r=-.36, p=.29) and increased 
positive interpretations (r=.27, p=.27) associated with larger improvements in functioning.  
 
In terms of mood, reductions in anxiety and depression, as measured by the HADS, were 
associated with some cognitive processing changes (Table 5). Though all correlations were 
in the expected directions, the only significant finding was between changes in anxiety and 
attentional control, r=-.47, p=.04; indicating that as attentional control improved, anxiety 
decreased. There were also non-significant, small to medium sized correlations between 
increased positive interpretations and reduced anxiety (r=-.31, p=24) and depression (r=-.39, 
p=.11). There was also a small non-significant relationship between reduced attentional 






8.4.3 Are changes in cognitive processing related to self-reported cognitive and behavioural 
changes? 
Before assessing whether the degree of change in cognitive processing was associated with 
changes in cognitive and behavioural responses to symptoms (CBRQ), (hypothesis 2b) it first 
needs to be established that treatments do indeed modify these cognitions and behaviours. 
Paired t-tests found significant reductions in fear avoidance beliefs (p=.001), catastrophizing 
(p=.001), damage beliefs (p=.008), symptom focusing (p=.01) and avoidance/rest behaviours 
(p=.002) pre to post treatment. There were no significant changes in embarrassment 
avoidance beliefs or all-or-nothing behaviours (both p<.05), though both reduced pre to post 
treatment (Table 4). To assess whether changes in these secondary outcomes are related to 
changes in cognitive processing, Pearson’s correlations between change scores were 
conducted.  
 
8.4.3.1 Changes in attentional bias and self-reported cognitions and behaviours 
There were significant medium sized, positive correlations between changes in attentional 
biases, all-or-nothing behaviours, r=.44, p=.03 and embarrassment avoidance, r=.43, p=.03 
(respectively). There was also a moderate non-significant correlation between attentional 
bias and catastrophizing, r=.32, p=.12; indicating that, the degree to which attentional biases 
decreased, correlated with a reduction in these unhelpful cognitive and behavioural 
responses. 
 
8.4.3.2 Changes in interpretation biases and self-reported cognitions and behaviours 
There were significant, medium to large, negative correlations between changes in positive 





(respectively); indicating that as positive interpretations increased these negative cognitive 
responses to symptoms decreased. There were no other significant relationships between 
positive interpretations and changes on the CBRQ, though trends were in the expected 
direction; with medium correlations between increased positive interpretations and reduced 
fear-avoidance (r=-.40, p=.09) and damage beliefs (r=-.38, p=.11).  
 
In terms of negative, illness-related interpretations, there were no significant correlations 
between changes in illness-related interpretations and the CBRQ. However, there was a 
small, non-significant negative relationship between changes in illness-related 
interpretations and changes in symptom focusing, r=-.29, p=.24; suggesting that as illness-
related interpretations decrease, symptom focusing increases. This is an unexpected finding 
in the opposite direction than anticipated. However, the relationship was non-significant and 
whilst some people showed reduced illness-interpretations others showed an increase 
(range=min change -1.08, max change 1.17). Furthermore, symptom focusing had the largest 
standard deviation in change across all of the CBRQ sub-scales (mean change=3.08; 
SD=5.53), and whilst some participants showed a reduction in symptom focusing, others 
increased (range= min change -20.00, max change 7.0). 
 
8.4.3.3 Changes in attentional control and self-reported cognitions and behaviours 
There was a significant positive correlation between changes in attentional control and 
symptom focusing (p=.04); indicating that as attentional control improved, symptom 
focusing reduced. There was also a small, non-significant correlation between increased 
attentional control and reduced catastrophizing (p=.19). There were no other correlations 






Table 5 Correlations in CFS group (n=20) between change in self-reported outcomes and 
changes in cognitive processing 
CFQ, Chalder Fatigue Questionnaire; SF-36, Short-form Health Survey; HADS, Hospital 











CFQ -.07 -.11 -.29 .23 
SF-36 .11 -.36  .27 -.01 
HADS depression .23 .02 -.39 .20 
HADS anxiety .25 .004 -.31 .47* 
CBRQ cognitive responses     
Fear avoidance  .03 .15 -.40 .08 
Catastrophizing .32 .23 -.49* .29 
Damage beliefs .21 -.10 -.38 .25 
Symptom focusing -.13 -.29 -.49* .47* 
Embarrassment avoidance .43* .07 -.23 .06 
CBRQ behavioural responses     
All-or-nothing  .44* .19 .10 .03 






This study hypothesized that current treatment treatments for CFS (CBT and GET) 
would shift people’s illness-specific attention and interpretation biases and improve 
general attentional control capacity. We also anticipated that changes in these measures 
of cognitive processing would be related to positive changes in self-reported outcomes. 
The findings only partially support our hypotheses. In terms of change in the three 
experimental cognitive tasks, only general attentional control capacity significantly 
improved over the course of treatment. Neither illness-specific attention nor 
interpretation biases changed significantly in this sample. However, there were large 
variations in the degree and direction in which cognitive processing biases changed, 
which may have obscured effects at the group level.  
 
As expected, treatments significantly improved self-reported fatigue, functioning and 
mood (depression and anxiety). Contrary to hypothesis 2a, improvements in fatigue, 
functioning and depression seemed unrelated to experimentally measured attentional 
bias, interpretation biases (both positive and negative), or general attentional control; 
though there were some non-significant correlations in the expected direction. In 
particular, there were moderate, non-significant relationships between improved 
outcomes and increased positive interpretations. Interestingly, improved anxiety was 
significantly associated with an increased attentional control capacity. 
 
Treatments also significantly reduced patients’ unhelpful cognitive and behavioural 
responses to symptoms, as measured by self-report. Consistent with hypothesis 2b, this 
change in symptom responding, was associated with changes in experimentally 





which participant’s attentional biases reduced (i.e. attention is less readily grabbed by 
illness-related information) and positive interpretation biases increased (i.e. more 
positive interpretations of ambiguity are inferred), was related to fewer unhelpful 
cognitive and behavioural responses to symptoms. Interestingly improved attentional 
control was most closely related to a reduction in symptom focusing.  
 
8.5.1 Can cognitive and behavioural treatments for CFS modify cognitive processing? 
It seems CBT and GET for CFS can improve people’s general attentional control 
capacity. This mirrors findings in fibromyalgia, which found, using this same objective 
measure, attentional control improved over the course of CBT (Miró, et al., 2011). These 
findings correspond with neurological changes observed following CBT for CFS (De 
Lange, et al., 2008) and chronic pain (Seminowicz, et al., 2013), indicating increases in 
grey matter volume in brain regions associated with attentional control functions.  
 
Illness-specific attention and interpretation biases did not change across the treated 
sample. This null finding may indicate that current treatments for CFS fail to tap into 
these more ingrained cognitive processing habits. If, for some people with CFS, these 
cognitive habits or biases contribute to the maintenance of unhelpful cognitions and 
behaviours, as indicated by our cross-sectional study in CFS (Chapter 5) and similar 
studies in pain (Crombez, et al., 1998; Heathcote & Jacobs, 2015; Van Damme, Crombez, 
& Eccleston, 2004a; Vancleef & Peters, 2006), the lack of change or ‘shift’ in these biases 
may result in less therapeutic benefit for these individuals (De Raedt & Koster, 2010; 
Schäfer, et al., 2015).  
 
The current treatment size is too small to draw conclusions about the effects of treatment 





not modify these illness-specific biases as a mechanism of treatment; yet for some people 
these biases are maintaining some core aspect of the condition; then the lack of change 
on attention and interpretation biases may explain some of the variance of treatment 
effects for CFS. Around 40% of people with CFS do not show a clinically significant 
improvement following CBT or GET (Knoop, et al., 2007; White, et al., 2013). 
Heterogeneity within CFS has been identified as a moderator of treatment outcomes. 
Cognitive biases may represent another heterogeneous aspects of CFS, with potential 
implications for treatment response (Cella, et al., 2011a). Indeed, Chapter 7 identified 
that attentional biases pre-treatment predicted a better response to treatment in terms of 
improved functioning. Perhaps for some people in the sample there was a meaningful 
change on attentional biases but this was obscured by the null group effect. Some people 
may be more likely to shift their attentional biases than others. This was demonstrated in 
Chapter 7, which found that people with CFS had varying degrees of attentional 
malleability (i.e. an ability to adopt an attentional bias); and those with higher attentional 
malleability responded better to treatment. Thus, whilst there was no change in attentional 
biases across this small treated sample, there may have been individual differences, not 
just in the existence of the bias, but also how malleable the bias is.  
 
Even for those that do improve or recover following treatment, a lack of change in these 
more habitual attention and interpretation processes could be a possible risk factor for 
later symptom deterioration and relapse. For example, converging retrospective and 
prospective evidence suggests that residual attentional biases in people recovered from 
depression, significantly increases the risk of recurrence (Woody, Owens, Burkhouse, & 
Gibb, 2015). This may be particularly pertinent when mental load is high and an 
individual’s ability to regulate their thought processes are reduced (Bowler, et al., 2012). 





effortful control in order to regulate their cognitive and behavioural responses to 
symptoms, thus they may rely instead on their more habitual or ‘implicit’ cognitive 
processing tendencies. If residual cognitive biases are reactivated they may precede or 
precipitate former negative and unhelpful illness-schemas, thus contributing to worse 
outcomes. Thus, for some people with pervasive cognitive biases, additionally targeting 
these processes directly, could enhance the resilience of treatment effects (Schäfer, et al., 
2015; Troy & Mauss, 2011).  
 
8.5.2 Are changes in cognitive processing related to changes in primary symptoms in 
CFS? 
The only significant relationship between measures of cognitive processing and primary 
self-reported outcomes was between changes in general attentional control and anxiety; 
with increased attentional control capacity, relating to reduced symptom focusing. The 
relationship between anxiety and attentional control is well documented in the anxiety 
literature (Berggren & Derakshan, 2013; Derakshan & Eysenck, 2009; Eysenck & 
Derakshan, 2011; Eysenck, et al., 2007), however, like these authors we cannot determine 
the direction of this relationship. It is unclear whether treatments directly target and 
strengthen attentional control or whether improved attentional control is a bi-product of 
changes in other domains. For example, this study found improved attentional control 
was associated with reduced anxiety and self-reported symptom focusing. Evidence 
suggests worry and rumination takes up working memory capacity and thus reduces 
attentional control ability (Hayes, Hirsch, & Mathews, 2008; Liston, McEwen, & Casey, 
2009; Owens & Derakshan, 2013). It may be that treatments reduce illness-related worry 
and the ruminative processes of symptom focusing, which in turn frees-up working-
memory capacity and improves general attentional control. Alternatively, it may be that 





to non-illness related information; thus reducing symptom focusing. To further explore 
these relationships mediation and moderation analysis are required with larger sample 
sizes and additional time-points of assessment.  
 
Though there were no other significant relationships between changes in primary 
symptoms and experimental variables, there were some non-significant trends in 
hypothesised directions. Most notably, increased positive interpretation biases were 
consistently associated with improved outcomes; in particular reduced anxiety and 
depression. This corresponds with findings in the anxiety and depression literature which 
indicate that making positive interpretations of ambiguity is a driver of emotional well-
being (Fredrickson & Joiner, 2002; Gander, Proyer, Ruch, & Wyss, 2013); and people 
with mood disorders lack this beneficial positive interpretation bias (Hirsch & Mathews, 
2000) Some authors have suggested that boosting positive interpretations, rather than 
attempting to reduce negative ones, can be therapeutically beneficial (Menne-Lothmann, 
et al., 2014). Indeed, boosting positive interpretations has been described as a ‘cognitive 
vaccine’ against low mood (Holmes, et al., 2009).  
 
It is interesting that in this study increased positive interpretations were associated with 
more self-reported change than illness-related interpretations. Perhaps this is reflective of 
treatments enhancing a range of alternative resolutions of ambiguity, including the 
potential for positive resolutions. For example the use of thought diaries in CBT 
encourages the person to generate a range of alternative thoughts to counter an unhelpful 
one, and to then weigh up these thoughts in terms of how realistic and balanced they are. 
This process may lead to less fixed habitual interpretation biases, and increase the 
likelihood that positive interpretations may be generated; which in turn is associated with 





interpretations of ambiguity may be therapeutically beneficial, and potentially important 
for addressing associated mood disorders.   
 
However, this hypothesis is hampered by the fact that, across this treated sample, there 
was no significant change in positive biases; in fact they remained relatively stable. It 
could be speculated that this indicates treatments for CFS do not change habitual 
interpretations. However, from a clinical perspective this seems unlikely. One of the core 
aims of treatments for CFS is to reduce misinterpretation of information and catastrophic 
thinking styles (White, et al., 2007); factors which must be closely related to how an 
individual interprets ambiguity. Perhaps the ambiguous scenarios task used in the current 
study was not sensitive enough to detect change in these processes. Indeed, this is the first 
study to my knowledge that has used the ambiguous scenarios task to assess interpretation 
biases in a pre-post design. It may be that simple change scores on a 0-4 Likert scale 
cannot adequately assess change in these processes. 
 
Much larger sample sizes are needed to get a clearer picture of the relationship between 
cognitive processing and response to treatments in CFS. The lack of significant change 
at group level, small sample size and inherently heterogeneous sample is likely to have 
reduced the power of this study to detect significant change. It may be that, where 
treatments to significantly change cognitive biases, associated changes in fatigue and 
functioning would be observed.  
 
8.5.3 Are changes in cognitive processing related to changes in self-reported cognitions 
and behaviours? 
It seems illness-specific attention and interpretation biases are not related to primary 





cross-sectional findings (Chapter 5). It seems that attention and interpretation biases are 
more closely related to how an individual responds to their symptoms; for example 
whether they are fearful and avoidant of activity or jump to catastrophic conclusions 
when a symptom is observed. It may be that these experimental measures are tapping 
into the more habitual component of these explicit cognitions and behaviours. Of 
particular note is that, increased positive interpretations were consistently associated 
with a reduction in unhelpful/ negative responses to symptoms; i.e. catastrophizing, 
symptom focusing and some non-significant associations with reduced fear avoidance 
and damage beliefs. These relationships suggest increasing positive interpretations may 
be an important therapeutic target.  
 
Reduced attentional bias to illness-related stimuli was associated with reduced 
embarrassment avoidance and all-or-nothing behaviours. Interestingly, these were the 
only two cognitive and behavioural responses that did not significantly change within 
this treated sample. It may be that for some people in this sample, these responses to 
illness were more resistant to change as they are underpinned or associated with more 
implicit attentional processes, which current treatments do not modify. It may be that 
attentional biases are associated with different processes for different people, depending 
on idiosyncratic illness beliefs and concerns. For example, someone who has high levels 
of embarrassment about their symptoms may have an increased sensitivity to the 
detection of illness-related, potentially embarrassing, information (attentional bias), 
which in turn may reinforce or maintain embarrassment avoidance. Specifically 
targeting illness-related attentional biases in CFS may be an additional way to tap into 






These findings are in-line with studies in chronic pain which have identified that, for 
some individuals, cognitive biases of attention and interpretation play a role in 
maintaining some core aspects of the condition; namely catastrophizing and fear 
avoidance (Crombez, et al., 1998; Crombez, et al., 2012; Keogh, et al., 2001; Van 
Damme, Crombez & Eccleston, 2004a; Vancleef & Peters, 2006). However, the exact 
nature and direction of these relationships are unclear. It may be a reciprocal process of 
change, or one change may precede the other. For example, in CFS an increased 
positive interpretation of ambiguous information may in turn reduce catastrophic 
thinking styles and symptom focusing; or, reducing these explicit, self-reported beliefs 
and behaviours, may in turn influence more positive interpretations of ambiguity. In 
order to explore these directional hypothesis, studies are needed which can isolate these 
components (i.e. attentional biases/ interpretation biases/ explicit cognitions and 
behaviours) and assess whether modifying one component has an impact upon the 
other. One method in which this has been achieved in psychopathology is via CBM. 
The potential use of CBM to explore these hypotheses in CFS is discussed in the 
subsequent section in this chapter ‘future avenues’ (8.5.5).  
 
8.5.4 Limitations  
This study is limited by a small and heterogeneous sample. Therefore, we should not 
place too much emphasis on the specific factors which were identified as statistically 
significant. Furthermore, the lack of significant change in cognitive biases at group level 
could reflect other limitations. The null finding may indicate that these measures are not 
adequate to assess change in cognitive processing over time. Indeed the visual-probe task, 
in particular, has been described as unreliable (Schmukle, 2005) and exhibiting only 





should include a wait list control group to further explore the comparable fluctuations and 
rigidity of cognitive biases in clinical and healthy populations.  
 
Other methodological limitations should also be considered. For example, because of 
participant burden the timing of post treatment assessments varied; occurring anywhere 
from 0 to 2 weeks after the last treatment session. This variability could further reduce 
the sensitivity of the visual probe and recognition tasks. Additionally, the current study 
assessed only two time points; pre and post treatment. It may be that cognitive processing 
biases are more related to longer term outcomes and relapse. Larger, longitudinal studies 
are needed to explore these possibilities. 
 
Given that this is a non-randomized study, there were a number of inherent confounding 
variables; including the combined CBT and GET treatments, as well as multiple treatment 
centers and therapists. Importantly, previous studies have found that whilst both CBT and 
GET are effective at reducing fatigue and improve functioning, they may operate via 
different mechanisms of change (Chalder, et al., 2015). Cognitive processes of attention 
and interpretation may be an important mechanism of change for one treatment but not 
the other (Niles, et al., 2013). The small sample size in the current study, particularly of 
the participants receiving GET, prevented us from investigating differences between 
treatments. Future studies should explore whether different treatments for CFS are related 
to different cognitive processing changes. Identifying specific, efficacious ingredients of 
therapy can help assign patients to treatments which are most appropriate for their needs.  
 
Though the current study did not find CFS treatments change these attention and 
interpretation biases, there were large individual differences in pre-existing biases as well 





be that, given the large heterogeneity in CFS (Williams, et al., 2017), some individuals 
did have a clinically significant change in cognitive biases; however, these changes were 
obscured by the null group effect. Future research should explore these individual 
differences in cognitive processing, with the potential to utilize this information for 
tailoring and customizing treatments to greater efficacy. If it is the case that current 
treatments already go some way in modifying biases for some individuals, as has been 
shown with other studies (Bowler, et al., 2012; Reinholdt-Dunne, et al., 2015; Tobon, et 
al., 2011), research needs to identify the mechanism through which this change occurs 
and secondly whether it can be enhanced.  
 
8.5.5 Future avenues  
An alternative, potentially less confounded way to assess the relationship between 
cognitive processing and CFS, is to utilize CBM techniques. CBM research can establish 
if cognitive processing biases play a causal role in CFS and furthermore whether changing 
cognitive biases has a therapeutic benefit. If so, there may be benefit in tailoring CBM 
techniques to target illness-specific cognitive biases in CFS. Though CBM techniques are 
in their relative infancy, they have shown some promise as a clinical tool (Hakamata, et 
al., 2010) and as an adjunct to conventional forms of psychological interventions 
(Williams, et al., 2013). Future CBM techniques, designed to tap into CFS relevant 
content, may provide a useful ‘add-on’ to current CFS treatments for some people with 
CFS. For example, for patients who have unhelpful biases in attention and/or 
interpretation, adjunct CBM may be able to target these attention and interpretation biases 







Further avenues of research should also consider individual differences in cognitive 
processing. Whilst our previous studies have shown that illness-specific attention and 
interpretation biases are a consistent finding in CFS populations (Chapter 5 and Chapter 
6), the degree to which these cognitive biases are a problem may vary at an individual 
level. There may also be heterogeneity in the degree to which cognitive processes are 
amenable to change. For some, cognitive and behavioural treatments may be sufficient to 
access and change these processes. For others, these biases may be more ingrained and 
hard to shift. Large, longitudinal randomized control trials, employing experimental 
methods are needed to fully explore the causal role of cognitive biases in CFS and the 
effects of changing cognitive biases on longer-term outcomes. 
 
8.5.6 Conclusions  
In sum, in this sample, treatments did not significantly shift habitual, illness-related 
attention and interpretation biases. Despite the lack of change on these experimental 
measures patients showed significant improvements in fatigue, functioning and mood pre 
to post treatment. Furthermore, these improvements seemed unrelated to any change in 
attention or interpretation (positive or negative) biases. This could lead to the conclusion 
that changing cognitive biases are not important for effective treatment of CFS. However, 
this may be premature. Lack of cognitive processing change across this treated sample 
may have been due to the small and heterogeneous sample. If significant changes in 
cognitive biases had occurred, associated changes in treatment response may have been 
revealed. Alternatively, these findings may suggest that cognitive and behavioural 
treatments for CFS cannot modify these biases. Using CBM techniques to experimentally 
manipulate cognitive biases would allow a cleaner assessment of the causal role of 






Importantly, though changes in cognitive biases were not observed across this treated 
sample, the degree to which individuals did shift their cognitive biases was associated 
with positive changes in cognitions and behaviours. Consistent with our previous research 
(Chapter 5), these relationships suggest that illness-specific cognitive processing biases 
may precede, precipitate or perpetuate unhelpful responses to symptoms. Prospective and 







Chapter 9  Discussion  
9.1 Chapter overview 
This final chapter concludes the thesis by considering the contributions of the research 
programme as a whole. The first section summarises the work conducted in this thesis, 
pulling out key findings and new contributions. The following section reflects upon the 
strengths and limitations of this work, and the final section highlights avenues for future 
research and potential clinical implications. 
 
9.2 Major findings and conclusions from the thesis  
Chapters 3, 4 and 5 sought to empirically establish whether people with CFS have illness 
specific cognitive biases in attention and interpretation and to determine the nature of 
such biases. The systematic review in Chapter 3 (Hughes, et al., 2016a) summarised the 
experimental work conducted in CFS to date, describing the methodologies commonly 
used. The review found tentative evidence of attention and interpretation biases for health 
threatening and illness-specific information in CFS, occurring at later stages of 
‘elaborative’ processing. However, studies were limited in number and rigor, and varied 
markedly in their methodological approach. Studies of interpretation biases in particular 
were lacking and employed diverse paradigms, tapping into different stages of 
information processing. Of particular concern was the fact that studies used a variety of 
‘threatening’ materials, assumed to tap into illness-related concerns, but largely 
developed ad-hoc and poorly validated, if at all. This lack of stimuli specificity, not only 
limited the conclusions drawn from the data, but also may have explained some of the 
mixed findings. The review concluded that, to assess whether cognitive biases occur in 
CFS work was needed to establish reliable and empirically valid, illness-specific 






Chapter 4 provided an exemplar systematic approach to material development, 
undertaken to address this issue. The published article briefly summarized the most 
recent, up-to-date experimental paradigms used to assess attention and interpretation 
biases and outlined steps for comprehensive/ robust stimuli development for such 
paradigms. The article provided illustrative examples for material developing for 
attention and interpretation bias paradigms for two conditions; CFS (used in the current 
research) and breast cancer. The latter group was chosen to illustrate the methods can be 
generalised to other illness groups. Three core steps to stimuli development were 
described; (i) pooling materials (ii) focus groups and interviews (iii) piloting the face 
validity of the materials. Tools were provided to assist researchers in this process. This 
work was important for the development of valid, illness-specific materials for the 
subsequent studies.  
 
Having conducted this developmental work, I sought to assess whether cognitive biases 
in CFS transpired when using these validated, illness-specific materials. The cross-
sectional study in Chapter 5 identified that, consistent with our hypothesis, people with 
CFS showed an attentional bias towards illness-related information and an interpretation 
bias favouring negative/ illness-related resolutions of ambiguity, compared to healthy 
controls. The use of CFS specific materials within a large and well-defined population of 
CFS participants, allowed this study to clarify cognitive biases that had eluded other 
previous research. 
 
I hypothesised that, similar to findings in chronic pain, illness-specific biases would be 
associated with unhelpful cognitive and behavioural responses to symptoms 
(Asmundson, et al., 1997; Roelofs, Peters, Fassaert, & Vlaeyen, 2005; Yang, Jackson, & 





between increased cognitive biases and unhelpful responses to symptoms. Interestingly, 
cognitive biases were most strongly associated with fear avoidance beliefs, 
catastrophizing about symptoms and all-or-nothing behavioural responses to symptoms; 
factors identified in previous research as perpetuating CFS and mediating treatment 
outcomes (e.g. Chalder, et al., 2015; Stahl, et al., 2014; Wearden & Emsley, 2013; 
Wiborg, et al., 2011; discussed in Chapter 1, section 1.5.8).  
 
In Chapter 2, I highlighted attentional control as a potential moderator of cognitive biases. 
The systematic review (Chapter 3) found some support for this hypothesis; one CFS study 
found an attentional biases in CFS were more pronounced for those with poor attentional 
control (Hou, et al., 2014). The study in Chapter 5 sought to replicate this finding and 
employed the same attentional control and attentional bias paradigms as Hou, et al. 
(2014). In line with Hou et al. (2014) the study confirmed that people with CFS have poor 
attentional compared to healthy populations. However, the study did not replicate poor 
attentional control as a moderator of either attention or interpretation biases. Several 
explanations for these contradictory results were proposed. It may simply be that this 
larger more robust study revealed a spurious finding in a smaller data set. Alternatively, 
attentional control, a ‘top-down’ process, may not be able to modify cognitive biases that 
are occurring at more ‘bottom-up’ stages of processing. It is not entirely certain as to 
whether this attentional bias task tapped into more ‘bottom-up’ or ‘top-down’ stages of 
attentional biases, as stimuli were presented for 500ms (considered a ‘mid-range’ in 
information processing). Certainly, however, the interpretation bias task allowed time for 
‘top-down’ processing to have an effect. Thus, while methodological differences may 
explain the null effect between attentional bias and attentional control, it is unlikely to be 
the reason for the lack of relationship between interpretation bias and attentional control. 





in CFS, with associated meta-cognitive beliefs about the helpfulness of behaviours such 
as symptom monitoring and activity avoidance in response to symptoms. This is 
consistent with the relationship between self-reported unhelpful cognitive and 
behavioural responses to symptoms and these cognitive biases. Whilst we can only 
speculate as to the reasons why this may be the case, the findings from this study suggest 
that cognitive biases in CFS are not moderated by attentional control. 
 
In order to verify these findings, I conducted a replication study with a Dutch CFS 
population (Chapter 6). The findings were consistent with those reported from the UK 
data; indicating that cognitive biases were evident across different cohorts and cultures 
when using illness-specific materials. In line with the previous study, attentional control 
did not moderate attentional bias or interpretation bias, indicating that in CFS attentional 
control is not likely to be the mechanism through which these processes occur. However, 
a major limitation of this study was that no Dutch healthy control group were recruited; 
the implications of this will be discussed further in the ‘limitations’ section (9.4).  
 
Chapters 3-6 established that people with CFS have CFS-specific cognitive biases and 
deficits in attentional control when compared to healthy people. The next chapters sought 
to build a more nuanced picture of cognitive processing in CFS and explore whether 
facets of cognitive processing predicted how an individual responded to treatments for 
CFS (Chapter 7), and whether current treatment protocols for CFS modified these 
cognitive processes (Chapter 8).  
 
Chapter 7 assessed whether attention and interpretation biases, identified in Chapter 5, 
predicted how people responded to treatments for CFS. Findings indicated that 





However, an increased attentional bias pre-treatment significantly predicted larger 
improvements in daily functioning post-treatment. Chapter 7 also measured the additional 
concept of ‘attentional malleability’ (introduced in Chapter 2). Previous research had 
indicated that attentional malleability predicted how people with social anxiety disorder 
responded to group CBT (Clarke, et al., 2012). Therefore, I hypothesized that people with 
CFS who had higher attentional malleability would respond better to treatments for CFS; 
this hypothesis was supported. Increased attentional malleability predicted larger 
improvements in functioning post-treatment for CFS. However, it did not predict changes 
in fatigue.  
 
There were several hypothesised mechanisms for these findings. Firstly, it may be that 
these cognitive characteristics (i.e., attentional bias and a high attentional malleability) 
facilitated engagement with certain aspects of treatment, such as, extinction type learning, 
which require an attentional focus on the threatening information in order to challenge 
and re-evaluate it (Waters & Kershaw, 2015). Thus, people with increased attentional 
bias and a more malleable attention gained more from these aspects of treatment, than 
those without attentional biases. Secondly, it may be that, for some people, attentional 
biases helped to maintain disability in CFS, thus engaging in treatment that modified the 
bias to some degree, had a therapeutic effect. Secondly, having higher attention 
malleability allowed more change in the biases when engaging in these treatments, thus 
boosting treatment efficacy. This fits with the ‘plasticity account’ of cognitive biases, 
discussed in Chapter 2; and adds to the small but promising literature on attentional 
malleability (Clarke, et al., 2008; Clarke, et al., 2012; Fox, et al., 2011). The fact that 
change in fatigue was not predicted by any of the cognitive variables indicates that fatigue 
may be underpinned by other mechanisms. These hypotheses assume that, to some extent, 





Chapter 8 explored this hypothesis with a small, longitudinal study with people who have 
completed a course of treatment for CFS (either CBT or GET).  
 
Contrary to the hypothesis, Chapter 8 found treatments for CFS (CBT and GET) did not 
shift illness-specific attention or interpretation biases. This may indicate that current 
treatment protocols for CFS do not modify these habitual cognitive processes. 
Alternately, it may be that the small sample size (n=20) and heterogeneity in the 
magnitude and direction of change in this variables, obscured any significant effects. 
General attentional control capacity, however, significantly improved over the course of 
treatment. Interestingly the degree of change on attentional control was associated with a 
reduction in anxiety and symptom monitoring.  
 
Whilst illness-specific attention and interpretation biases did not change across the treated 
sample, the degree of change in these processes at an individual level was associated with 
self-reported changes in cognitions and behaviours. In particular, increased positive 
interpretations were consistently associated with the attenuation of unhelpful symptom 
responses, such as catastrophizing and symptom focusing. Perhaps by engaging in certain 
therapeutic techniques (e.g. thought records in CBT) people begin to expand their range 
of interpretations of ambiguity, to include those that are more positive. These findings, 
though tentative, indicate that illness-specific cognitive biases have some relationships 
with self-reported symptom responding.  
 
9.3 Contributions to the literature  
The different studies contained in this thesis produced multiple insights and specific 
results that make a distinct contribution to the literature. Firstly, by employing 





literature in CFS, which has largely relied on self-reports to date.  Secondly, the thesis 
identified novel insights into cognitive characteristics and deficits in CFS. Thirdly, this 
thesis contributes to the currently sparse but burgeoning, experimental research within 
health psychology. These contributions are discussed below. 
 
9.3.1 Contribution of experimental research to the CFS literature 
Self-report methodologies in CFS have been employed across a range of study designs 
including cross sectional studies (e.g. Edwards, et al., 2001; Heijmans, 1998; Moss‐
Morris, et al., 1996) predictors of onset of CFS (e.g. Candy, et al., 2003; Moss-Morris, et 
al., 2011) and mediators of change following treatments  (e.g. Chalder, et al., 2015; 
Wearden & Emsley, 2013; Wiborg, et al., 2011). Consistent findings emerge that negative 
illness and symptom interpretations, as well as behaviours (particularly all-or-nothing and 
fear avoidance) are associated with fatigue and disability in CFS. By using experimental 
methods this thesis has identified that similar and related constructs are activated at more 
habitual levels of processing. For example, if self-reports of physical symptoms and 
fatigue are taken to reflect a somatic pre-occupation; an attentional vigilance for illness 
related information in the environment may represent pre-occupation for illness stimuli 
at earlier, habitual levels of processing. Similarly, a tendency to interpret ambiguous 
information as negative/ illness-related may over-lap with self-reported catastrophic 
thinking styles and fearful beliefs regarding activity. Thus, these experimental findings 
validate self-report studies in CFS and further demonstrate that illness-specific cognitions 
are also present at habitual levels of processing.  
 
Experimental methods have several advantages over self-report; they are not subject to 
demand (e.g. social desirability or recall bias) and they can tap into levels of processing 





experimental measures in CFS populations is that they avoid reinforcing the stigma that 
is often associated with psychological assessments (Looper & Kirmayer, 2004). Using 
experimental measures alongside self-report measures can build a more comprehensive 
picture of cognitions and behaviours involved in CFS.  
 
This experimental research also adds to the literature discriminating between cognitive 
profiles of CFS and psychiatric disorders. Moss-Morris and Petrie (2001) found distinct 
cognitive profiles which appear to distinguish between CFS and depression. Similarly, 
this research found illness-specific cognitive biases in CFS were independent of co-
morbid depression and anxiety. These findings are consistent with studies in chronic pain 
(Crombez, Viane, Eccleston, Devulder, & Goubert, 2013) and irritable bowel syndrome 
(Chapman & Martin, 2011), suggesting that cognitive biases in somatic based  conditions 
depend on the relevance of the stimuli to the individual’s illness concerns and beliefs, 
rather than anxiety and depression per se. However, conclusions from this data are limited 
by the use of only one category of stimuli, as well as the lack of clinical control group. It 
would be interesting to assess whether biases for other categories of information occur 
for stratified groups of patients; or indeed, whether people with other chronic health 
conditions show similar cognitive biases.  
 
Whilst these biases appear to be independent of comorbid psychiatric disorders, 
(measured by a structured clinical interview) they may be dependent on fluctuating mood. 
Chapter 6 found that across both the UK and Dutch CFS populations, attentional biases 
disappeared when distress, measured by the HADS (Zigmond & Snaith, 1983), was 
partialled out. So, why might attentional biases in CFS be affected by mood but not 
psychiatric comorbidity? One potential reason may be that low mood in CFS reflects a 





mood the difference between people with CFS and healthy controls was obscured. 
Whereas, comorbid depression, whilst prevalent in CFS, is not a core aspect of the 
condition; rather it reflects an additional but distinct psychiatric comorbidity (Cella, et 
al., 2013). The fact that group differences on attention and interpretation biases remained 
significant when controlling for comorbidity, suggests that these factors are not driving 
the cognitive bias. Alternatively, this discrepancy may be due measurement error within 
the HADS. A psychometric analysis found the use of the HADS to assess anxiety and 
depression in CFS, was ‘fundamentally compromised’ by the presence of a three-
dimensional underlying factor structure (McCue, Martin, Buchanan, Rodgers, & Scholey, 
2003). However, others have disputed this (Cella, et al., 2011b) and the HADS remains 
the most widely used research measure of anxiety and depression in CFS populations 
(Bjelland, Dahl, Haug, & Neckelmann, 2002; Cella, et al., 2011b). The levels of HADS 
anxiety and depression demonstrated in this CFS sample were similar to that reported in 
other studies.  
 
It may not be surprising that people with CFS preferentially process illness-related 
information. Experiencing pervasive, debilitating and unpredictable fatigue would 
understandably make fatigue related cues salient; thus lowering the threshold for their 
perception and subsequent processing (Verkuil, Brosschot, & Thayer, 2007). Indeed, we 
all preferentially attend to information that is most personally meaningful or temporarily 
salient (Pool, et al., 2016). However, interestingly, cognitive biases in CFS, were not 
moderated by attentional control (Chapters 5 and Chapter 6); though attentional control 
was impaired; and were associated with unhelpful responses to symptoms. These findings 
may indicate that cognitive biases represent a coping strategy, which alert the individual 
to signs of potential fatigue inducing stimuli and thus helps them evade further injury. 





strategies and thus modify unhelpful responses and cognitive biases. Thus, cognitive 
biases may have a role to play in the CB model of CFS. However, the direction of these 
relationships is unclear; it could that cognitive biases are driving more explicit illness 
beliefs and behaviours, or it could be that repeatedly engaging in certain responses to 
symptoms may create heuristics (cognitive biases) in information processing. 
Alternatively, the relation between cognitive biases and symptom responses in CFS may 
be maintaining, or mutually reinforcing, as has been proposed with anxiety (Van 
Bockstaele, et al., 2014). To unpick these relationships longitudinal, mediation studies 
are required.   
 
9.3.2 Cognitive characteristics and deficits in CFS  
This thesis also measured two proposed mechanisms of cognitive biases: attentional 
control and attentional malleability. The findings provide novel contributions to the 
neuropsychology literature in CFS and add to the theoretical understanding of cognitive 
biases more broadly.  
 
9.3.3 Attentional control 
Two studies within this thesis identified that people with CFS (from the UK and 
Netherlands) had significantly poorer general attentional control capacity compared to a 
healthy population. These findings are consistent with other CFS studies using the same 
objective task (Hou, et al., 2014; Togo, et al., 2015). However, it should be noted that 
both the UK and Dutch CFS groups were compared to the same healthy population that 
were recruited from London and were slightly younger than the CFS groups. Perhaps 
these healthy controls represent a sample with particularly good attentional control. 
However, this is unlikely as the median and range attentional control scores within this 





Flombaum, & Posner, 2005; Fan, et al., 2002; Hou, et al., 2012; Williams, et al., 2016). 
Furthermore, attentional control scores obtained from both CFS populations were 
comparable (Chapters 5 and 6); and in line with previous CFS research using this task 
(Hou, et al., 2012; Togo, et al., 2015). Nor did age have any bearing on the effects 
(Chapters 4 and Chapter 5).  
 
Thus, it seems poor attentional control, as measured by the ANT (Fan, et al., 2005; Fan, 
et al., 2002) is a robust finding in CFS. This is in contrast to a plethora of other 
neuropsychological tests, which find generally slowed information processing speed but 
no consistent neurological deficits on any particular test (Cockshell & Mathias, 2010; 
Cockshell & Mathias, 2013, 2014; Michiels & Cluydts, 2001). It may be the attentional 
control segment of the ANT (the flanker task) accurately reflects patients’ difficulty 
processing information and relatedly the subjective experience of cognitive difficulties. 
Notably, however poor attentional control was not related to subjective reports of 
functioning or fatigue in our studies; despite the fact that our measure of fatigue (Chalder 
Fatigue Scale, Chalder, et al., 1993) includes an assessment of mental fatigue. 
Nevertheless, while attentional control deficits do not seem directly related to core 
symptoms in these CFS samples, they are still important to address. Attentional control 
is closely related to other executive functions, which are helpful and sometimes integral 
to multitasking (Diamond, 2013). Thus, improving attentional control may be an 
important treatment outcome for people with CFS. 
 
Chapter 8 identified that, not only is attentional control in CFS amenable to change, but 
current treatment protocols for CFS (CBT and GET) seem effective at improving this 
cognitive ability (Chapter 8). This finding corresponds with brain imaging data, which 





in brain regions associated with attentional control (De Lange, et al., 2008). However, the 
mechanisms through which these treatments are able to achieve these improvements are 
unclear. Reducing anxiety and illness-related worry have been proposed as once such 
mechanism (Derakshan & Eysenck, 2009). The rational is that anxiety occupies a 
proportion of the available cognitive resources, leaving fewer resources available for 
effortful tasks. This theory is supported by findings in the anxiety literature which 
demonstrate increased anxiety and worry are associated with reduced attentional control 
(Hayes, et al., 2008; Stefanopoulou, et al., 2014), and by reducing worry and worry 
related intrusive thoughts, this deficit can be reversed (Bomyea & Amir, 2011; Fox, et 
al., 2015). Interestingly, the improvement in attentional control in the current CFS data 
was associated with reduced symptom focusing and anxiety (Chapter 8) which may 
represent illness-related worry. Perhaps CBT and GET treat the anxiety and symptom 
focusing in CFS, thus freeing up working memory and improving attentional control as a 
bi-product. Further studies need to explore the direction of these relationships.  
 
9.3.4 Attentional Malleability 
Several studies in the anxiety literature recently explored the concept of attentional 
malleability- a person’s ability to adopt an attentional bias. These studies indicated the 
utility of attentional malleability at predicting both vulnerability to developing anxiety in 
healthy populations (Clarke, et al., 2008), and better response to treatment in anxious 
populations (Clarke, et al., 2012). As such, attentional malleability was identified as a 
potentially useful concept to investigate in terms of treatment response in CFS. Chapter 
7 found that, as hypothesised, attentional malleability predicted better response to CBT 
and GET for CFS. This novel finding provides further support for the ‘bias plasticity 
account’ of attention (Clarke, et al., 2008; Clarke, et al., 2012) which proposes that the 





that engage attentional processes. Attentional malleability in CFS warrants further 
investigation. These findings need to be replicated with larger samples in order to identify 
whether they are consistent and importantly whether attentional malleability can help 
explain some of the variance in treatment response. If those with less malleable attention 
are less likely to benefit from treatment, it would be important to consider how to optimize 
treatments for individuals with low attentional malleability.  
 
9.3.5 Contribution to experimental research in health psychology 
Experimental research within health psychology is small but growing. There is increasing 
interest in applying experimental methods to assess potential cognitive biases underlying 
illness beliefs and influencing health behaviours. The potential for experimental research 
to contribute to health psychology is substantial; however, in order for it to be fruitful, 
methods must be tailored and adapted appropriately. A failure to do so limits the 
conclusions drawn from the data and misses the opportunity to expand upon existing self-
report data and health psychology models. 
 
Having reviewed the experimental literature in CFS (Chapter 3), and briefly outlined 
similar experimental work in other areas of health psychology (Chapter 4) it became clear 
that, no one methodological approach to developing appropriate experimental materials 
had been used; nor did there seem to be any guidance on how to adapt tasks appropriately 
for different populations. Given that materials are at the heart of these experimental tasks, 
it is essential they are subject to the same rigorous development and validation as self-
report questionnaires. With this in mind, I published guidance on how to develop 
population-specific materials in a systematic way; and provided tools to aid researchers 
in this processes. Employing a standardized and systematic approach to material 





research within health psychology. This is particularly pertinent if health psychology 
research is to capitalize on the developments and rapid expansion of experimental 
research (e.g. CBM).  
 
Furthermore, the findings from this research, whilst specific to CFS may also be relevant 
to other chronic conditions. For example, the psychopathology literature has identified 
that attentional biases are transdiagnostic processes that maintain symptoms across a 
range of disorders, including generalised anxiety disorder, unipolar depression, specific 
phobia and panic disorder, amongst others (Mansell, Harvey, Watkins, & Shafran, 2008). 
While the content of the attentional bias varies according the specific disorder, the process 
remains the same. Similarly, cognitive biases identified in CFS may also be occurring in 
other chronic conditions. For example, CFS shares similar cognitive and behavioural 
features to irritable bowel syndrome and fibromyalgia (Deary, et al., 2007). If research in 
CFS establishes that cognitive biases are maintaining some of these shared cognitions 
and behaviours, it may be worthwhile exploring whether cognitive biases also maintain 
similar cognitions and behaviours in these other conditions.  
 
9.4 Limitations  
The limitations of individual studies are discussed within the relevant chapters. Here I 
will discuss the limitations of the research programme as a whole. 
 
9.4.1 Reliability and validity of the experimental tasks  
Both the strengths and limitations of this research largely hinge on the validity and 
reliability of the experimental paradigms employed. In the following section, I will 
discuss each of the experimental tasks in turn and consider whether these paradigms were 





per the study design); or whether alternative paradigms would have offered a more 
reliable measure. 
 
The Attention Network Task (Fan, et al., 2005; Fan, et al., 2002) was chosen to measure 
attentional control as it had been used previously in CFS populations and consistently 
identified deficits in attentional control, when compared to healthy individuals (Hou, et 
al., 2014; Togo, et al., 2015). The studies in this thesis corroborate these findings (Chapter 
5 and 6). Furthermore, a test of repeated measurement of the ANT found that scores 
remain robust even after 10 sessions (Ishigami & Klein, 2010). Thus, the pre post deign 
of this research should not be problematic for the ANT. This adds validity to finding of 
improved attentional control over the course of treatment (Chapter 8).  
 
The ambiguous recognition task developed by Mathews and Mackintosh (2000) was 
chosen as the measure of interpretation biases. This task measures ‘off-line’ 
interpretations of ambiguity which are made at more elaborate stages of processing, rather 
than spontaneous ‘automatic’ interpretations that are assessed by ‘online-tasks’ (see 
Chapters 3 and 4 for a discussion of offline and online IB tasks). An off-line task was 
chosen as the systematic review (Chapter 3) had indicated that interpretation biases were 
more likely to occur in CFS at these more elaborative stages of processing. The 
ambiguous scenarios task was the clear choice of off-line interpretation bias tasks as it 
has been the most widely used (Hirsch, et al., 2016b). However, it is difficult to compare 
studies that have used this task given that the integral content of the task is adapted 
according to the population of interest. Within this thesis, the careful structuring of the 
interpretation bias materials to tap into illness-relevant concerns yet remain ambiguous, 
led to the detection of interpretation biases across two CFS populations (UK and Dutch) 





two time points, pre- and post-treatment (Chapter 7). This may indicate that treatments 
did not change interpretation biases, or this may indicate a methodological issue of 
repeated measurement. Whilst different sets of data were presented to each participant, at 
each time point, they may have surmised from their first testing session what the task was 
about, which may have influenced how they responded to the task the second time around. 
Furthermore, there may be an issue with creating simple change scores on this task. There 
were large standard deviations in both pre and post treatment interpretation bias scores, 
indicating that there was large heterogeneity in how people responded to the 
interpretation bias task at both time points. Creating simple change scores results in a 
summation of measurement errors and may have obscured any change over time. Test-
retest designs and larger studies that assess reliability over time are needed to resolve 
these issues. 
 
A modified version of the Visual Probe Task (MacLeod, et al., 2002) measured 
attentional biases and attentional malleability in this thesis. The VPT was chosen as it has 
been used extensively to assess attentional biases in a variety of populations, including 
CFS (Hadwin & Richards, 2016; Hou, et al., 2012; Hou, et al., 2014); and more recently 
has been used to measure attentional malleability (Clarke, et al., 2008; Clarke, et al., 
2012). Using this paradigm allows direct comparisons with these studies. However, 
questions have been looming regarding the reliability and validity of the VPT (e.g. Mogg 
& Bradley, 1999). Indeed the VPT has been described as unreliable to detect attentional 
biases in non-clinical samples (Schmukle, 2005) and exhibiting only modest reliability in 
test-retest designs (Britton, et al., 2013; Price, et al., 2015). Nevertheless, the VPT 
remains the most widely used measure of attentional bias to date. Alternative paradigms 
have been proposed, such as visual search task (e.g., Rinck, Becker, Kellermann, & Roth, 





2012; Fashler & Katz, 2016; Price, Greven, Siegle, Koster, & De Raedt, 2016a; Wieser, 
Pauli, Weyers, Alpers, & Mühlberger, 2009; Yang, et al., 2013), and EEG measures such 
as steady-state evoked potentials (Wieser & Keil, 2014; Wieser, McTeague, & Keil, 
2011; Wieser, Miskovic, Rausch, & Keil, 2014). However, few validation studies of these 
paradigms have been conducted, and as yet, they have not been definitively established 
as superior to the VPT (Cisler, Bacon, & Williams, 2009). Thus, it seems that whilst the 
VPT may not be ideal, it offered the most straightforward and comparable assessment of 
attentional biases at the time.  
 
However, the use of the VPT task inherently limits the conclusions from the data. The 
VPT does not assess attention as the continuous and dynamic process that it is. Rather it 
assesses attention at a ‘snap-shot’ in time; assuming that the quicker this ‘snap’ is taken 
the more ‘automatic’ the process it reflects; i.e. stimuli presented <500ms representing 
more automatic processing, and >500ms representing later stages of processing. It is 
unclear whether the 500ms snap of attentional bias in this research is indicative of biases 
at early or later stages of processing. Furthermore, the VPT cannot tell us about the 
deployment of attention during this window of time. It might be that attention is deployed, 
maintained or re-arranged in different ways during this 500ms period; and certain phases 
may be important in distinct ways in the development and maintenance of attentional 
biases. For instance, an eye tracking study in chronic pain not only confirmed the overall 
attentional bias towards pain related information, but also contributed novel data pointing 
to a pattern of late-phase attentional hypervigilance to injury-related pictures (Fashler & 
Katz, 2016). Additionally, employing eye-tracking technology to measure these variables 






9.4.2 Study design issues   
The study design limits the conclusions of the data. The lack of clinical control group 
across the studies means it is not certain that these cognitive biases are unique to CFS. 
Perhaps they are an effect of having a chronic illness more generally. From the cross-
sectional data in Chapter 5, it seems cognitive biases in this CFS sample were not 
influenced by chronicity (measured as duration of illness); however there may be some 
methodological issues with its measurement, which will be discussed shortly. 
Furthermore, the lack of comparison group in the follow-up studies (Chapter 7 and 
Chapter 8) means that we do not know how cognitive biases and attentional control 
change over the natural course of time. Perhaps improvements would have also occurred 
in an untreated sample; thus revealing that effects are not attributable to treatment. Future 
studies should include a clinical wait-list control group and further explore the 
comparable fluctuations and rigidity of cognitive biases in clinical and healthy 
populations.  
 
There are also a number of unmeasured, potentially confounding variables to consider, 
such as intelligence, cognitive ability and medications, omitted in these studies. For 
example, the use of certain medications, such as anticholinergic drugs (e.g. 
benzodiazepine), may have had an impact on an individuals’ cognitive ability and thus 
influenced their performance on the cognitive tasks. This study did not assess the use of 
medications, though it is likely that some patients would have been on certain 
anticholinergic drugs, such as benzodiazepines and doxepin, for the treatment of 
comorbid anxiety and/or depression (respectively). For these people the short stimuli 
presentation duration in the VPT (500ms) and the requirement to recall the 10 ambiguous 
scenarios presented in the recognition task, may have been more difficult; thus, their 





appropriate data handling should have negated this potential issue; across all the tasks 
only correct responses were analysed, participants with less than 90% accuracy rate were 
excluded, and reaction time data for responses <200ms and >2000ms were excluded.  
 
Intelligence may also be important to consider in future studies employing cognitive tasks 
in CFS. In particular, the ANT measure of attentional control, has been related to fluid 
intelligence- the reasoning and problem-solving component of executive functioning 
(Unsworth, Fukuda, Awh, & Vogel, 2014). The only proxy of intelligence in these studies 
was ‘years in education’, which was equivalent in the CFS and healthy population 
reported in the cross-sectional study (Chapter 5). Furthermore, ‘years in education’ did 
not correlate with scores on the ANT. However, ‘years in education’ is a poor proxy of 
fluid intelligence. Future studies should consider including measures such as the 
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (Wechsler, 2014), to assess whether responses to 
cognitive tasks in CFS is affected by general intelligence.  
 
Another limitation is this research is that the CFS samples consisted mainly of women. 
Though this is representative of the male to female ratio in CFS (Bakken, et al., 2014; 
Buchwald, et al., 1994; Cho, et al., 2009; Nacul, et al., 2011; Prins, et al., 2006; 
Skapinakis, et al., 2003), it may have biased our results. For example, Keogh, Hamid, 
Hamid, and Ellery (2004) found that women had an increased tendency to negatively 
interpret sensations, compared to men, which was related to greater negative pain 
responses. In this thesis, the finding of interpretation biases in CFS samples (Chapter 5 
and Chapter 6) may have been due to the CFS samples consisting of mostly women. Men 
with CFS may have different patterns of interpretation. Studies with larger samples sizes 
and equal numbers of men and women should assess whether there are gender differences 






A key strength of this study was the inclusion of those with a clear diagnosis of CFS. All 
participants met the CDC 1994 diagnostic criteria (Fukuda, et al., 1994), which was 
confirmed by a consultant psychiatrist or experienced cognitive behavioural therapist and 
confirmed by meeting cut offs of fatigue and functioning of the Chalder Fatigue Scale 
(Chalder, et al., 1993) and SF-36 (McHorney, et al., 1994) (respectively). However, the 
recruitment of participants from specialist CFS treatment centres may have biased the 
sample. For instance, those willing to attend treatment centres which offer psychological 
and behavioural treatment for CFS (i.e. CBT and GET), are less likely to have fixed 
biological illness attributions, and are at least open to the idea of psychological 
components (Chew-Graham, Brooks, Wearden, Dowrick, & Peters, 2011). It is likely that 
people with very fixed beliefs about the biological cause of the illness, would not have 
attended such a treatment service and therefore will not have been included in this 
research. Perhaps those with more fixed illness beliefs also have stronger cognitive 
biases. For instance, studies have shown that the more fixed and somatic beliefs about the 
cause of the illness the more evasive of physical activity people are (Chalder, Power, & 
Wessely, 1996; Vercoulen, et al., 1998). In an attempt to avoid further injury and be alert 
to symptoms people may have also developed habitual cognitive biases for salient, 
illness-related information. Future studies should assess illness attributions and beliefs 
(e.g. Illness-Perception Questionnaire-Revised, Moss-Morris, et al., 2002) to assess 
whether these factors predict or interact with how people with CFS attend to and interpret 
information.  
 
Another potential bias within the CFS samples was the particularly long mean length of 
illness duration reported. This may be linked to the fact that participants were recruited 





range of demographic and disease characteristics. Additionally, the wording of this 
question was somewhat ambiguous (‘How long have you had CFS?’). It may have been 
that some participants answered this question in relation to how long they have had 
experienced symptoms of CFS, whereas other answered how long since they had received 
a diagnosis. Unfortunately, data was not available for the mean length of illness within 
the Dutch CFS population reported in the cross-cultural study in Chapter 56. Illness 
duration is important as it might be argued that people who have had CFS for some time 
have become preoccupied with their illness, and these biases develop or are further 
embedded over time. Though duration of illness did not influence the results in the cross-
sectional study (Chapter 5) it would be worth exploring whether chronicity; measured 
both in terms of symptom duration and time since diagnosis, has a role to play in the 
expression of cognitive biases in CFS.  
 
Another consideration is the type of onset of CFS. For instance, DeLuca, Johnson, Ellis, 
and Natelson (1997) found differences in neuropsychological tests in those with sudden 
versus gradual onset of CFS. Those with sudden onset had more severe impairment in 
memory than the gradual onset CFS group. Supporting these findings is a twin study 
(Claypoole, et al., 2007); which found twins with sudden illness onset demonstrated 
slowed information processing speed compared with those with gradual onset. These 
findings suggest the mode of illness onset impacts cognitive processes in CFS. The 
studies in this thesis did not assess the type of illness onset. It would be interesting to 
examine whether those with different illness onsets had differing cognitive biases, 
characteristics or deficits and whether these factors influence the illness trajectory.  
 
Importantly, a major limitation of these studies is the relatively small sample sizes. Whilst 





n=52; health controls, n=50) and the sample size of the Dutch cohort in (Chapter 6) 
(n=36) represent average sample sizes for experimental data, these samples were still too 
small to explore the effects of heterogeneity within CFS. The samples sizes of the follow-
up studies (Chapter 7, n=26; Chapter 8, n=20) are at particular risk of Type II error. Future 
research, with larger, stratified samples should explore the heterogeneity of cognitive 
processes in CFS. 
 
9.5 Future avenues for research  
This thesis has provided a new and encouraging line of experimental research within CFS. 
However, several questions posed in this thesis need further clarification. Most of these 
issues have been addressed within limitations section; however, I will provide a brief 
summary in the next section ‘unanswered questions’. Furthermore, the current research 
has generated an array of new questions for future research to consider. I will outline 
these under the heading ‘new questions’, alongside suggestions as to how these might be 
addressed in future research.  
 
9.5.1 Unanswered questions 
Firstly, as previously discussed, we cannot be certain that the cognitive biases in attention 
and interpretation are unique to CFS. They may represent an effect of having a chronic, 
disabling condition more generally. Studies should compare cognitive biases in CFS to 
other chronically ill groups, with comparative levels of disability and illness duration. 
Secondly, the correlations between cognitive biases and cognitive and behavioural 
responses to symptoms, while indicative of important relationships between these 
variables cannot tell us about the direction or causality of these relationships. Further 
longitudinal, studies with multiple time points, employing mediation and moderation 





Computerized cognitive bias modification techniques (CBM) (discussed in Chapter 7 and 
Chapter 8) offer the methods to assess the causal/ maintaining role of cognitive biases in 
CFS. If cognitive biases have a maintaining role in CFS, the logic goes that modifying 
the bias would alleviate symptoms. Thus, utilizing CBM techniques could help establish, 
firstly whether biases in CFS are modifiable and secondly whether they are maintaining 
some core aspects of CFS.  
 
To address the issues within the longitudinal data (Chapter 7 and Chapter 8) i.e. the small 
sample size and lack of control group, large randomized control trails (RCT) are required. 
RCT’s should compare people with CFS in treatment and on a wait list to healthy controls 
and other chronic illness groups in order to build a comprehensive picture of how these 
biases operate in different groups and further establish the specificity of these biases in 
CFS. Longitudinal data with these groups can establish how cognitive biases and 
attentional control deficits change over the natural course of time and how stable these 
processes are in healthy populations. Multiple time points would allow mediation analysis 
to explore whether these biases are important for treatment outcomes.  
 
9.5.2 New questions  
This thesis raises a number of interesting lines of inquiry. Firstly, while this research can 
conclude that people with CFS have biased interpretations at later stages of processing 
(off-line), we do not know whether people also show biased interpretations at earlier, 
more spontaneous levels of processing (on-line). To date only one study in CFS has 
explored this possibility, with null findings (Martin & Alexeeva, 2010). Whilst this study 
had a high quality rating (15/16) in the systematic review (Chapter 4), the methodology 
could perhaps have been improved. The study used an online lexical decision task, 





prime target words. The authors did not provide the list of stimuli, so the extent to which 
these words tapped into core, illness-related concerns is unclear. However, I would argue 
that there are very few homophones that represent concerns specific to CFS; and of the 
few that do, one use of the word is typically more common. Perhaps for people to make 
illness-related inferences in CFS, more contextual information is required. An ‘on-line’ 
task that is able to achieve this and circumvent the single word issue, is the speeded lexical 
decision task (Hirsch & Mathews, 2000). In this task, participants read a passage of text, 
which is ambiguous but has the potential for a threatening interpretation, e.g., being 
interviewed for a job. At critical points in the text participants are required to make a 
speeded response to resolve the ambiguity, e.g., ‘As the interviewer asks the first 
question, you realise that all your presentation will be…’, participants respond to possible 
targets, ‘useful’ or ‘forgotten’. Quicker responding to threatening resolutions indicates an 
on-line, spontaneous negative interpretation bias. Such a design could be adapted for use 
with CFS participants to assess online inferences.  
 
The current research assessed attention and interpretation biases in isolation, using 
distinct tasks that do not lend themselves to comparison. However, numerous theories 
suggest that attention and interpretation biases should be correlated (Everaert, et al., 2012; 
Pincus & Morley, 2001). The paradigms used to assess these biases were not appropriate 
to test this hypothesis. In order to do so, tasks are needed which use similar materials 
across cognitive tasks and simultaneously assess these processes, in order to reduce the 
error variance associated with different experimental tasks (Butler, et al., 2015; Everaert, 
Tierens, Uzieblo, & Koster, 2013; Hirsch, et al., 2006; Todd, Sharpe, Colagiuri, & 
Khatibi, 2016; Todd, et al., 2015; White, Suway, Pine, Bar-Haim, & Fox, 2011a). Future 
studies should employ such techniques to explore whether one bias precedes or predicts 






Another methodological consideration for future studies is whether cognitive biases occur 
for somatosensory information. Theoretical models postulate that an increased attention 
towards internal somatic cues and misattribution (interpretation bias) of internal sensory 
information, are key factors in driving CFS (Knoop, et al., 2010; Meeus & Nijs, 2007; 
Moss-Morris, Deary, & Castell, 2013; Nijs, et al., 2012; Vercoulen, et al., 1998). 
However, developing experimental methods to assess biases for these types of stimuli is 
clearly challenging. In pain studies, fear-conditioning paradigms have assessed 
attentional biases towards anticipatory pain (i.e. electric shock) (Van Damme, et al., 2006; 
Van Damme, et al., 2004b) and pain-relevant body locations (Bulcke, Van Damme, 
Durnez, & Crombez, 2013; Van Damme, et al., 2016). In these paradigms, pain stimulus 
(i.e. an electric shock) is paired with a cue. The degree to which participants subsequently 
respond to that cue is indicative of their attentional vigilance for the anticipated pain (i.e. 
electric shock). Employing such designs in CFS is likely to be more difficult. Not only is 
real-life fatigue difficult to experimentally induce (Caseras, et al., 2008) but furthermore, 
fatigue itself is heterogeneous in CFS; for example some people experience 
predominantly post-exertional malaise whereas others may report more mental fatigue 
and concentration problems (Hickie, et al., 1995). Researchers should consider how best 
to develop and adapt paradigms in order to assess cognitive biases for internal bodily 
sensations. Methodologies such as monitoring internal heart rate variability (Beaumont, 
et al., 2012) and eye-tracking (Fashler & Katz, 2016; Yang, et al., 2013) may provide 
fruitful avenues for further study. 
 
Turning to the relatively new concept of attentional malleability, the findings of the 
predictive study in Chapter 7 adds credence to research on attentional malleability to date 





that of Fox, et al. (2011) in measuring malleability both towards and away from threat  
and supported the ‘plasticity account’ (Clarke, et al., 2008; Clarke, et al., 2012); which 
proposes that individual differences in the readiness to adopt an attentional bias (either 
towards or away from threat), is associated with individual differences in response to 
treatment. However, it is still unclear, from the previous anxiety literature and the current 
CFS data, whether clinical populations have poorer attentional malleability compared to 
healthy individuals.  Studies need to establish what constitutes ‘good’ attentional 
malleability; and secondly the genetic, psychological and behavioural characteristics that 
define it. Research into attentional malleability is just beginning. Thus far, it seems to be 
a promising construct, warranting further investigation across disorders. Fox, et al. (2011) 
associated attentional malleability with a genetic marker, they termed the ‘plasticity 
gene’. It would be interesting to explore the interaction between this genetic marker of 
malleability with environmental variables, in prospective and longitudinal studies. Such 
analyses could shed significant light on how, when and for whom cognitive biases 
develop and under what circumstances these biases become a problem (e.g. maintaining 
some form of distress). In CFS, for instance it would be interesting to consider whether 
this ‘plasticity gene’ might make some people more vulnerable to developing CFS after 
an adverse experience, such as glandular fever.  
 
9.6 Potential clinical implications 
This research has identified that people with CFS have illness-specific attention and 
interpretation biases, which have some relationships with unhelpful responses to 
symptoms. The next step is to assess whether these biases play a role in maintaining core 
aspects of CFS. Cognitive bias modification techniques (CBM; introduced in Chapter 2, 
section 2.3.3; and further discussed in Chapter 5, Chapter 7 and Chapter 8) offer an 





single protocol for CBM and CBM studies are not always successful in modifying 
cognitive biases (Cristea, et al., 2015; Hakamata, et al., 2010; Hallion & Ruscio, 2011; 
Menne-Lothmann, et al., 2014; Mogg & Bradley, 2016; Mogoaşe, et al., 2014; Pool, et 
al., 2016). At this point, work is needed to establish (i) whether cognitive biases in CFS 
are modifiable via CBM (ii) the optimal conditions that elicit change in cognitive biases. 
Having conducted this basic research, CBM procedures could be adapted for CFS 
populations, following similar material development procedures outlined in Chapter 3. 
CBM could then be utilized to test the potentially maintaining role of cognitive biases in 
CFS.  
 
Should CBM establish a maintaining role of these biases in CFS, there may be clinical 
utility in further developing CBM for CFS, as an additional therapeutic tool. Though 
CBM techniques are in their relative infancy, they have shown promise at reducing 
symptoms in clinical populations (e.g. anxiety) (Hakamata, et al., 2010) and can be an 
effective adjunct to conventional forms of psychological interventions (Williams, et al., 
2013). In CFS, CBM techniques may provide a useful ‘add-on’ for those individuals for 
whom cognitive biases are a problem (i.e., maintaining some cores aspects of the 
condition). However, work is needed before CBM can be considered a treatment. In its 
current form CBM training is time consuming and relatively unengaging (Beard, et al., 
2012) and we do not yet know the feasibility or acceptability of delivering CBM in the 
‘real world’ (Beard, 2011).  
 
9.7 Conclusions 
This research programme illustrates the promising application of experimental research 
in CFS. The studies identified that people with CFS have illness-specific processing 





treatment. Importantly, this research identified that these processes are amenable to 
change, and furthermore, the degree of change in these processes, was associated with 
the adoption of more adaptive response to symptoms. Studies in other illness groups have 
shown that altering these processes through more direct techniques (e.g. CBM) can have 
positive impacts on other biological, emotional and behavioural factors. Similarly, 
enhancing adaptive cognitive processing, such as positive interpretation biases and more 
flexible attention allocation, may provide beneficial intervention targets in CFS. 
 
Cognitive processing forms only one component of the CB model of CFS and, alongside 
cognitive and behavioural factors, other biological and psychosocial factors play key 
roles. Research should begin to explore how these diverse components interact with one 
another and how these interactions vary for each individual. Continued research efforts to 
understand a range of factors preceding, precipitating and perpetuating CFS, that employ a 
range of methodologies, can help identify the most effective and appropriate targets for 
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Appendix A. Detailed Comparison of CFS Case Definitions 
Table 6 Comparison of case definitions for CFS/ ME 
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* Postexertional immune disorder (PENE) as defined by Carruthers, et al., (2011) is a pathological inability to produce sufficient energy on demand with prominent 
symptoms primarily in the neuroimmune regions. Characteristics are as follows: 
 1. Marked, rapid physical and/or cognitive fatigability in response to exertion, which may be minimal such as activities of daily living or simple mental tasks, can be 
debilitating and cause a relapse. 
 2. Postexertional symptom exacerbation:e.g.acute flu-like symptoms, pain and worsening of other symptoms. 
 3. Postexertional exhaustion may occur immediately after activity or be delayed by hours or days. 
 4. Recovery period is prolonged, usually taking 24 h or longer. A relapse can last days, weeks or longer. 







Appendix B. Questionnaire Pack 
 
List of Questionnaire Pack Materials 
Participants completed the following self-report measures:  
1. Demographics questions (including questions on employment) 
2. Chalder Fatigue Scale (Chalder et al., 1993) 
3. SF-36 Physical functioning scale (Ware et al., 1994) 
4. Work and Social adjustment scale (Mundt et al., 2002) 
5. Cognitive Flexibility scale (Martin and Rubin, 1995) 
6. Cognitive Behavioural Responses Questionnaire (Spence, Moss-Morris & 
Chalder, 2004) 
7. Beliefs about emotions scale (Rimes and Chalder, 2007) 
8. Hospital Anxiety and Depression scale (Zigmond and Snaith, 1983) 
9. Attention Control Scale (ACS)  (Derryberry and Reed 2002) 
























































































Appendix C. Visual Probe Task Materials  
 
Two sets of materials were developed for the Visual Probe Task (MacLeod, et al., 1986). 
Stimuli appeared on screen as per Figure 6below. 
 
 
Figure 6 Trial on the Visual Probe Task 
Practice Stimuli (16 trials) 
apex  duet 
whirl  zooms 
cheese planes 
watches  storing 
accurate  variable 
extrinsic  countable 
matchstick  shortbread 
teal gilt 
elect  debut 
binary animal 
strands  sprayed 
cellular tropical 
scrapbook  fountain 
typewriter  sandwiches 
quiz  lace 

















Stimuli for the main task  
(two sets of 12 matched word pairs) 
Illness related words Neutral Words 
Set 1. Set 1. 
bedridden buttercup 
collapse  transmit 
immobilised  calligraphy 
fatigue pockets 
exhausted  messenger 
disabled  calendar 
drained pitched 
limited  created 
aches  domes 
anxious  whistle 
Incapacitated infinitesimal 
painful  trumpet 
Illness Related Words Neutral Words 
Set 2 Set 2 
impaired  polished 
restricted  newspapers 
debilitating  articulation 
housebound  grapevines 
weak  zone 
powerless  triangles 
unwell  russet 
frustrated  settlement 
tired  brief 
disheartened  stewardesses 
feeble inland 







Appendix D. Ambiguous Scenarios Recognition Task Materials 
The task 
This interpretative bias task is based on the assessment phase of Mackintosh & Mathews 
(2000) interpretative bias (IB) re-training task. A title is present on screen followed by a 
short scenario (4 lines of text) describing an ambiguous scenario. This is followed by a 
comprehension question. Participants are then asked to rate how pleasant or unpleasant 
the imagined scenarios was; 1 = extremely unpleasant, to 9 = extremely pleasant.  
Later, after the participant has read all 10 scenarios they are presented with a ‘recognition 
test’. The titles of the scenarios are present in sequential order and the participant is asked 
to rate four statements in terms of how similar they are to the original text. Instructions 
were ‘how similar is this sentence to the original description you read?’ Ratings were 
from 1=very different in meaning, to 4 =very similar in meaning. The statements contain 
a positive interpretation, a negative interpretation as well as positive and negative foils. 
The order of the four statements are randomized for each ‘recognition test’. 
In the following examples:   
1. Positive interpretation  
2. Negative interpretation  
3. Positive foil (this is positive false information and is not a true interpretation of the 
text; if it is consistently endorsed it shows a general bias for any positive information) 
4. Negative foil (again this is false information and is not a true interpretation of the text; 
if it is consistently endorsed it shows a general bias for any negative information) 
 
For this project 3 material sets were developed as it was anticipated that CFS participants 
would be tested on 3 occasions; pre-treatment, mid-treatment and post-treatment. 
However, due to practicality issues the mid-treatment assessment was dropped. 
Participants received two different sets of IB materials on two occasions; pre-treatment 
and post-treatment. Set of materials were randomized to avoid any potential order effects 
should one set of materials produce. Materials were developed to tap into key themes 






On a beautiful sunny day, you decided to do some gardening. You spent most of the day 
weeding. A week later you’re looking at the garden and think about how you felt after 
your last gardening session.  
Did you plant rose bushes?   
1. You remember how satisfying if felt to have the garden looking good.  
2. You remember how stiff and sore you felt for a number of days afterwards. 
3. You completed the gardening much quicker than you expected.   







Title: Phone Conversation with a Friend 
You are chatting to a friend on the phone who you haven’t spoken to in quite some time. 
You have a lot to catch up on and the conversation lasts almost an hour. A few weeks 
later you have a missed call from your friend and you think about how you felt after the 
last phone call with them. 
Did a miss a call from a friend? 
1. You had a nice conversation and your friend had a lot to say.  
2. You had problems following the conversation, as your concentration is poor. 
3. You had a lovely lunch with your friend and chatted for hours. 
4. Your friend rudely interrupted you in order to end the phone call.  
 
Set 3 
Title: Babysitting for your niece and nephew 
Last week you babysat your niece and nephew and played games with them for hours. 
The following week your sibling calls and asks for a favour. They ask if you would be 
able to babysit for the afternoon. You think about how you felt after babysitting last week. 
Did you play games with the children? 
1. You remember how much you enjoyed playing with the children. 
2. You remember how exhausted you were by the end of the day. 
3. You remember how excited the children were to go out for dinner.   





Title: Weekend Break  
You and your partner booked to go on a weekend break. You stayed for 2 nights and 
fitted a lot in. You ended up doing a lot of sightseeing around the city. As you travel home 
you think about how you found the weekend.  
Did you go on a break with a friend?  
1. You had an enjoyable and interesting weekend.  
2. You found the weekend exhausting.  
3. Your partner booked the holiday as a surprise.   
4. You had to come home from the holiday early.  
 
Set 2: 
Title: Cleaning the House 
Last week you spent a day cleaning the house. you hoovered all the carpets in the house 
and mopped the kitchen floor. A week later you notice the carpets are dirty and need 
hoovered again. You think about how you felt after the last time you cleaned. 
 Q. Did you clean the windows? 
1. You felt pleased with how nice the house looked after cleaning.  
2. You felt stiff and painful for days as you pushed your body too far. 
3. You completed the cleaning quicker than you had expected. 







Title: Team Away Day 
You have a new boss at work and they have arranged a team away day.  The day involved 
a lot of team building activities, which required your attention and concentration. As you 
travel home you think about how you found the activities.  
Did you go away for a weekend?  
1. You found the team building activities engaging.  
2. You found it difficult keeping up with all the activities.  
3. You led your team to victory in most of the activities. 





Title: Cleaning the Windows 
You decide to clean inside the windows today. You finish cleaning the windows 
downstairs quicker than you expected and move on to clean the upstairs windows. While 
climbing the stairs your notice how your shoulders and arms feel.  
Did you clean the inside windows?   
1. Your shoulders and arms feel like they have had a good workout.   
2. Your shoulders and arms feel stiff and painful after over doing things.   
3. You cleaned both the inside and outside windows quicker than expected.   
4. You fell off a ladder after cleaning the outside windows. 
 
Set 2. 
Title: Moving House 
You are moving house and have been packing up boxes all day. By the end of the day 
you have all your items boxed and ready for the move tomorrow. You go to bed that night 
and know how you will feel in the morning.  
Are you moving house tomorrow? 
1. You feel excited to move into the new house. 
2. You feel stiff and painful after overdoing things. 
3. Your friend helped you with your packing. 
4. You had to delay the move, as you were ill. 
 
Set 3. 
Title: The morning of the holiday  
Tomorrow you are going on holiday for a week. You have had a very busy day packing 
and getting things organized. You set your alarm for the next morning for your flight. 
You go to bed that night knowing how you will feel when the alarm goes off in the 
morning.   
Did you set your alarm for the morning?   
1. When the alarm goes off you will feel excited about the holiday.   





3. You don't need to set an alarm because you will wake up early anyway.  




Theme: Catastrophizing  
Title: Walking the neighbour’s dog 
Your neighbour has asked you to walk their dog while they are away on holiday. The 
dog needs to be walked in the morning and you have been enjoying this activity the last 
few days. This morning you wake up feeling exhausted. You think about how you will 
feel if you walk the dog.    
Have you been asked to look after the neighbour’s plants? 
1. You will feel refreshed after the walk.  
2. Your health will suffer if you walk the dog.  
3. You jump out of bed to walk the dog.  
4. You haven’t been able to walk the dog for the last few days.  
 
Set 2: 
Title: Walking to Work 
For the last few weeks, you have been walking to work rather than getting the bus. You 
have been enjoying this short walk and find it refreshing. This morning you wake up 
feeling physically worn-out. You think about how you will feel if you walk to work. 
Did you previously get the train to work? 
1. You think you will feel refreshed after the walk. 
2. You know you will feel worse after pushing yourself too much. 
3. You decide to jog to work instead of walk. 
4. You decide to call in sick to work as you are too ill to go in.  
 
Set 3 
Title: Grocery Shopping 
You have spent the afternoon shopping and bought some groceries.  You carry the bags 
of shopping home which are quite heavy. By the time you get home you feel drained. 
You manage to go to bed early and know how you will feel in the morning.  
Did you carry the shopping home?  
1. In the morning you will feel refreshed after getting an early night.  
2. In the morning your muscles will hurt and you will be exhausted.  
3. When you get home you make dinner and watch television.  
4. When you get home you fall asleep on the sofa.  
 
Q.5 






Title: Falling asleep on the sofa 
You were extremely tired last night and fell asleep on the sofa.  You wake in the morning 
feeling uncomfortable. Your body and neck ache. You know how your body will feel 
when you get up.  
Did you fall asleep on the sofa?   
1. Your body will feel better once you have walked around and stretched.  
2. Your body will be in pain and you will be hardly able to walk.  
3. Your body will feel energized as you had a comfortable sleep in bed.   
4. Your body will be bruised as you fell off the sofa in your sleep.  
 
Set 2. 
Title: The Car Journey 
You are going to visit family who live a long drive away. As you sit in the passenger seat 
you fall asleep and when you wake up you have arrived at your destination. Your legs 
feel cramped and uncomfortable. You know how your legs will feel when you are out of 
the car. 
Did you fall asleep in the car? 
1. Your legs will feel better once you have walked around and stretched. 
2. Your legs will be painful and you will need to rest.  
3. Your legs will feel fine as you took plenty of breaks during the drive. 
4. Your legs will be bruised as you fell getting out of the car.  
 
Set 3 
Title Working on the computer 
You have spent the day doing some work on the computer. By the end of the day your 
eyes feel strained from staring at the computer screen. When you have finished your work 
you decide to close your eyes for half an hour. You know how your eyes will feel after 
your rest.  
Did you play games on the computer? 
1. Your eyes will feel better after a short rest. 
2. Your eyes will continue to feel heavy and tired. 
3. Your eyes do not need a rest as you took plenty of breaks. 
4. Your eyes feel strained as you did not wear your glasses. 
 
Q.6 
Theme: Catastrophizing  
Set 1 
Title: Public Transport   
You are running late for an appointment and have taken public transport to get there. 
When you arrive at the station you find the lifts and escalators are out of order. Passengers 
are advised to take the stairs or get off at the next stop for disabled access. You think 
about what will happen if you take the stairs. 
Are you running late for your appointment? 
1. You think the stairs will be effortful but quicker.  





3. You walk briskly to your appointment.  
4. You fainted on the train on the way to your appointment.  
 
Set 2 
Title: Stuck in Traffic 
You are running late for a meeting because you are stuck in traffic. You realize if you 
park the car here it would be a 30 minute walk to the building where your meeting is. 
You think about what would happen if you walked at a quick pace the whole way there.  
Have you taken a taxi to the meeting? 
1. You will make the meeting on time if you walk quickly. 
2. You would be too exhausted to attend the meeting if you walked. 
3. You will be on time for the meeting as the taxi driver knows a shortcut. 
4. You cancel the meeting as the car has broken down.  
 
Set 3 
Title: Rushing to get the train 
You are running late for your train. You arrive at the station with a few minutes to spare. 
The ticket inspector tells you that if you quickly climb the two flights of stairs to the 
platform you should be able to make the train on time. You know what will happen if you 
rush up the stairs.  
Are you in a hurry to get the train?  
1. If I run up the stairs you will be out of breath but will make the train.   
2. If I run up the stairs I will pay for it later. 
3. I have time to sit down and get a coffee in the train station.  





Title: The deadline  
You are working towards an important deadline for tomorrow and have quite a bit to get 
done today.  By the middle of the day you have got a lot of your work done however 
you have developed a headache so you take a pain killer tablet. You carry on working 
and you know how you will feel by the end of the day.  
Is the deadline today?   
1. By the end of the day you will feel pleased to have your work done.   
2. By the end of the day you will feel physically awful.   
3. You meet the deadline early and help a colleague with their work. 









You have had a very productive morning at work and have got a lot of jobs done. You 
take an hour lunch break and realize you have been rushing around all morning. You get 
ready to go back to work and think about how you will feel by the end of the day.  
Did you skip lunch? 
1. By the end of the day you will feel pleased to have achieved many of your jobs.  
2. By the end of the day you will feel physically drained from rushing around. 
3. By the end of the day you have met all your deadlines and are congratulated by your 
boss. 
4. By the end of the day you have developed a headache and decide to take tomorrow off.  
 
Set 3 
Title: Family in Town 
Some family are in town and you have arranged to spend the day with them. You have 
an enjoyable morning showing them the local attractions. You go for lunch together and 
realize you are quite tired from this morning’s activities. As you leave the café you think 
about how you will feel by the end of the day.  
Did you go to a café for lunch? 
1. You feel pleased to have shown them around. 
2. You feel physically exhausted from the day.  
3. You feel pleased that they stayed the night. 
4. You feel anxious that you have offended them. 
 
Q.8 
Theme: Misattribution of emotions and sensations 
Set 1 
Title: Walk with a friend  
You have arranged to go for a walk with a friend. You meet at the park and your friend 
suggests taking the longer and more scenic route around the lake. Some of the walk is 
uphill and as you climb up a particularly steep hill you notice your heart rate increase. 
It’s easy to know what that means.  
Did you walk around the lake? 
1. Your increased heart rate is a normal sign of exercise.  
2. Your increased heart rate is a sign you are over doing things.   
3. Your friend comments on how fit you are.   
4. As you climb the hill you slip and hurt your knee.   
 
Set 2 
Title:  New Neighbour  
A neighbour has recently moved in next door and they come over to introduce themselves. 
A few days later you bump into them in the local shop. You say hello but you have trouble 
remembering their name. You know why you can’t recall their name.  
Did you meet your neighbor in a shop? 
1. You can’t recall their name because you have only recently met them. 
2. You can’t recall their name due to your on-going memory problems. 
3. They reintroduce themselves and you have a long chat in the shop.  







Title: Market research interview        
You have agreed to do a telephone interview with a market research company.  The 
telephone interview lasts an hour. You have to think hard about some of your answers. 
When you get off the phone you reflect on how the interview went. 
Did the research company send out a survey?  
1. The interview was interesting and you had a lot to say.  
2. The interview was draining and you had problems with your memory.  
3. The interviewer thanks you for the best interview they have done.  
4. The interviewer abruptly tells you the interview took too long.  
  
Q.9 
Theme: Misattribution of emotions and sensations 
Set 1 
Title: Catching the Bus 
This morning you rush to get a bus on time and you don’t manage to have any breakfast. 
You just catch the bus, but suddenly notice you feel light headed and weak. You know 
why you are feeling like this.   
Did you have toast for breakfast?  
1. You feel light headed because you haven’t eaten. 
2. You feel weak and light headed because you over exerted yourself. 
3. You feel delighted to have bumped into a friend on the bus. 
4. You feel awful and end up missing the bus.  
 
Set 2 
Title: Going to bed after a busy day 
You have had a very busy day and have been on your feet a lot. You don’t get to bed until 
later than usual and when you lie down in bed you notice your body feels heavy and you 
sink into the mattress. You know why your body feels like this. 
Have you stayed up later than usual? 
1. Your body feels heavy because your muscles are relaxing.  
2. Your body feels heavy because you have over exerted yourself. 
3. You go to bed early and fall asleep immediately.  
4. You can’t sleep for hours and have to take a sleeping tablet.  
 
Set 3 
Title: The exercise class  
You have started going to a beginners exercise class once a week at your local leisure 
centre. After a month you feel fitter and decide to enroll in the intermediate class. After 
attending the first intermediate class you notice your arms and legs are sore. You think 
about what this means. 





1. Your limbs will be sore until you get used to your new exercise regime.  
2. You will be bed ridden for days as you have pushed your body too far. 
3. Your arms and legs feel stronger after a week of your new exercise regime.  




Theme:  Misattribution of emotions and sensations 
Set 1 
Title: The exercise regime  
You decide that you must start to exercise more.  For the next week you take a little more 
exercise each day. After several weeks, you are walking faster and further and decide to 
see how far you can push yourself, when you notice your breathing is laboured.  
Have you been exercising for several weeks?  
1. Walking faster and further than usual, you have to breathe harder and deeper.  
2. Pushing yourself too hard you cannot get enough air and can hardly breathe.   
3. Pushing yourself more than usual, you feel your walking is much easier . 
4. You push yourself so hard you strain a muscle and hurt yourself. 
 
Set 2. 
Title: At the Cinema 
You have gone to the cinema with a friend. Your friend picked the film and you do not 
find it particularly interesting. Half way through the film you notice you are finding it 
difficult to keep your attention on the story line. You know what this means. 
Did your friend pick the film? 
1.  You find the film boring and it does not hold your attention. 
2. Your problems with concentration mean you cannot follow the film. 
3. You enjoy the film immensely and are glad you chose it. 
4. You leave the film half way through as you find it offensive. 
 
Set 3: 
Title: Late night out 
Yesterday you attended your friend’s birthday party. You were having such a good time 
you ended up staying out later than you had planned. When you wake up in the morning 
you reflect on your decision to stay out late. 
Did you attend a family party? 
1. You are glad you stayed out as you had a good time.  
2. You regret staying late as you will now be in bed all day. 
3. You are delighted to have met so many new people at the party. 
4. You are very ill from the food at the dinner party. 
